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“There is no problem so complex that it cannot simply be blamed 
on the pilot.” 
Dr. Earl Weiner, Human Factors Society President. 
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Abstract 
The investigation and modelling of aviation accident causation is dominated by linear 
models. Aviation is, however, a complex system and as such suffers from being 
artificially manipulated into non-complex models and methods. This thesis addresses 
this issue by developing a new approach to investigating aviation accident causation 
through information networks. These networks centralise communication and the flow 
of information as key indicators of a system‟s health and risk. The holistic approach 
focuses on the system itself rather than any individual event. The activity and 
communication of constituent elements, both human and non-human agents, within 
that system is identified and highlights areas of system failure. 
The model offers many potential developments and some key areas are studied in this 
research. Through the centralisation of barriers and information nodes the method can 
be applied to almost any situation. The application of Bayesian mathematics to 
historical data populations provides scope for studying error migration and barrier 
manipulation. The thesis also provides application of these predictions to a flight 
simulator study in an attempt of validation. Beyond this the thesis also discusses the 
applicability of the approach to industry. Through working with a legacy airline the 
methods discussed are used as the basis for a new and forward-thinking safety 
management system. 
This holistic approach focuses on the system environment, the activity that takes place 
within it, the strategies used to conduct this activity, the way in which the constituent 
parts of the system (both human and non-human) interact and the behaviour required. 
Each stage of this thesis identifies and expands upon the potential of the information 
network approach maintaining firm focus on the overall health of a system. It is 
contended that through the further development and application of this approach, 
understanding of aviation risk can be improved. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 The field of “Human Factors” 
Human Factors encompasses a large area of study within the realm of engineering and 
design. The basic premise of the research in this area is to increase performance, and 
especially in the last two decades performance in increasingly complex socio-technical 
systems. 
Performance is a term that needs clarification due to its „catch all‟ nature. Simply to 
increase performance within a system does not tell us too much; rather performance 
may be increased through increasing two main factors: Safety and productivity. 
Increasingly these two factors are seen as mutually exclusive; indeed Reason (1997) 
revisits several times the idea that in the „battle‟ between productivity and protection of 
a system, it tends to be resolved in favour of the former due to the innate commercial 
nature of the areas where these systems exist e.g., Aviation, Rail, Nuclear, Chemical, 
Gas and Oil industries. This is not surprising in light of the discussions throughout 
Reason‟s book as a facet of human nature where increases in productivity have very 
positive results to individuals and to the collective but “by contrast, successful 
protection is indicated by absence of negative outcomes” (Reason, 1997, P.4). To 
management at all levels the former is indeed the more aspirational aim. In the system 
itself, however, these items are not at all exclusive; more so they are one and the 
same. As one is increasing the other by default will decrease but does not necessarily 
guarantee a negative. Rather, the level of „absence‟ noted by Reason is diminished.  
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Figure 1-1 - The „Battle‟ between performance characteristics within a system 
In light of this, Human Factors has a very important role to play when looking at 
accident causation and investigation. As technology has become more reliable over 
time so the role of the human in the system has started to become the „weak link‟ in a 
complex system, i.e., the human can act as pivotal between safety and productivity. 
There is nowhere more illustrative of this than the rapid development of aviation since 
its inception a century ago. For many years the accident rate was being reduced by 
increases in technological and industrial ability; the increase of structural integrity and 
reliability of the aircraft being flown and in particular the development of their 
propulsion, avionic and safety systems. However, in the last two decades, the serious 
accident rate1 in commercial aviation has remained relatively stable at approximately 
one per million departures (Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group, 2000) and, as the 
continual increases in reliability etc. do not appear to be moving the statistics from this 
equilibrium, the focus to reduce these figures still further has become the human 
involved. For this reason, the field of Human Factors has evolved to play a major role in 
aviation accident investigation and its sole aim as stated in ICAO Annexe 13; “…the 
prevention of accidents and incidents2.”  
The „accident pyramid‟ in Figure 1-2 was first developed by Heinrich (1930) and 
illustrates the comparable frequency of events in terms of magnitude. From this the 
human factors literature has developed comparisons with fatal accidents being the „tip 
of the iceberg‟ and attempts to control the events at the larger base of the triangle in 
order to reduce those at the upper levels. The lower level of „no-injury‟ accidents 
includes the largest group; that of „near-misses‟ which have become a larger and more 
                                               
1
 ICAO define a Serious accident as involving at least one serious injury/fatality, substantial 
damage or complete destruction of aircraft and fire (pre or post-crash) 
2
 The term “incident” is taken to include near-misses and non-fatal/lesser-damage occurrences 
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important part of safety systems recently whereas the very tip may signify fatal 
accidents and these thankfully have reduced over time. 
 
Figure 1-2 - Accident Pyramid (Adapted from Heinrich, 1930) 
This Human Factors evolution was primarily hinged around the term human error: the 
errors committed by the operator of the system that „caused‟ the accident or incident.  
The term Human Error itself has been well defined by Reason (1997) “as failure of 
planned actions to achieve their desired ends – without the intervention of some 
unforeseeable event.” This in itself limits the areas of interest to those which can be 
affected directly by humans and possibly those which are proximal enough to have 
remedial actions possible and immediately effective. It is within this field that this 
project is based. 
This thesis aims to address how we might go about improving the way in which we 
attempt to understand and investigate the complex world of aviation accidents and 
safety. More specifically this thesis explores the use of information networks to support 
improved risk mitigation. 
1.2 Objectives and aims of the thesis 
As highlighted above, and further discussed in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, 
the complexity of aviation accidents presents significant challenges both in academia 
and industry. Traditional models will be shown to be too linear that any representation 
of the real-world is artificial and limits usefulness. There needs to be a shift to 
understanding the system in which accidents (and equally normal-work events) take 
place rather than an improper emphasis on the end-result itself.  
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The thesis aims to address how information networks can be used to develop our 
understanding of complex system accidents and in particular those within the aviation 
domain. Through its focus on the system holistically and elements that are present 
within normal work, incidents and accidents it is hoped that artificial limitations are 
reduced and ultimately removed from risk mitigation methods.  
The aims of this thesis are three-fold. Firstly a new method is to be developed and 
tested that moves away from the linear models that currently dominate aviation 
risk investigation and reduction. Full and real understanding of the complex aviation 
domain can only truly be realised if the models used in investigation reflect the non-
linear complexities of the real world. 
Secondly, the thesis looks to incorporate general aviation and make any method 
usable within this part of aviation equally as well as within the more heavily studied and 
discussed commercial world. Any new method would need to be able to address the 
sometimes very different issues which underlie these aviation types. 
Thirdly, the thesis sets out to address whether there is a fundamental difference 
between accidents and incidents. Due to the reduction in aviation accidents, data 
are often not sufficient to develop system understanding. For this reason it would seem 
appropriate to turn to the more common incidents. However, it is important any method 
is able to cope with each type of event and does not preclude the use of incidents or 
oversimplify any relationship that they may have with actual aviation accidents. 
A singular method is sought, therefore, that can address all of these issues. Complex 
network models are central to the work within this thesis and their many facets 
investigated in order to determine their true value within the field. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis has been constructed so that it can be read from beginning to end by 
readers new to this specific subject area. An attempt has also been made to maintain a 
simple writing style to aid understanding and inclusiveness. Later chapters are also 
designed to be read individually for those readers interested in specific areas of the 
research. In order to aid in the reading of this thesis signposting is included at the 
beginning of each chapter and in other positions as required. Figure 1-3 illustrates the 
outline of the thesis and helps in maintaining the central themes expanded upon below. 
The themes developed in chapter 2 of the thesis, the literature review, are continued 
throughout the remaining chapters. In particular the central crux of this work is the 
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movement away from linear analysis of aviation events in chapters 3 to 8 (thesis aim). 
Chapters 3 and 4 identify information networks as a suitable tool to apply to aviation 
with the potential for integration with complex mathematics to provide both a qualitative 
and quantitative element (thesis aim). Chapters 5 and 6 build on the research and 
development from previous chapters in applying Bayesian mathematics to the 
information networks and testing this. In particular general aviation is the domain tested 
in order to provide a more comprehensive view of aviation that doesn‟t just centre on 
commercial operations (thesis aim). Chapter 7 then looks to firmly place the work in an 
industrial context (thesis aim) by working with a legacy airline and developing a brand 
new risk rating methodology based on a model consisting of networks. Finally chapter 
8 looks to tie up some loose ends, look at possible further work and conclude the 
central thread of the thesis. 
 
An overview of each chapter in slightly more detail is provided for the reader here: 
 
Chapter 2, Modelling a dynamic world – The thesis commences with a scene setting 
chapter that sets out to explain the development of accident investigation models to 
date. Some of the key issues associated with these models and ways of thinking are 
explained and the foundations for the aims of the thesis identified. 
 
Chapter 3, A complex approach to a complex scenario – In order to illustrate the 
usefulness of the information network approach, two polarised aircraft accident case 
studies are investigated with the technique. These case studies were selected as they 
illustrate two very different situations which led to very different events. It was 
considered important to show how applicable the method is to aviation accidents in 
their many guises. Each analysis, in this and subsequent chapters, may not be fully 
comprehensive on its own but throughout the thesis different aspects of the novel 
methodology are brought to the reader‟s attention and expanded upon. 
 
Chapter 4, Development of a study – In this chapter the methods of developing 
information networks into a more comprehensive and useful approach are investigated. 
The chapter aims to draw quantitative measures to work collaboratively with qualitative 
aspects of the information networks. Bayesian mathematics are introduced as a 
potentially powerful ally of information networks and this forms the basis for the 
subsequent two chapters. 
 
Chapter 5, Extending the potential of information networks; a Bayesian Approach – 
This chapter introduces the integration of Bayesian mathematics with the information 
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network approach. A program was written to allow for a network to be investigated and 
potential error migration calculated in a novel way. Central to this chapter is addressing 
the thesis aim of developing a method that can not only be applied to commercial 
aviation, as is so often the focus of safety management, but also to general aviation. 
For this reason, data from general aviation accidents is used to populate probability 
information networks and potential uses investigated. 
 
Chapter 6, Can we validate networks derived from incident data through simulation? A 
Pilot Study – Following on from the promising results of chapter 5, a flight simulator 
study was developed to validate the possible use and effectiveness of the Bayesian 
information network approach. Chapter 6 focuses on the planning and implementation 
of this flight simulator study together with statistical analysis of the resulting data. 
These data allow predictions of error migration to be tested and results discussed. 
Despite the study size being limited it is in the validation of the approach that the 
emphasis is on. 
 
Chapter 7, Incidents versus Accidents; an Industrial Study – A central tenet of this 
thesis is the applicability of any developed methodology to industry. The key to 
applicability in a domain that is suffering from the sheer number of complex and time-
consuming methods available is one that can be seen by industry to be of benefit and 
implementable. This chapter addresses these issues and reports on two years‟ work 
with an international legacy airline. The applicability of the information network 
approach to incidents and accidents allows for the development of a long-term plan to 
integrate the method into the airline‟s safety management system. Limitations of 
working in industry are also discussed and the past, present and future methods of risk 
management for the airline outlined. An interim method is tested against commercial 
aviation incident data to highlight the pertinence and usefulness of the approach. The 
method has now formed the core of the working practices of a new safety management 
system. 
 
Chapter 8, Conclusions  – the final chapter concludes the study with discussion of the 
aims and objectives. Areas for further research are also identified. 
 
 
©    Griffin, T. G. C.   Chapter 2 – Modelling a dynamic world 
 7 
 
Figure 1-3 - Project Pathway Diagram 
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2 Modelling a dynamic world 
 
2.1 Accident Causation Models 
As chapter one outlines, this project focuses on accident causation models and in 
particular their application to the field of Human Factors in aviation. In order to fully 
understand the current position and trends of accident causation modelling it is 
important to acknowledge the developments and history of the area and where there 
may be room for further investigation and work. This chapter aims to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the history and development of models and where 
opportunities and validation for this project arise. 
The next section begins with an aviation accident case study. This is then referred to at 
salient points of the chapter in order to maintain a rooted discussion. It is appropriate to 
look at the history of accident investigation models by way of illustrating them with a 
contemporary accident case study. 
2.2 Runway Overrun at Bangkok (QF1) 
At about 2247 local time on 23rd September 1999, a Qantas Boeing 747-438 aircraft 
registered VH-OJH (callsign Qantas One, enroute from Sydney to London) overran 
runway 21 Left (21L) while landing at Bangkok (Don Mueang) International Airport, 
Thailand. The aircraft landed long and aquaplaned due to the runway being affected by 
water following very heavy rain. 
The first officer was the handling pilot for the flight. The crew elected to use the „normal‟ 
company practice configuration for the approach and at various stages during the 
approach to runway 21L, the crew were informed by air traffic control that although 
there was a thunderstorm and heavy rain at the airport, visibility was 4 km (or greater). 
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At 2244:53, the tower controller advised that the runway was wet and that a preceding 
aircraft (which landed at approximately 2240) reported that braking action was „good‟. 
As the aircraft descended through the 200ft point, it started to deviate above the 3.15 
degree glideslope, passing over the runway threshold at 169 kts at a height of 76 ft. 
Those parameters were within company limits but both high and fast. When the aircraft 
was approximately 10 ft above the runway, the captain instructed the first officer to go 
around. As the first officer advanced the engine thrust levers, the aircraft‟s main-wheels 
touched down and the captain immediately cancelled the go-around by retarding the 
thrust levers, without announcing his actions. This resulted in confusion amongst the 
flight crew and reverse thrust was not selected or noticed to be absent during the 
landing run. The aircraft came to rest some 220m after the end of the stopway with its 
nose resting on an airport perimeter road. The aircraft sustained substantial damage 
during the overrun. None of the three flight crew, 16 cabin crew or 391 passengers 
reported any serious injuries. (ATSB Investigation Report 199904538, 2001) 
2.2.1 Single Perception Theory 
1890s 
The birth of modern research into accidents and causation is mostly attributed to the 
work of Bortkiewicz (1898). He concluded, from limited studies, that accidents occurred 
at random and were therefore inexplicable. This view luckily did not restrain further 
research into accidents but instead opened the gates for years of investigation, 
conjecture and argument. 
 
 
 
1910s and 20s 
The majority of the work and investigation into accidents was at first set with a pivotal 
view of a single event perception whereby an accident or incident is regarded as a 
solitary event for which there must be a solitary cause. The job of an Air Accident 
Investigator was to find this cause and by eliminating it would stop an accident from 
reoccurring. There are still elements and often mistaken use of the idea of a „single 
event‟ when working with aviation, or other complex systems. However, it was soon 
realised that these environments spawn much more complex interactions between 
human-human, human-system and system-system components. This view of accidents 
also allowed for a blame culture to flourish whereby there was a party responsible as a 
„cause‟ to the „event‟. An accident had to have someone or something at fault, to blame 
so that it was not purely an „Act of God‟ that could not be explained. This rather 
simplistic view and the work of, for instance Greenwood and Woods (1919) from the 
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industrial fatigue research board (IFRB), gave rise to the „Accident Proneness‟ model. 
This focus solely on the individual (rather than the system) came to dominate the 
research and accident reduction exercises for the first half of the twentieth century. 
Further work within the IFRB and clinical studies of reactions, coordination and 
distraction amongst other elements, concluded that accident proneness existed. It was 
considered related to nervous instability and poor aestheto-kinetic coordination (Farmer 
and Chambers, 1926 and 1929). The uncritical acceptance of such an accident 
proneness model by the community at the time is almost fully attributed to this work. 
This view precipitated for many years to come although it can be seen that other work 
such as that of domino theory was already being developed realising the shortfalls of 
the current theory. Indeed, studies have continued long after this time examining the 
concept and working around the broad theory base of accident proneness in individuals 
e.g., Mohr and Clemmer (1988). During their study they find no real evidence for a 
proneness that is measurable or useful in accident causation analysis and conclude 
that “...it is unlikely that overall injury rates in the workplace can be effectively reduced 
by screening out workers with excessive number of injuries”. (Mohr and Clemmer, 
1988, p. 127) This work illustrates the shortfalls of this model of accident investigation 
and as such highlights the limits of application to our QF1 study. If accident proneness 
were the case then the pilots should have been involved in other incidents prior to and 
following on from this event. These ideas can not be substantiated given the evidence. 
This view also suggests that these people can be selected out and therefore all 
accidents can be prevented by removing the accident prone individual either at the 
selection or training stage, or additionally after any incident has occurred. This is now, 
almost universally, accepted as a flawed theory. Dekker (2006) describes this „Bad 
Apple Theory‟ as the „Old View‟ and contends that safety progress was made mainly 
from technological advances and not as the result of the application of these theories. 
Thus, further models were needed to attempt to explain accident causation. 
The main problems with the simple explanation of single perception theories, other 
than the realisation that more complex interactions occur, is that it assumes an innate 
replicability in incidents. If a „cause‟ can be removed then the accident could not 
happen again. Were this applied to QF1 and the event investigated in the 1920s, the 
pilots could be sacked and as such the incident should not reoccur. This does not 
address any of the real issues and would have a devastating effect on morale and 
reporting behaviour were it enacted. The inherent fact is that accidents are viewed now 
at least as being so complex that many different „causes‟ could have produced an 
incident. It is very difficult often to identify a certain cause or produce an effective 
barrier to similar accident types. The single event perception is very much suited to the 
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type of investigation predating Human Factors influence as often that conclusive „part‟ 
of an aircraft etc. could be found and blame attributed to structural facets of the system. 
However, a systems view had to be developed and adopted. 
 
 
 
 
1930s and 1940s 
2.2.2 Domino Models and their development; the Demise of 
„Proneness‟? 
In his book Industrial Accident Prevention (1931), Herbert William Heinrich elaborated 
for the first time on his Domino Theory of industrial accidents. For the first time in 
Human Factors literature, accidents were attributed to a sequential chain of events 
rather than a single causal factor (normally an employee). In order to illustrate this he 
used the idea of a series of dominoes falling over causing the final event. (Figure 2-1) 
 
Figure 2-1 - Heinrich‟s Domino Model of Accident Causation – Adapted from H. Heinrich, 
D. Peterson and N. Roos (1980) Industrial Accident Prevention (5
th
 Edition) New York, 
McGraw-Hill. 
 
Inherent in this model of accident causation, Heinrich labelled each of the dominoes 
with causes that may lead to an accident. It can be contended that this resulted in the 
basis for modern accident causation models.  
Heinrich‟s first domino was entitled “Social Environment and Heredity”. This referred to 
the believed personality traits that are born from inheritance or the social environment 
that the worker is in influencing the likelihood of being involved in an accident. This in 
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particular echoes elements of accident proneness theory whereby internal facets of a 
human contribute towards accidents regardless of external factors. This in a way 
shows a development on accident proneness rather than a complete deviation but with 
the other dominoes bringing in factors being discussed in all the research of the time. 
Second, and inherently linked through the chain of events basis of the theory, is the 
“Fault of Person”. This refers to the effect a worker‟s life (as an outside influencer) is 
having on them e.g., family problems, fatigue etc. This also includes flaws developed in 
the context of the social environment and system in which the worker operates. This is 
a significant drawing together of ideas that external influences on an individual and 
accident causation are equally, if not more, significant as internal ideas of proneness. 
Still today this is an important area in the investigation of accidents and incidents. 
These „soft issues‟ are often easier to gain from those involved in an incident or 
accident on a surface level. It can be contended that approaching Human Factors via 
the „soft issues‟ of family life and social life allows the industry to merely tick a box and 
not truly understand the more complex facets of system interaction with humans at all 
levels. However, referring again to QF1, at least had the event occurred in the 1930s 
there would be some form of defence for the flight crew. For the first time in an 
investigation outside influencers would be considered and from this the potential for 
changes to regulations, training and standards existed. 
The second domino was also developed in Heinrich‟s later expansions to include the 
actual expression „mistake‟ as a result of these personal factors. The third domino 
illustrates Heinrich‟s direct cause of accidents/incidents. This domino was termed either 
an unsafe act or unsafe condition. The very idea that this domino is required in order to 
„knock‟ over the fourth, “accident”, shows that Heinrich postulated that one or both of 
these must be present for an accident to occur. This model was the first to really 
develop the importance of behaviour on influencing safety and accident causation and 
Heinrich felt that this third domino was the most important, and also easiest to remove 
from the picture in order to prevent accidents. The presence of this domino means that 
for the first time in investigating QF1 it would be necessary to dig deeper into the 
behaviour and rationale of the flight crew‟s actions; a movement towards truly 
integrating behaviour. 
The final domino, the fifth, was termed “Injury/Property Damage” and later included 
“Near Miss”. If one of the first four is removed, then the idea is the fifth “event” is 
avoided. At last there was a gateway into the complex world of system accident 
causation.  
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This was a significant step in the right direction for the study of causation and for 
modelling the Qantas incident more comprehensively. Any analysis is, however, still 
limited by the problems of a linear causal chain. If one domino is not present then 
theoretically the event would not occur and yet it is arguable from the report whether, 
for example, there were any significant outside influences (e.g., personal life) that 
affected the crew. Also, in the instance of the first domino, heredity is somewhat 
questionable and the social environment was the same for the first officer and captain 
and yet it is possible to suggest it was the captain who made the first mistake. A major 
problem with this, and one that has been brought to light particularly in recent years 
(e.g., Young et al. 2004), is that it may result in the search of answers to fit the model 
so that the chain is not broken. Although this does appear to answer some of the 
complex issues involved in the QF1 incident, the model is too reliant on the linear chain 
and on ideas of the individual. This takes little or no account of, for example, training 
and management. Arguably, had Domino Theory predicated the QF1 investigation the 
responsibility would again fall on the flight-crew as this is the most „resolvable‟ course 
of action. 
If we take the third domino, which is arguably the most important issue in Human 
Factors, it can be broken down into Heinrich‟s terms of unsafe conditions (or reasons to 
commit unsafe acts). Expanding upon this idea of unsafe conditions is that they are 
caused by: physical unsuitability, lack of knowledge or skill, poor attitude and an unsafe 
working environment. This today still holds very true as precursors to complex incidents 
with just new „buzz‟ terms being added to the bare-bones structure of the seminal 
framework. Heinrich goes on to distinguish between underlying and direct conditions 
within this domino. Although Heinrich suggests that the first two dominoes combine to 
produce the third, Vincoli (1994) puts it rather neatly that these unsafe conditions in the 
third domino are in fact “symptoms of root causes” from the first two dominoes so 
modernising the view on the unsafe act being a result not cause in itself of underlying 
factors. 
Whilst the domino theory had already been published by Heinrich, the movement within 
the area still centred on theories of single perception. There was however a growing 
disillusionment with the studies that led to the theory of accident proneness. Johnson 
(1946) criticises over two hundred studies working on accident proneness citing invalid, 
inadequate or inappropriate statistical methods and conclusions. Indeed much of the 
work defending the theory from the IFRB and others was statistical argument on 
whether patterns of accident rates fit poisson and other distributions effectively. The 
major flaw with this work, though, was that it was based on a presumption of a 
homogenous exposure to risk. This polarised the work from recognising a difference in 
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hazard exposure to individuals or effects on the individual such as those mentioned in 
domino theory - e.g., family problems, depression etc. It is this basis of a homogenous 
exposure to risk that fails to explain how aircraft only minutes prior to QF1 managed to 
land or go-around safely. Adelstein (1952) too was intrigued by the idea of accident 
proneness and its application to hazardous work. His study of 1,452 accidents of 
shunters on South African railways concludes that chance factors explain a lot more 
than proneness. He went on to conclude that there was no significant correlation 
between individuals and the repeat of accidents or accident rates over five years. He 
did not try to explain any new theory to explain the patterns but merely sought to apply 
accident proneness theory into a truly empirical situation. 
 
 
 
1950s and 1960s 
A „new view‟ was developed based on the work of Cresswell and Froggatt (1963) 
amongst others. In their study of the causation of bus driver accidents, they coined the 
term „Accident Liability‟ as a more developed addition to single perception theory. This 
reflected a propensity of individuals being prone to take risks rather than being accident 
prone directly and allowed for a new focus for research and behaviour adaptation. 
To reflect these developments of theoretical knowledge and beliefs, further work was 
carried out throughout the period by a number of individuals to develop single 
perception theories; i.e., those holding the individual fully responsible in a Human 
Factors sense (as an alternative to an object failing). Clark Kerr in particular based his 
work around the premise of the single perception theories but reflecting on current 
research moving away from the rigid accident „proneness‟ suggestion developed his 
Goals-Freedom Theory (GFT) (Kerr, 1950). The fundamental concept behind this 
theory is that unsafe behaviour leading to an accident is due to an unrewarding 
psychological climate in the workplace that leads to a lack of mental alertness. This is 
still centred on a single cause of accidents but begins to take into account fully the idea 
that external factors, or internal problems, may influence an individual so takes it away 
from some innate proneness. These developments begin to attack at the heart of the 
investigation into the Bangkok runway overrun. There is still very much lacking when 
addressing such an event though as this is still ultimately single-perception oriented 
and can easily over-simplify an incident. This case study is a prime example of where a 
relatively simple looking incident on the surface could all too easily be classified as 
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such but if the surface is broken, as in the accident report, much more (and more 
meaningful) information can be retrieved. 
In 1957 Kerr developed on his idea of GFT with his Adjustment Stress Theory. In this 
he reflects on the negative work environment contributing to accident causation and 
highlights stress as a factor that manipulates an environment, preventing the individual 
from concentrating fully on their work. This stress covers a multitude of areas including 
personal situations, time pressures, poor relationships in work and workplace hazards. 
Whilst this work was going on in the background of industry, the 1960s, 70s and 80s 
brought technical advances and observable reductions in accident rate so the fighting 
force of Human Factors was arguably reduced during this period. Indeed, the 
pendulum had swung somewhat away from the human involved in an incident directly 
to a view of making the technology accept this „inevitability‟ of accidents. Haddon 
(1961) commanded the design of fail-safe vehicles given the inevitability of accidents 
for some time into the future. This concept has again come to the forefront of study in 
recent years under the new label: Resilience Engineering (e.g., Hollnagel et al., 2006). 
Even though Human Factors work, in the form carried out to date, was slightly 
dwindling there were still a number of notable developments in the standpoint of cause 
with respect to the bigger picture. 
 
 
1970s 
2.2.3 Development of a Domino Idea 
By the 1970s in particular, the theory had come to be broadly acknowledged and many 
based their work on the domino theory such as Weaver (1971). He put more emphasis 
on the poor supervision afforded by management levels and stressed still further the 
importance of identifying the unsafe act and developments around this occurring.  Bird 
and Loftus (1976) too reflected the direct management relationship on incidents and 
accidents and added an extra domino based on lack of control by the management to 
the original Domino process. (Figure 2-2) However, by merely adding a new domino, it 
could be assumed that (as no uncontrollable factors are considered in such a model) 
all incidents are avoidable if the management asserts enough control of the system. 
This almost blanket assertion that management is to „blame‟ can not be justified for the 
QF1 case study presented. Beaty (1995) has repeatedly praised the management at 
Qantas and presented it as a model in many ways for airline operations worldwide. 
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Figure 2-2 – Bird and Loftus‟ (1976) Loss Causation Model 
 
Adams (1976) took this one step further and recognised the complex interaction of 
management strategy further up the chain using the term “Organisational errors” (a 
term still greatly extant today) to encompass the first three dominoes of the chain. Both 
worked to advance the model but neither made a giant leap in investigating accident 
causation as they were still bounded by limits in the applicability of a framework or 
model to the dynamic world in which it would be applied. 
One of the first, and originally influential, attempts to apply this theory to the „real‟ world 
was Johnson‟s Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) (1975). Johnson 
recognised the interaction between personal, organisational and physical 
(environmental) aspects of the system or situation (Figure 2-3). 
 
 
Figure 2-3 - Johnson‟s Three Level Model of Accidents (From Leveson, 2002) 
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Moreover Johnson‟s attempts to indicate that several accident pathways may develop 
over time led to this being a highly researched area of Human Factors and in particular 
to the rise of frameworks such as Reason‟s GEMS or “Swiss-Cheese” model. 
MORT therefore encompasses not only Human Factors in terms of the individual but 
also a systems perspective in accident analysis. The first stage of a MORT analysis 
involves the „standard‟ investigation into „failures‟ by equipment or individuals that could 
have contributed to the event but also influences on these individuals and teams and 
some coverage of post-accident events including the response and availability of 
emergency services etc. It is at the second stage that MORT begins to look in more 
detail at accident causation by viewing “management system factors” (Johnson, 1975). 
In this, the general situation at the time of the accident is considered and failures within 
management and even other organisations are investigated. This happens even if 
there is no apparent direct link to the actual accident. MORT assumes a level of 
responsibility for accidents at the management level as it is said that they should create 
an organisation that would not allow situations such as these through directives and 
conditions. MORT looks for actions by the management level that could have 
prevented an incident at the event or in the pre and post event timelines. These are 
encapsulated into a standardised MORT fault tree to illustrate the development and 
causation issues of the event (Figure 2-4).  
 
Figure 2-4 - An example of the MORT Fault Tree (From Bandener, 2005)
3
 
                                               
3
 Labels to boxes: Left (e.g., SB1) is a unique identifier in investigation. Right (e.g., 3) is the 
MORT page number in the handbook. Further details of shapes etc. see Johnson, 1975. 
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As is clear from this summary of the application so far, MORT is heavily management 
oriented and almost appears to hold a level of blame but merely shifts this up the 
organisational structure. MORT does however allow some risks to be termed “assumed 
risks” and these do not hold management responsible as it would not be viable to do so 
for the smallest of factors in a real-life organisation. Possibly one of the most significant 
results of the work into MORT was the development of the idea of „barriers‟ in a 
system. These can include simple physical barriers such as guards on machines or 
implementing a procedure to avoid an accident within the workforce; e.g. the go-around 
procedure for our QF1 case study. It is said that an accident occurs when one or more 
of these barriers is broken through either human action or some form of technological 
failure. Working the QF1 case study towards MORT, the points hold about the 
management being important, especially in terms of the barriers that were put into 
place but also the problems that resulted from incorrect approach procedures or 
weather training being implemented. These do not however account for the actual 
decisions made by the flight crew and to an extent neglects the direct influence of the 
conditions and actions despite a reference to assumed risks. This model most 
comfortably encompasses the case study this far and has moved itself slightly further 
away from the restrictive linear flow models. In itself though, the model fell foul to its 
own complexity and inflexibility for use as an investigative tool; a problem that can be 
argued is still present with many of today‟s frameworks. 
 
 
 
1980s and 1990s 
By the late 1980s and 1990s, the effect of technology improvements on accidents had 
diminished and again the rate plateaued. With this in mind, the greatest leap towards 
more investigation into organisational contributions to incidents has to have come from 
James Reason‟s “Swiss Cheese” model of accident causation (e.g., Reason, 1990 and 
Reason, 1997). This model has been adopted by individuals, companies and world 
regulatory bodies such as ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation), the global 
aviation body as the basis of their investigative efforts and understanding of accidents. 
This includes the application of the model during the course of the Flight QF1 
investigation itself. 
Investigations into accidents outside the realm of aviation have also moved the 
concentration of investigation into the system as a whole e.g., Three Mile Island, The 
Herald of Free Enterprise and Piper Alpha. These incidents are discussed elsewhere in 
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the literature but all illustrate the movement towards an organisational view of complex 
events. Indeed some years earlier, Perrow (1984) argued in his text that it was the 
nature of complex, tightly-coupled systems to suffer unforeseeable socio-technical 
breakdowns. This appears to have formed the basis for the movement such as 
Reason‟s work. This does, however, take any power away from the possibility of 
predictive work of accidents and incidents if the breakdowns are truly „unforeseeable‟. 
 
Figure 2-5 - Reason “Swiss Cheese” Model of Accident Causation (Reason, 1997) 
As can be seen from Figure 2-5, Reason has identified several layers within which 
„holes‟ are always present and where these align the result may be a catastrophic 
event. In the majority of cases, a layer will stop an event resulting in catastrophe and 
holes are fluid in that they may appear and disappear or change in magnitude 
depending on the psychopathology of the system or organisation. Most important to 
Reason‟s model is the distinction of latent errors versus the active errors of those at the 
„sharp end‟ of the system. Arguably though (e.g., Young et al. 2004) this would suggest 
that human error, in either latent or active form, would be a contribution in 100% of 
incidents and accidents. This discussion of the percentage of accidents and incidents 
„caused‟ by human errors has long been contentious with many views being put 
forward from Heinrich‟s (1931) discussion of an 80:20 split to Boeing‟s (1996) two-
thirds, to this plausible view of 100%. Even in his book Reason (1997) says that 
although there will always be a presence of active failures, due to defences most will 
be caught and not lead to negative outcomes. This in itself, however, appears to 
highlight a major problem of Reason‟s work which is that without a predictive element 
some active and latent conditions will continue to exist and this leads to problems. This 
does tend to limit the model‟s applicability to a post-mortem investigation into the 
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pathology of an organisation rather than a context-specific and applicable method of 
investigating all precursors to an incident or accident before or after the event. 
Therefore, it can be suggested that the danger lies in the way this model has been 
adopted and applied by rote and this needs further work. 
Reason (2000) when discussing his developments and model states that we “…cannot 
change (the) human condition, but we can change the conditions under which people 
work” (p768). In other words he seems to allude to the fact that the understanding of 
thinking or „why‟ of an individual‟s action at any cognitive level may well be of little or no 
use as it is an inevitability that error will occur. But is this too simplistic and almost 
fatalistic?  Even in a conference presentation from late 2003 (p. 26), Reason suggested 
“…perhaps we should revisit the individual (the heroic as well as the hazardous acts.)” 
These appear to be significant words in re-highlighting the importance and relevance of 
active error. 
This model has made a significant jump in the field of human error investigation and 
drew the attention of investigators and companies away from solely studying and 
blaming individuals. Through methods such as TRIPOD DELTA (e.g., Groeneweg, 
1998) organisational identifiers of latent factors are centralised. The method, based on 
Reason‟s model, aims at controlling latent factors within an organisation through 
identification, categorisation and the use of compensating factors. Indeed we only have 
to look at the example of the Challenger accident that led to the loss of life and shock 
across the globe to see this movement more towards organisational errors being 
placed at the core of an investigation. In her very in depth and intelligent review of this 
event, Diane Vaughan (1997) shows how applicable Reason‟s model is to a timeline of 
events stretching back 9 years of latent pathogens and arguably no active error4.  
Despite the massive developments that this new view on accident causation and 
investigation undoubtedly caused, the movement appeared to remain central to the 
fundamental domino theory of a single causal chain but with the addition of factors and 
influences into the model. Even the “Swiss Cheese” model appears to be an extension 
of this and it is contended that such event chain models encourage limited notions of 
linear causality that make it difficult to incorporate non-linear relationships such as 
those of feedback (Leveson, 2002). Some worries also occur when such a model of 
causation is applied as an accident investigation method and model as in the ATSB‟s 
                                               
4
 Even this is contentious however and the “launch decision” has been suggested as an active 
error. This re-highlights the issue of errors being the cause or result of events as the launch was 
the cause of the event but also the result of many events previous to it e.g., the meetings with 
engineers etc. 
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investigation of the Bangkok overrun. The distinction between the two appears to be 
fuzzy at best in real world application. Following an illustrative model such as this could 
lead to latent factors or non-important issues being searched for or found at the 
expense of others in order to complete the „required‟ model of the accident chain. 
Reason (1997) argues that latent errors are always present in any accident or incident 
but active errors may or may not be present - i.e. the active errors may well be the 
consequence and not the cause of incident pathways and are not a requirement if 
enough latent conditions exist. This helped to emphasize the concentration of 
industries on searching relentlessly for latent errors which have proved to be very 
difficult to find pre-event and too easy to find (or at least search for dogmatically) post-
mortem due to factors such as hindsight bias. Fischoff (1975) emphasised that we 
rebuild the past into a linear and a logical fashion in our minds but such a linear 
progression is not possible in the real world; it is thus almost an oversimplification 
which magnifies the problem of searching for latent conditions in order to satisfy an 
abstract requirement for an unnatural cut off point in the investigation. That is, there is 
no natural point in a post-mortem accident investigation at which to stop searching 
when looking at latent conditions further and further up the organisation - but where do 
we start to get non-returns, or unrealistic returns, for effort? Sidney Dekker (2005) 
points out that Reason‟s model is limited by the confines of structuralism and although 
works well post-mortem (hindsight notwithstanding) it lacks function in the fluid pre-
event world. This limitation is still prevalent today. 
Perrow (1999) too emphasised this effect of latent conditions in a system which are 
most succinctly described by Reason (1990) in his seminal resident pathogen 
metaphor. This complimented all of the work that has led to many in depth discoveries 
of the salience and importance of latent errors. There are occasions, however, such as 
the Chernobyl disaster that have arguably been attributed to purely active errors by the 
operators at the plant. These appear to go against the grain of a wholly Perrow or 
Reason oriented approach to accident investigation. It should be remembered that this 
model is an illustration of an idea not a direct application for the accident investigators 
to rigidly adhere to. The relevance of these developments to those of a blame culture is 
discussed in section 2.3.2 especially with reference to Reason‟s (1997) fundamental 
attribution error and surprise errors.  
It seems pertinent to point out that Reason‟s organisational model of human error is not 
being said to have never been useful. One example of a methodology in regular use 
and based upon his ideas, especially within aviation accident literature, is the Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2001). 
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HFACS has been applied to numerous aviation accidents and can identify useful 
relationships between active and latent factors (e.g., Li et al., 2008). However, there 
are many limitations associated with such a methodology. Shorrock and Chung (2010) 
studied the links between research and practice and found gaping holes in the success 
of models such as HFACS. 
It was during this time, however, that work was also being carried out to bring a 
completely new perspective to accident causation. An early example was the work of 
Hendrick and Benner (1987) in their development of the Sequentially Timed and 
Events Plotting (STEP) method from their earlier work on Multilinear Events 
Sequencing (MES) (Benner, 1975). Not only did these theories aim to help 
investigators in the actual carrying out of an accident investigation but they also moved 
significantly away from Domino Theory rebirths. Both of these methods are based upon 
Peturbation Theory (P-Theory) which is based on a system homeostasis being 
maintained and if this is disturbed by a perturbation then an accident sequence will 
develop if the system does not adapt (Benner, 1975).  
The STEP method uses cards to consolidate event information including the actors and 
actions involved as well as a description and source of information. Events are then 
placed in a tabulature with time along the x-axis and actors along the y-axis and causal 
links drawn between events where required. This gives an investigator the details of 
the accident sequence and can highlight where defences or barriers have failed in 
relation to, for example, the Bangkok overrun event and where further developments 
may reduce further incidents. When applied to a case study such as QF1 it appears 
that STEP provides a useful method for illustrating and investigating both active and 
latent issues. However, there would appear to be a facet missing from making STEP a 
tool suitable for use within complex systems and that is the focus on a single event 
(and its immediate surrounding events) rather than at the system as a whole. There 
needs to be development in these tools that allows them to reflect a system space 
during normal and abnormal work.  
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Figure 2-6 - A Simplified STEP matrix for a car accident in an urban area 
 
The STEP matrix (Figure 2-6) when completed illustrates nicely this birth of network 
approach to accidents built up of multiple causes, multiple actors and multiple events. 
This allows network models to be fluid (or at least dynamic) which counters the issues 
raised referring to Dekker‟s (2005) assertion that Reason‟s model cannot. 
Rasmussen (1997) too developed work to step outside the constraints of single-chain 
causation albeit with added influences and factors. Rasmussen understood that to 
decompose behaviour into decisions and actions artificially isolated the phenomenon 
from the context in which those behaviours had taken place. This was, he concluded, 
an ineffective way of trying to understand behaviour (Rasmussen, 1997). He presented 
a systems approach looking at vertical integration between layers of a dynamic socio-
technical organisation. Rasmussen (Figure 2-7) knew the importance of a closed loop 
feedback system to an organisation‟s success in a dynamic world so that, similar to 
STEPs P-Theory idea of adapting to changes in the system in order to prevent chains 
of events leading to an incident occurring, the system may remain stable. A lack of 
vertical integration between the various layers shown in Figure 2-7 can be blamed on 
this lack of feedback and the actors involved (human or machine components) not 
understanding fully the role of the other actors within the system but not in the 
immediate vicinity, i.e., actors at other levels.  
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Figure 2-7 - Rasmussen‟s levels of a complex socio-technical system (Adapted from 
Rasmussen, 1997) 
Vicente (2006) produced a paper illustrating how Rasmussen‟s framework for risk 
management in a dynamic society can fit the breakdown of a water supply system 
resulting in many injuries and deaths in Walkerton, Canada in 2000. Vicente‟s work 
was the first full-scale independent application of the framework to dynamic society. It 
was concluded in the paper that most of the predictions of the model were found to be 
true by the surrounding events. The defences are seen to erode not all at once but 
gradually over time as the interactions between the different layers degrade and 
feedback is reduced. The temporal pattern of events is not illustrated easily in this 
method but a descriptive map of factors can be derived and from this all the 
interactions and responsibilities of actors from all levels can be shown. Vicente 
illustrates the relevance of this approach to systems failure. This framework when 
applied to a case study such as QF 1, still lacks, however, elements of the network 
methods of STEP discussed above. Such facets as a temporal and more detailed 
event synopsis are lacking yet it gives a good overall basis for abstracting details about 
an incident and allowing generalisable conclusions. 
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2.2.4 Human Reliability and Error Identification 
If accident investigation is one side of a coin, we can now turn our attention to the other 
side of that coin, which as we have seen has many unanswered or unanswerable 
questions and problems, which is accident prediction. Although not exactly new in the 
realm of Human Factors, methods such as Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) 
techniques are still in their infancy in terms of development. These methods use 
probabilistic risk assessment as a form of basis. This movement towards quantitative 
methods of accident investigation is often powered by a need to limit subjectivity. The 
quantity of historical data that is so often collected and perhaps not utilised to its full 
potential is also important since these often help develop probability relationships. This 
next section then, addresses the more quantitative aspects of accident investigation 
models which to date are often separated from their qualitative „cousins‟. 
Human Error Identification (HEI) is fundamentally the initial part of HRA techniques and 
is used as the basis of Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSAs) (Cox and Tait, 1991). 
HEI is a subjective technique that is method-specific. The aim is to illustrate the impact 
of human error on a system and also the recovery associated with that error. (Kirwan, 
1998)  
Kirwan (1998) highlighted the relevance of HEI to Human Factors and Ergonomics 
independent of HRA in that the identification of errors through the process is result 
enough in itself. These factors are further refined in Error Reduction Analysis (ERA) 
which can demonstrate the ways of reducing the likelihood of the error, or if it occurs, 
the impact on the system. This eliminates the dependence on probabilities and 
quantification of errors, the use of which is highly debated in the literature. Reflecting 
on previous discussion about the over-emphasis on chain type models of causation, 
Leveson (2002, p.14) states that the “limitations of event-chain models are also 
reflected in the current approaches to quantitative risk assessment. When the goal of 
the analysis is to perform a PRA, initiating events in the chain are usually assumed to 
be mutually exclusive. While this assumption simplifies the mathematics, it may not 
match reality.” 
In Kirwan‟s (1998) discussion of the HEI methods available he finds thirty-eight in the 
literature including well known examples such as SHERPA (Embrey, 1986), THERP 
(Swain and Guttmann, 1983) and HAZOP (Kletz, 1974). Almost half of these have 
been produced in the preceeding five years which demonstrates the emphasis shown 
on this area of study throughout the 90s and still today5. SHERPA (a flowchart based 
                                               
5
 Stanton et al. (2006) find over 100 models in the literature 
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application) has had wide application and remained a popular tool in complex tasks it 
has been seen to become unwieldy and too resource intensive (Kirwan, 1998). „Second 
Generation‟ HEI methods have been developed such as the Cognitive Reliability and 
Error Analysis Method (CREAM) (Hollnagel and Embrey, 1994) which was based upon 
SHERPA, Rasmussen‟s (1988) Skill, Rule, Knowledge framework (SRK) attempts to 
incorporate a cognitive level of analysis to HEI. This and the TRACEr method 
developed by Shorrock and Kirwan (2002) can be applied both retrospectively and 
prospectively which advances the usability of these tools greatly in accident prevention. 
An important point also is that these diagrammatic, or simply formalised, methods of 
investigation allow observers to view the basis upon which investigators make their 
conclusions and bring with it improved transparency. 
As the design related to aircraft develops with time so must the means with which to 
qualify the design and analyse/investigate human related interaction with it evolve. The 
ERRORPRED Project (Stanton et al. 2006) is a great source of an investigation into 
the modern investigative tools available to Human Factors practitioners at present. All 
of the major models are covered and their positive and negative aspects discussed 
briefly. The problems found tend to be that despite the number of models available, 
many become too unwieldy to apply in complex situations and there still appears to be 
large scope out there to develop a framework, especially including some level of 
cognitive modelling of actors, that is not too general to use in investigation nor too 
specific to just one realm or particular situation. Stanton et al. (2006a) developed a 
toolkit approach to the problem of predicting error and this method faired favourably 
when compared with standalone methods, such as SHERPA and HAZOP mentioned 
above. The toolkit approach appears to deal well with the complexities of working with 
error and increased the sensitivity of error prediction and multiple-analyst validation 
compared to other HEI methods used in isolation (Stanton et al., 2009). 
During their development of this new HEI tool for aviation, Stanton et al. (2008) reflect 
that despite the number of techniques available the applicability in a number of 
situations is still questionable: “The goal for researchers now remains to investigate 
how these contemporary HEI methods can be improved and also the development and 
creation of new, aviation specific HEI methods.” (Salmon et al., 2002, p.129)  
 
 
 
Present 
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2.3 Current Application of Human Factors in Aviation 
Accident Investigation 
2.3.1 Hindsight as a Barrier to the future 
Do we wish to address specifically the direct causes to an incident or accident or 
address the overall pathology of an organisation and system? This is the question that 
presents itself at this junction in Human Factors work in accident investigation. As 
discussed by Young et al. (2004) and Dekker (2002) many latent conditions or failings 
are found in current accident investigations, but the ability to attribute causality is only 
truly possible in hindsight. The relentless application of these top-down models of 
accident causation (e.g., Reason, 1997) although without doubt finding many important 
latent conditions within an organisation, may well be the barrier to any form of 
predictive and arguably more relevant investigation. The argument stands that 
searching back from an event there is no natural „stop‟ point. Indeed, Braithwaite 
(2001), whilst discussing Moshansky‟s 1992 investigation of the F-28 Air Ontario icing 
crash from Dryden, put it rather well when he said that the “apparently vast number of 
errors was not indicative of a particularly bad accident, rather, a thorough 
investigation.” 
Since the concept of hindsight as a major problem with investigation is being 
discussed, let us first look at when the concept originally arose. Fischoff (1975) 
discussed this at length and concluded that hindsight was not equal to foresight but the 
movement at the time believed that by knowing how past events occurred and 
eliminating some element of this, they could not occur in the future. Although simplistic 
by today‟s standards this did set about a very important culture within industries to 
identify errors and problems within the system or individuals. Now the prevalent idea is 
that, as mentioned previously, the past is structured into a linear set of events. 
However, this simplification was not possible in a dynamic period of time so 
immediately we are behind in the „war‟ on the factors involved in the lead up to an 
event. It is known that simply removing an element will not prevent future accidents. It 
is further understood that the use of ideas such as the fluid motion of the layers within 
Reason‟s model and the holes within those layers the situation can be viewed as ever 
changing. This forms two main camps of which those that feel the need for the 
acceptance of fallability in humans and the need for “resilience engineering” (e.g., 
Hollnagel et al., 2006) appear to be the most forward thinking. 
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When looking at causation it is important to try and place ourselves in a position similar 
to that of the individuals and system at the time. In this way an attempt is made to not 
utilise our own biased view of what it may have been like with our new omnipotent 
knowledge. Woods (2003) put it very succinctly when he says that the future seems 
implausible before an event but after this the past seems incredible in a kind of „how 
could they not have seen that‟ way. This surprise factor that must have been present 
by the individuals at the time is also discussed in Reason‟s book Human Error (1990) 
and the truth is they did not „see it‟ (whether aural, visual, tactile etc.) or else the event 
would not have occurred. This is further developed by Dekker (2005) in his discussion 
of the “banality of accidents”. Accidents are not the result, he and Perrow (1984) 
suggest, of a series of incidents leading up to an accident but are normal people doing 
normal work in normal organisations. From the point of view of an individual involved, 
the lead up to an accident may well appear that way to themselves. This gives extra 
weight to the importance of addressing „near misses‟ and reporting programs such as 
CHIRP or BASIS. 
What can be gleaned from accident investigations using the prescriptive method of 
adhering to a top-down model appears to be a great audit of a company and its 
pathology but may not realistically extract „causes‟ of the event proximal enough for it 
to be usefully analysed and attacked. It is after all “workable remedial applications” 
(Reason, 1997) that we are searching for in accident investigation not an unmetered 
breakdown of all company failings. Therefore, as Young et al. (2004) suggest in their 
paper, maybe a bottom-up approach as discussed again in Dekker (2002) may be 
more useful and less biased in the hunt for true causes of accidents. Then, if acted 
upon appropriately, those causes may positively affect the future of the system.  
2.3.2 The Safety Culture and Blame 
All of the models discussed above have been used as the basis for investigations into 
accidents. The basis for the study of Human Factors in accident causation and in 
aviation, along with other complex socio-technical systems, is to increase safety within 
and across the industries. Surely the basis of this is to have an organisation that is 
safe. Looking at the organisation as a whole, what exactly can make a safe culture or 
background for a system in order to decrease the chance of incidents and accidents? 
This next section addresses some of the issues which are important regardless of the 
model or method chosen since they directly affect the reporting and investigative 
practices of organisations. 
Westrum (1992) identified three major organisational cultures: Pathological, 
Bureaucratic and Generative (Table 2-1). It can be seen from the table produced that 
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an airline, or other complex industry, should aspire to generative ideals. Things are not 
swept under the carpet but are addressed and ideas welcomed; a mainstay for risky 
and complex operations is the need to be adaptable and imaginative.  
  Cultures 
  Pathological Bureaucratic Generative 
 
T 
o 
p 
i 
c 
s 
Information Don‟t Want to Know 
 
May not find out Actively Seek it 
Messengers “Shot” Listened to IF arrive Trained & rewarded 
 
Responsibility Shirked Compartmentalised Shared 
Failure Punished or 
concealed 
Lead to local repairs Lead to far-reaching 
reforms 
New Ideas Actively discouraged Often present 
problems 
Welcomed 
Table 2-1 Westrum‟s Organisational Cultures and how they handle safety information 
(Adapted from Reason, 1997, P. 38) 
Learning needs to become a priority within these organisations and the need is strong 
to remove the typical epitaph of complex socio-technical systems that there is always 
something else more important or pressing. (Reason, 1997) 
There have been a number of prescriptions as to being a safe culture and a safe 
organisation mentioned through the literature over time such as Reason (1997) 
discussing organisation „competence‟ in terms of collecting the right data, acting upon it 
and disseminating it a useful way to all concerned. Examples of this would include the 
incident data collection and safety information systems discussed later in the section 
on incidents and their importance. There is no definitive organisational safety health at 
present though and papers or companies will use whatever statistic or comparison 
suits their needs in order to shed positive light.  Reason (1997, p.191) states rather 
importantly that most commercial airlines today have almost uniform training, 
operational and regulatory procedures and even similar aircraft types so the difference 
around the globe of flying an airline with 1:260,000 chance versus 1:11,000,000 
chance of an accident with at least one death may in some part at least be down to the 
culture of that airline. This again should be comparable with other industries and 
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indeed in the UK‟s report on the incident at Chernobyl the head of CEGB at the time, 
Lord Marshall, amongst others (Reason, 1990) went so far as to state that the accident 
could not have happened in Britain due to its safe nature. Identifying and quantifying 
what actually makes a safe culture is an area in which much work needs to be done in 
order to make effective use of good examples worldwide. This is shown to be hard 
though when an individual from any particular state or inclination, be it eastern, western 
or other, looks as if to compare with their own „way‟ rather than from a perspective of 
objective total outsider. 
A significant illustration of this is found in Braithwaite‟s discussion of safety culture 
within Qantas and other airlines where he compares crews from different parts of the 
world and within different national carriers. Firstly, though, before discussing such a 
question it is important to look at what culture means in the argument. Again, Reason 
(1997, p.192) covers this rather well and states succinctly that “whereas national 
cultures arise largely out of shared values, organisational cultures are shaped mainly 
by shared practices.” If we take this as doctrine, then this would imply that regardless 
of where in the world or which airline or dominant social culture, if one implemented a 
practice such as giving out incident reports/briefing safety procedures or newsletters 
etc., will always lead to a better safety culture. This rather simplified things a bit too 
much but looking back, as did Reason to Uttal (1983), it can be seen that an 
organisational culture is “shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things 
work) that interact with an organisations structure and control systems to produce 
behavioural norms (the way we do things around here)”. 
Braithwaite (2001) proposed that Australian crews may well have success in a safety 
environment due to their openness to speak out against each other regardless of 
„seniority‟. This may well be the opposite of well-established Far Eastern airlines or 
those from countries that can be considered as having a far more „hierarchical‟ social 
culture. In these organisations superiors are significantly more autocratic with their 
subordinates signifying a large power divide. This has been associated with poor crew 
resource management in certain parts of the world (Harris, 2008). However, safety in 
these more rigid environments has been attributed to a high level of sticking to the 
SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) that may also be relevant to the Qantas model 
of Aviation safety. It can be seen yet again that these areas have many unanswered 
question but the major foreseeable problem with this, and even the studies that stand 
so far, are that they rely on input from the pilots in the form of questionnaires or 
interviews both of which struggle to get the response levels that would provide truly 
reliable information or scope for the entire airline/nation/environmental culture. 
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It can be argued, as Reason does, that safety (or any other aspect for that matter) 
culture is something that an organisation „has‟ not „is‟. By this, the organisation is 
malleable and facets may be added to or subtracted from such a culture in order to 
improve it. It is these facets that need to be identified and examined as to whether they 
will be integrated with other cultural facets to work in a positive manner. Indeed, 
Braithwaite (2001) makes an interesting discussion of the need for a comprehensive 
set of system safety indicators similar to the Flight Safety Foundation‟s CFIT checklist. 
This would need to be a proactive and simple checklist style procedure to assess an 
organisation and look for obvious areas that may need improvement, or indeed can be 
proved to be even better than the previous believed norm at any level and thus 
integrated to other organisations or at least argued for or against. Reason (1997) again 
points out that prescriptive feed-forward only methods can never fully control safe 
behaviour. Therefore, use of such a system safety check would allow a continuous 
feedback process for the development of the safe culture within an organisation. This 
would require processes to be carried out periodically and all individuals made to feel 
that all comments or reports (e.g., through incident reporting) are welcome and acted 
upon. The problem is in the level at which it is aimed as if too general its usefulness will 
be limited but if too fine-grained it may become prohibitive to use. The essence of the 
argument is for „loops within loops‟ integrating levels of the system through feedback 
(Figure 2-8). 
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Figure 2-8 – Illustration of interconnected feed-back and feed-forward loops through 
levels of a system 
Intrinsic to any organisation is the presence of a blame culture whether it be a true 
blame culture or one of no-blame, or even positioned in between (such as the „just‟ 
culture). Certainly for the development of incident reporting programs blame is 
particularly important. This is also the case in the author‟s argument for a redressing of 
the balance of emphasis that has led to active error playing second fiddle to latent 
pathogens in investigations and prevention of incidents; i.e., it is not the intention to 
return to a period of blame and shaming individuals for their actions but merely to 
concentrate on the „whys‟ and „hows‟ of an individual‟s actions. Aside from this though, 
blame has been a major factor in moving the concentration of investigations away from 
the individual even though attribution to individuals at the sharp end, according to 
Reason (1997), deflects the blame from the organisation as a whole. It is contended in 
fact that an organisation cannot simply uncouple culpability of an event from itself to an 
individual; they are an internal factor and a part of the organisation from which blame 
should not be sought to be removed. It has oft been the culture to blame individuals 
due to the satisfaction, both to conclude an investigation where looking at an 
organisation may involve a never ending search, and also to fulfil our possible innate 
requirements. However, this must be avoided if a high level of safety culture is to be 
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gained. Blaming an individual and acknowledging the effect of an active error by an 
individual, or group of individuals, should not be one and the same; they should be 
treated as mutually exclusive for the purposes of investigation. Only if terms such as 
„gross negligence‟ are fulfilled should one then look to sanction an individual; beyond 
that training and correction must come first. After all, it is known that all activities have 
some form of inherent risk therefore it would be unfair to punish an individual for falling 
for this risk. The emphasis must become not on blaming and not on ignoring the fact 
that an individual can have a profound effect on accident causation but on the „whys‟ 
and „hows‟ at a cognitive and organisational level, i.e., A Systems View. 
2.4 Incidents; a tool for proactive safety 
Central themes of this research coming to the surface in the review thus far have 
included the comparison and use of both commercial and GA aviation and the need to 
address dominant linear models. Additionally in reviewing the literature and in particular 
the practical use of methods relating to aviation accident investigation there appears to 
be scope to increase the use of non-accident scenarios to understand the aviation 
system better. In particular feedback has been discussed as an important issue within 
an organisation that will be safe and incident reporting programs are one area where 
this usefulness can be capitalised on. 
Incidents, or “near-misses”, can be defined as ranging from partial penetration of 
defences to situations in which all the available safeguards were defeated but no actual 
losses were sustained. As such they cover a whole multitude of sins and would 
hopefully therefore promulgate a multitude of information for safety development. This 
section sets out to discuss the way in which industry is currently working with 
accidents. This will also address the issue of using incidents for safety management 
and more particularly understanding incidents more fully with information networks. 
2.4.1 What place for incidents? 
In his editorial to a special edition of Interacting with computers, Chris Johnson (1999) 
highlights an important factor in Human Factors; a “…bias towards major accidents”. 
He goes on to suggest that this is a barrier to the uptake of Human Factors in industry 
and the full utilisation of techniques. These are the high profile, high cost (in monetary 
and life terms) accidents that cover the front pages and can send the public into frenzy. 
Thankfully, the majority of “events” involving human error result in an incident (or even 
non-event) rather than a catastrophic accident and these can be considered by many 
to be “Free Lessons”. Reason (1997) spends some time discussing the idea that safety 
awareness and defence is highest post-accident. This may then dwindle over time as 
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accidents are expected to happen to someone else and, as per his “surprise 
attribution”, not happen to themselves. Ideally, incidents should be used to create a 
safer environment within these systems and organisations to a similar extent that 
accidents have been in the past. Safety systems such as CHIRPS (the Confidential 
Human Factors Incident Reporting System) or BASIS (British Airways Safety 
Information System) attempt to do this. Reason (1997) again rather cleverly relates 
incidents to inoculations that may be protective measures for a period of time after the 
event. This of course is reliant on useful interpretation, investigation and dissemination. 
As the number of catastrophic accidents in aviation, and other highly complex 
industries, decreases over time due to increases in safety, so the lessons that can be 
learned from them also decrease. This results in the awareness of what can happen 
also passing out of the current mindset. It must become that incidents do not only 
receive the cursory or routine attention in investigation that they have to date; they 
must be the new “accident”, in investigative terms, until we fully learn all the lessons 
they may have to offer us. This movement to fully utilise incidents due to the falling 
accident numbers has been discussed as far back in the literature as Rasmussen in 
1988 yet we are still not fully taking advantage of the resource available to us. The 
concentration of investigation also must develop in order to truly utilise these incidents 
to their utmost. We must begin to look at where incidents went right and the positive 
circumstances that may be developed into preventative measures in the future. There 
are, of course, caveats to any statement such as this and care must be taken not to 
return to a “throw more regulations at it” type attitude. Within this, it appears something 
is being done about safety but such counter-measures may have negative implications 
for some aspects of work or elsewhere within the system. Incidents may be a true step 
towards proactivity in safety management until such a time as fully proactive error 
prediction techniques, which are admittedly in their infancy, can make a larger 
contribution to complex systems. 
2.4.2 Common Cause  
In order to get the most from incidents, this research intends to analyse them to the 
same extent as accidents (and even look to predict potential outcomes based on 
incident investigation) in order to ascertain whether lessons are being missed. 
However, before we can do this another hurdle must be addressed. The whole premise 
on which the usefulness of investigating incidents in order to reveal information about 
accident causation is balanced around what is commonly referred to as the Common 
Cause Hypothesis. This dictates that the causal pathway leading to an accident is 
fundamentally the same as that leading to an incident, or near miss, with the significant 
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alteration of one or several factors that lead to a changed outcome (one not of an 
accident).  
This was first discussed in Heinrich‟s (1931) Industrial Accident Prevention. Although 
there has been some work to assess the validity of such a common cause, it appears 
as if the similarity of causal pathways for incidents and accidents has become 
confounded with issues of severity and frequency of incidents and accidents (Wright 
and Van der Schaaf, 2004). Perhaps the basis of this confusion is in the way Heinrich 
and others (e.g., Bird, 1996 and Salminen et al., 1992) carried out ratio based studies 
in order to try and prove or disprove the relationship between incident and accident. In 
fact, in Wright and Van der Schaaf‟s paper they go on to discuss the confusion found in 
all the studies they found (of pertinence) that suggested an argument for, or against, 
the common cause theory. In other words, the theory itself has never really been 
proven and yet it is the basis for so much near-miss based work. 
Dekker and Hollnagel (1999) several times allude to an evolution towards failure that 
releases pre-cursor events to an accident and signal the vulnerability of the system. 
They suggest that the sequences of events leading up to an incident or accident are 
almost identical and they share traits of human-automation breakdown. This holds 
firmly in view the common cause for accidents and incidents in the most complex of 
socio-technical systems and human-computer interactions. Indeed there appears to be 
much empirical evidence (although the link not proven or attempted to be proven) to 
suggest that correct investigation of incidents could prevent accidents. Woods et al‟s 
(1994) analysis of a 1992 Strasbourg crash showed that a previous British Airways 
incident had many of the same details but the information did not get to those who 
needed it in order to prevent the accident. This is one of many articles in the literature 
that illustrate the previous existence of incidents that did not have a catastrophic end 
yet accidents followed with too many of the same precursors. Indeed this again 
emphasises the communication issues that the details of incident investigations and 
reports need to be directed to the correct people. Working with Orasanu and Connolly‟s 
(1993) concept of Naturalistic Decision Making we can see that people tend not to 
bring situations back to first principles for knowledge based behaviour when novel. 
Instead, they rely on comparisons with previous encounters and from this we can 
surmise that the more knowledge of previous events we can give our crews, the higher 
the possibility that comparisons may be correct. 
This is not to say that all cases of remedial action following on from an incident result in 
a totally positive outcome. Reason (1997) discusses a couple of case studies where 
this is not true including one from Three Mile Island in 1979. There are also cases in 
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aviation such as that involving the introduction of takeoff monitors during the 1950s 
following a number of accidents on contaminated runways. This device directed pilots 
to the “correct” takeoff attitude for the conditions in order to resolve problems identified 
in previous incidents of flight crews demanding the incorrect attitude. Following the 
failure of a retaining screw within the unit, an unusually high angle of attack was 
commanded by the device and following the instructions, the flight crew stalled the 
aircraft and crashed back onto the runway. This illustrates succinctly the danger of 
merely introducing new guidelines, practices or regulations in not actually identifying 
and preventing the problem and cause of accidents. As Don Norman (1990) concludes, 
if analyses are isolated so the improvements that result from them may also be isolated 
potentially leading to new problems at the system level. 
Wright and Van der Schaaf‟s study worked at a very general level and in very limited 
conditions within the railways using data from CIRAS (Confidential Incident Reporting 
and Analysis System). It is, however, the only paper of its kind in a search of the 
literature that appears to address the actual assumption of common cause. This does 
introduce the idea of further significant work possibly using BASIS, CHIRPS and other 
reporting systems in different industries to get a multi-level study of common cause 
presence. This would give a clear grounding to further work in promoting the use of 
incident data to prevent accidents. 
There are proponents, such as Dekker (2005), of the banality of accident theory. This 
suggests that incidents do not in fact precede accidents in systems safer than 1 in 10-7 
events. Before this point he suggests that indeed incidents may be precursors of an 
event and useful as such. Dekker says that normal work precedes accidents in these 
states and this in itself goes against the ideas discussed by Reason and those 
defending common cause. Leveson (2002) too refers to papers by Edwards (1981) and 
Kjellen (1982) claiming “data on near-miss (incident) reporting suggest that cause for 
these events are mainly attributed to technical deviations while similar events that 
result in losses are more often blamed on human error.” (Leveson, 2002, p. 21) This 
however, may be due to reporting practices and characteristics of human reporting 
procedures rather than true causation difference. This is a different view of the coin that 
may be answered with further study on the core of common cause theory. 
2.4.3 Realising the potential 
We have already mentioned a diminishing return through accident investigation alone. 
Accidents are rare events leading to a population size that is not good enough for any 
form of statistical analysis to show the state of the system (Waldock, 1992). It could be 
more useful to start treating incidents in this way; „incident‟ becoming the new 
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„accident‟. Westrum‟s (1992) organisational cultures illustrate quite clearly that those 
organisations with a generative nature would be most likely not just to collect incident 
data and reports, which is not enough in itself, but also to act on them appropriately. 
They would also treat those making the report fairly and in a positive manner 
(notwithstanding the discussions centred around blame or misconduct).  
Incidents, when properly examined, may also allow us to get past the hurdle of 
hindsight. A chain of events have occurred that may be interrogated and the individuals 
are still present to discuss their feelings and position at the time; we can actually ask 
what and who was aware of what at any time. Incidents are in short, all of the negative, 
common cause withstanding, events which allow positive investigation returns without 
the completely negative and destructive end. Although Reason (1997) feels accidents 
are indeed necessary for the development of an organisation it is contended that the 
answer should be no; if incidents are given the precedence accidents received in the 
past twenty years or so then the number may be reduced and the safety of the industry 
increased as a whole. 
Reason (1997) goes on to discuss how redundancy in systems may hide mistakes or 
errors. This, he suggests, may be negative to safety evolution within an organisation as 
the ability to learn from them is diminished. However, this is also true whereby 
incidents if not used to their full extent also makes these complex systems more 
opaque to users. Information that may prove useful if attacked in the right way is being 
wasted. One cautionary note at this point, however, is that if incident data are to be 
utilised fully, and as such shared in the public domain for researchers and other 
companies to view, they must not form the basis for a new „league-table‟ of safe 
airlines, crew, or industries as this will have only negative effects on the reporting side 
of incident data. 
In order to glean the highest standard of information from our incident data we first 
need a system for collecting and investigating data. This is far from simple as the 
literature discussions to date have pointed out. In recent years we have seen the 
development of some very exciting and useful incident reporting tools such as the UK 
CAA‟s CHIRPs (Confidential Human factors Incident Reporting Program), the USA 
NTSB AIRS (Aircraft Incident Reporting System) and British Airway‟s BASIS programs 
to name but a few. These systems are an amalgamation of data, with voluntary and 
mandatory reporting procedures for incidents and accidents set out by national 
authorities or airlines themselves. In order to gain as much information as possible 
systems such as BASIS use voluntary reporting forms from pilots then engage the crew 
by telephone, or no-blame inquiries in Qantas‟ INDICATE proactive safety program 
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(Braithwaite, 2001). In using open-ended and specific questions, investigators try to 
work out not just what happened but also why. This „why‟ has become more important 
to these systems in recent times as the data are increasing. As a result, the data was 
useful for a while showing trends of „what‟ is occurring but struggled to show „why‟ an 
event or situation may have occurred. Concentration on the latter may lead to a better 
safeguard than event logs per se. CIRAS too, the confidential reporting system for the 
UK railways (Davies et al., 2000) has been struggling with large quantities of data but 
limited information on why the events are occurring. Some of this may be due to the 
way in which the comparatively immature reporting system is approached by 
employees in the railways and may develop in time. Here a development towards 
looking at the bigger picture of the safety of the system and what the reports are telling 
the analysts is crucial. This is not to say that it would be an easy task with such a large 
number of data and a possible entire culture shifts being required. 
2.4.4 Reporting Issues 
At the heart of these reporting systems, as already mentioned, is normally the word 
„voluntary‟. Even in „mandatory‟ schemes, the crews involved are relied upon to not 
only „own up‟ to an event or „error‟ but also to be prepared to think about how, what and 
why this happened so that lessons can be learned. This is asking a lot from commercial 
airline crews especially as they already feel their time is under pressure. Many see 
these duties as more paper-work taking them away from their principal flying role. 
There is also the issue of embarrassment that Braithwaite (2001) picks up on so 
clearly. 
Mentioned in chapter 2, the idea of blame is even more prevalent in a society where 
voluntary means possibly putting yourself forward for “the chop”. De-identification of the 
individuals involved is the simplest step taken towards encouraging individuals to come 
forward. It is important and widely acknowledged in the literature (and thus feeding into 
organisations slowly) that although there is emotional satisfaction in blaming individuals 
there is little or no effect on future fallibility of that individual if blamed. Again, we are 
unable to change the human condition but must work with it. There is still a long 
standing question with the legal position though, especially as Braithwaite (2001) points 
out in the USA where litigation is a serious business (now also becoming overused in 
the UK and around the globe). Much of the literature around this area at first 
encouraged the position of a „no-blame‟ culture. However, this can be just as negative 
as a „blame‟ culture. With „no-blame‟, there can be no come back or remedial measures 
taken for truly culpable acts of negligence or acts extremely removed from training. 
This is where the idea of a „Just‟ culture was developed. It was correctly recognised 
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that although a system was needed to encourage the reporting of incidents, where 
individuals were truly responsible or negligent then action could be taken whether it be 
remedial training, merely a union representative talking to the crew involved (as in 
BASIS after any important reports submitted) or even legal proceedings. There are 
bases in the literature such as Neil Johnston‟s substitution test (1996) to assess 
whether blame is a fair or necessary element to a situation. In this psychological test, it 
is suggested that where an individual‟s actions are judged to be possible unsafe acts in 
relation to an event, the individual concerned is replaced by someone of similar 
qualifications and experience. The following question is then posed: “In the light of how 
events unfolded and were perceived by those involved in real time, is it likely that this 
new individual would have behaved any differently?” If the answer is “probably not” 
then Johnston asserts that “…apportioning blame has no material role to play….” This 
allows a simple comparison between peers and allows for a just analysis of the need 
for blame or not. 
There is also important cautionary recognition throughout the literature that indeed the 
most poorly reported incidents, whether due to embarrassment or non-detection, may 
well be the most dangerous “latent pathogens” out there in the system. Indeed, Dekker 
(2005) elaborates at great length about the difficulties of relying on an individual to 
recognise one‟s own mistakes. This is particularly poignant when working in a complex 
environment whereby one believes they are doing normal work and nothing special is 
occurring. Even an outsider viewing a „mistake‟ may not be correct in that it is a 
mistake to them but inside the head and „world‟ of the individual it is a normal action at 
that time. This is an interesting area, in attempting to use incident data, which may be 
worth investigating further together with its implications on incident reporting. This is a 
new idea compared to the work of Woods (1984) showing how individuals or their co-
workers in nuclear industries identified the errors they had made. If there is an innate 
difficulty in identifying errors, especially at the rule and skill based levels, then this is 
going to leave incident and accident investigation with an almost unconquerable chasm 
in attaining our goals. In a similar vein, Guastello (1996) cited a Swedish study which 
illustrated a need to train individuals in what to report and what not to report in terms of 
what actually is an incident; i.e., the quality of reporting is just as important as the 
quantity. 
The story doesn‟t end there however, and the literature has examples of the need for 
action on whatever reports are made in order to encourage future reporting by crews or 
individuals (Dekker and Hollnagel, 1999).  
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2.4.5 The future for Incident Use 
Once again though, even if we do collect enough of the right information and are able 
to apply thorough investigative techniques it is effectively useless unless that 
information is communicated to those that matter: individuals within organisations at all 
levels. Indeed, beyond simply disseminating the information within the company, 
Christopher Hart (FAA Assistant Administrator for System Safety) “…believes that the 
only way of further reducing airline accident rates is the sharing of safety information.” 
(Male, 1997, p. 24) Inherent in this sharing of information though would have to be an 
evolution in inter-company relations. This would particularly be with respect to 
commercially sensitive or confidential information and data. Safety cannot afford to 
take a back seat to company secrecy but this is of course an idealist view. 
I think it is also time for the industry to begin really concentrating on the elements in 
incident reports that lead to successful outcomes; these are a truly positive and 
proactive element to investigating near-misses. Reason (2008) too believes it is time to 
return to the „heroes‟ of events rather than treating all involved as „villains‟. Johnston‟s 
substitution test again has scope for application here. Would, for example, another pilot 
have saved flight UA232 (an engine failure resulted in damaged and unusable flight 
controls leaving the crew to use the two remaining engines for control) given the same 
circumstances. What is the heroic element either of individuals who avert accidents or 
of a system that does so? As appears to be standard amongst this research though 
there are warnings such as from Habberley et al. (1986, p.50) suggesting that near-
misses resulting in a successful outcome may cause crews to be more daring in the 
future and believe they can “get away with it”. The crux of the argument with incidents 
is that organisations in high-risk situations must develop a „learning culture‟ and 
continually reflect upon their practices through monitoring and feedback (Pidgeon and 
O‟Leary, 2000). This requires flexibility of organisations that comes right back to the 
opening arguments of the “tug of war” between cost/production and safety. Braithwaite 
(2001) discusses how Qantas allow their crews access to practice onboard simulators 
whilst not in use for training. As such, he points out, pilots have a natural quality that 
they want to improve and be the best so flexibilities like this can make a very big 
difference within the organisation. This determination to improve, I would argue, has 
even overtaken the feeling discussed by Beaty (1995) that safety was viewed as a 
feminine attribute discouraging pilots from taking it too seriously. This, linked with 
improved dissemination of the result of these investigations and analyses, will aim to 
improve the accident rate beyond its almost twenty year plateau. As Reason put it: 
“Errors arise from informational problems. They are best tackled by improving the 
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available information – either in the person‟s head or in the workplace.” (Reason, 1997, 
p.154) 
2.5 The Influence of Modern Technology 
In the past twenty years or so automation has had significant effects on the role and job 
of flight deck crew but despite this, the accident level as we have seen has remained 
relatively constant. With the advent of increased automation and redundant safety in 
complex flight systems, the role of the pilot is oft quote in the literature as becoming 
more of a monitoring role removed from the physical control of the aeroplane. Indeed, 
through this increase in automation (and possibly a significant factor in encouraging it) 
is the decrease in slips made by the human actor in the system. This, however, comes 
at a price as the errors made tend to be of a higher order and therefore can be much 
more serious. There is still not enough known about the issues of new „sharp-end‟ 
technology and their effect on a system. More concerning than this is the reluctance of 
commercial aviation manufacturers to fully integrate and adopt Human Factors 
perspectives in products (although this may partially due to the fact that designs tend 
not to be „new‟ but rather „developed‟ from past models) (Harris, 2007 and 2009). The 
following section introduces some of the issues that will need to be addressed in order 
for the crossover from academia to be realised in the commercial aviation industry in 
particular. 
The importance of Human Factors is not reduced because of an increase in system 
reliability and complexity; indeed it is effectively increased. As Woods et al. (1994, 
p.181) quotes a director of safety at an aircraft manufacturer, “you can incorporate all 
the human engineering you want in an aircraft. It is not going to work if the human does 
not want to read what is presented to him, and verify that he hasn‟t made an error.” 
Although a slightly harsh summary of the role of humans and Human Factors it does 
reinforce the issue that humans are, more often than not, the limiting factor (Harris, 
2006). Sarter, Woods and Billings (1997) put in focus the situation by describing „the 
substitution myth‟. This contends that simple substitution of people by machines to 
improve system safety whilst retaining previous standards is an oversimplification and 
a fallacy (Harris, 2006). Instead the substitution has a far-reaching effect on the system 
and changes the role of human operators. In other words, machines cannot simply 
replace humans and humans must rely on interaction with machines for jobs at which 
they perform better. In any given situation both are affected by the other; a linked 
system. This means the system works on the basis of function allocation and playing to 
the strengths of the interaction is of the utmost importance. Arguably where things may 
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fail more than not are at the interfaces of this interaction; the points of information 
transfer. 
The development of more advanced systems brings about new varieties of pitfalls for 
the human actor in the system. Errors resulting from mode-errors, abnormal situation 
recoveries and monitoring duties simply did not exist until the technology to create 
these pitfalls was present and integrated to modern air transport. 
The problem of human-machine interaction has many layers to it that increase in 
complexity to model and understand. One such layer discussed by Rasmussen (2000; 
cited in Woods and Dekker, 2000) is attempting to predict the way in which humans will 
react to new technologies and in particular to that natural human facet of work: The 
work-around that may lead to errors or problems. Woods and Dekker also point out 
that, although an answer to the problem is not so easily identifiable, it is hard to study 
current world technology and effects of introducing new technology. They argue that 
this introduction effectively changes the world into which it enters; an almost 
paradoxical situation that may only be changed with greater emphasis on predictive 
models and improved understanding of the system working and interacting as a whole. 
(Figure 2-9) 
 
Figure 2-9 – Illustration of the interaction between technology and task (Carroll et al., 
1991) 
Many studies and papers have been written looking at the effects of increased 
automation on pilot performance. Wood (2004) carried out a review for the CAA on 
“Flight Crew Reliance on Automation” and from this learned that indeed pilots have 
become more reliant on systems especially as those systems have become more 
reliable. This harks back to the idea mooted by Reason that lack of an accident draws 
people‟s attention away from safety issues; in the same way the lack of the systems 
failing draws people into a false illusion of safety. Another interesting point that arises 
from this paper, and one that has recently resurfaced in popular aviation media and 
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academia (e.g., Ebbatson, 2009), is that of whether commercial pilots have indeed lost 
manual flying skills due to their over-reliance on automation. A spin off of this may well 
be related to points discussed in the GA section about relevance of training for 
commercial pilots on manual flying skills. 
2.6 Conclusions 
This review of current literature has identified several areas where improvements can 
be made to the methods, tools and underlying models for aviation accident 
investigation. It can be seen throughout the chapter that the dominant theory behind 
many methods and current viewpoints is a model developed from linear domino style 
research. There are, however, more recent developments which have begun to evolve 
from a new and exciting approach which tries to combat any linearity. It is in this area 
that much future work must be carried out to refine and hone current and novel 
methodologies.   
Stanton et al. (2006), discussed in section 2.2.3, confirm the need for aviation specific 
models of investigation that are usable yet flexible enough to be applied to the 
polarised spread of incidents occurring. It has also been discussed that there is scope 
for improvement and modification of current techniques rather than necessarily having 
to develop a brand new method (of which there are arguably already too many!). 
The central problem that has surfaced from this review of the literature is that many of 
the tools that are currently in use are very good at certain aspects of the job but given 
the complexity of the world in which they are being applied they are often found 
lacking. There is also the balance between a complex method reflecting a complex 
system versus the desire to keep a method simple and this is proving problematic for 
many current methods.  
2.7 Chapter summary 
This research has identified the need for a method that can not only handle the 
complex sociotechnical systems it aims to investigate, but can also progress beyond 
being reactive to proactive and even predictive. The chapter began exploring the 
history and development of accident investigation techniques, it then introduces more 
complex non-linear theories that may provide further development and finally 
addresses the needs of the aviation community in terms of a suitable tool.  
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The aims of this thesis, therefore, can be summarised as follows: 
This project will aim to look at developments of bottom-up investigative models. This 
will concentrate on looking into an area of merging predictive modelling into 
investigation so that we might reach a goal of proactive investigation and accident 
reduction. This chapter has highlighted significant gaps in current practice and these 
include the need to develop a method that draws from the positive aspects of both 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies and incidents in addition to accidents. The 
need has also been revealed for a method which can be universally applied across 
aviation (general and commercial) to understand both catastrophic events but also 
near-misses and ideally normal-work. Most significantly is the requirement for a method 
which can better reflect the dynamic and complex real-world events that it is trying to 
understand more fully. This requires a movement away from linear models and a return 
to understanding the importance of the „sharp-end‟ of Human Factors. The most viable 
way to address these issues is to begin to look at more complex network type 
approaches to accident investigation. This new method would need to embrace the 
multi-causal, non-linear system in which these aviation events take place. 
The subsequent chapters identify and apply a novel methodology within aviation and 
then look to refine and develop that model before applying it with an industrial partner. 
It is hoped the work will help progress past a stagnant level of safety in complex socio-
technical organisations. 
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3 A complex approach to a 
complex scenario
6
 
 
3.1 Chapter introduction 
In order to truly understand and begin to move forward within the field of accident 
mitigation it is the opinion in this project that it is important to break down accident 
causation into its constituent elements without losing the dynamic properties of the real 
world situation. This allows us, as discussed in chapter 2, to highlight not only the 
negative elements resulting in accidents or near-misses but also gives us the 
opportunity to begin to study the positive elements of any event and how these avoided 
worsening situations.  
It is not enough to simply create a timeline of tasks carried out by actors within a 
scenario and suggest those actions contributed or otherwise to the resultant outcome 
(akin to „Domino‟ style cause and event chains). Whilst aviation accident analysis has 
traditionally been dominated by linear models of causation (e.g., Heinrich, 1931), the 
complexity of factors in many accidents, including increasing levels of design 
complexity, make it difficult to fit them to a simplistic „domino‟ model.  Even the current 
„world standard‟ for aviation accident investigations (Reason‟s „Swiss cheese‟ model; 
Reason, 1990, 1997), despite being highly successful over years of application, is still 
limited by a linear approach which cannot capture the full complexity in the chain of 
events and relies too heavily on a post-mortem analysis (Dekker, 2005). In this chapter, 
more fluid, non-linear representation of the system space is adopted. This illustrates 
                                               
6
 This chapter is the basis for the following journal publication: Griffin, T. G. C., Young, M. S., 
Stanton, N. A. (2010). Investigating accident causation through information network modelling. 
Ergonomics, 53: 2. 198-210. (Attached in Annexe 1) 
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where decisions were made and the event took place emphasising the dynamic 
interaction between agents and the central role of information transfer - communication 
- in optimising complex systems. 
One must look further into the dynamic world that we have already discovered: “Even 
relatively simple aviation tasks involve multiple agents (human or non-human), 
dispersed throughout time and space (pilots, air traffic controllers, flight management 
systems etc.), working together towards a common goal, and with emergent properties 
which may not be easily predicted from the task inputs.  Thus the analysis of such 
tasks warrants a multi-causal, multi-linear and multi-agent approach.” (Griffin et al., 
2007, p.1)  
3.2 Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork (EAST) 
The first challenge was to find a suitable method to break down accidents and incidents 
into their constituent parts. It is proposed that a new model based on methods of 
complex system analysis may be applied to aviation accidents. One such framework 
which appeared to analyse the events in a suitable way was The Event Analysis of 
Systemic Teamwork method (EAST; Stanton et al., 2008). EAST was originally 
developed as a “toolkit” Human Factors method fusing several other well known and 
published methods in order to examine the role of actors and groups of actors to gain a 
more complete picture of complex socio-technical systems. This multifaceted approach 
has the potential, when all aspects are interlinked, of providing a more comprehensive 
representation of the system. This focus on the system in which an event takes place 
rather than the event (or agents within that event) itself is something that no model 
reviewed in chapter 2 attempted and could elicit major benefits. It has been applied to a 
number of domains, including military vessels (Gregoriades & Sutcliffe, 2006), rail 
(Walker et al., 2006) and „command, control, communications, computers and 
intelligence‟ (C4i) scenarios in the military (Stanton et al., 2006), all of which have 
parallels with aviation tasks.  However, it has not yet been applied to accident analysis.   
Through this novel application, EAST could allow for the causal events to be 
deconstructed into three major networks and it was hoped that from this conclusions 
could be drawn and links between the layers of the networks made to form a fully 
three-dimensional model of the accident build-up. EAST breaks down events into three 
major networks: Task, Social and Information (Figure 3-1; for a more detailed review of 
the methodology see Stanton et al, 2008).  This network approach allows for the study 
of a system in a dynamic and complex way rather than a linear chain in that it covers 
the „who‟ (agents), the „what‟ (tasks), the „how‟ (communication/teamwork), the „why‟ 
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(knowledge), the „when‟ (by a timeline) and the „where‟ (through an operations 
sequence diagram). EAST therefore allows a detailed view of the complexity of the 
system and a comprehensive examination of information flow across the networks. It 
opens an opportunity to investigate where things go wrong, particularly from the multi-
causal perspective - errors or weak links within the networks can migrate onto other 
pathways and ultimately lead to a system failure. This multi-causal approach is in 
complete contrast to the linear models that dominated the literature review. This could 
allow for a more natural deconstruction of a system and a system‟s events removing 
many of the artificial and over-simplified aspects of previous methods. 
In order to accomplish this, the three networks described above are firstly created for 
„snapshots‟ in time, and can then be animated over a period to illustrate the changes 
within the networks. The changes over time are equally informative as the status of the 
network on each snapshot. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Interrelationship between Task, Social and Information networks (adapted 
from Stanton et al., 2008) 
One major area where EAST differs to a number of well-published methodologies in 
aviation safety, e.g., STAMP (Leveson, 2004) and HFACS (Wiegmann and Shapell, 
2003), is its non-taxonomic approach. This is obviously not to say that taxonomic 
approaches are any less valid or useful in their own right; indeed their number is 
greater than any other form of model. However, EAST attempts to represent the 
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system “as is”. From this EAST allows identification of issues arising from decisions 
made and the information that is or is not available to the correct person at the correct 
time thus centralising the concept of situation awareness (SA) and beyond that 
introducing measures of team SA (Salmon et al., 2008).   
Situation awareness (SA) is often used as a blanket causal term for accidents involving 
pilots (i.e., Human Factors issues) within the aviation industry. In fact, some studies 
have concluded SA, or loss of it, is a leading causal factor in aviation incidents (e.g., 
Hartel, Smith and Prince, 1991). SA, however, remains a contentious topic within the 
human factors community. Despite much work into the SA of individuals, there is much 
to be learned about how individuals work together as teams in complex systems and 
how their SA is shared, or distributed (Salmon et al., 2008). Information networks may 
allow a more in depth understanding of this phenomenon. 
To date, EAST has not been applied to accident analysis; in this thesis the 
methodology is used to describe an aviation accident case study for the first time, and 
from there we explore the potential for prospective use of the information networks in 
particular. 
The crux of this study then, is the idea that inter-network and intra-network 
communication (both verbal and non-verbal) forms the basis of effective performance 
and as such reduces the likelihood of an accident or negative event from occurring or 
going uncorrected. Under this assumption the primary network of concern was the 
knowledge network – who owns what knowledge, and how is it being communicated 
around the network? 
In order to assess the suitability of EAST as a method for accident analysis in aviation 
a case study is described in the following section. This case study provides the basis 
for a comprehensive review of the EAST method and then opens up pathways for 
development and improvement. 
3.3 The Kegworth Air Disaster 
Central to this study was the issue of identifying a suitable case study to analyse. This 
needed to balance a relatively simple causation with enough depth of knowledge of the 
events that led to the accident. Since this project predominantly focuses on the Human 
Factors of accident analysis it was also important that these factors were reported by 
the investigating body as being of significance to the outcome rather than purely 
mechanical or other facets (this of course does not preclude any factor being involved 
in addition to the human agents). 
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The crash of a Boeing 737-400 near Kegworth in Leicestershire on the 8th January 
1989 was identified as being suitable for a preliminary application of the novel accident 
analysis technique, in particular because the official Air Accidents Investigation Bureau 
(AAIB) report included enough detail to populate the networks (including interviews with 
the crew themselves). The Kegworth crash is also noteworthy as it is one of the first 
involving the new design of cockpit instrumentation known as glass-cockpits, hailed as 
one of the greatest single leaps in pilot-machine interaction. 
The synopsis below is taken from the official AAIB Report (Aircraft Accident Report 
Number 4/90 (EW/C1095)): 
“G-OBME left Heathrow Airport for Belfast at 1952 hrs with 8 crew and 118 
passengers (including 1 infant) onboard. As the aircraft was climbing through 
28,300 feet the outerpanel of one blade in the fan of the No. 1 (left) engine 
detached. This gave rise to a series of compressor stalls in the No. 1 engine, 
which resulted in airframe shuddering, ingress of smoke and fumes to the flight 
deck and fluctuations of the No. 1 engine parameters. Believing that the No. 2 
engine had suffered damage, the crew throttled that engine back and 
subsequently shut it down. The shuddering caused the surging of the No. 1 
engine ceased as soon as the No. 2 engine was throttled back, which 
persuaded the crew that they had dealt correctly with the emergency. They then 
shut down the No. 2 engine. The No.1 engine operated apparently normally 
after the initial period of severe vibration and during the subsequent descent. 
The crew initiated a diversion to East Midlands Airport and received radar 
direction from air traffic control to position the aircraft for an instrument 
approach to land on runway 27. The approach continued normally, although 
with a high level of vibration from the No.1 engine, until an abrupt reduction of 
power, followed by a fire warning, occurred on this engine at a point 2.4 nm 
from the runway. Efforts to restart the No. 2 engine were not successful. 
The aircraft initially struck a field adjacent to the eastern embankment of the M1 
motorway and then suffered a second severe impact on the sloping western 
embankment of the motorway some 2 nm from the runway. 
Thirty-nine passengers died in the accident and a further eight passengers died 
later from their injuries. Of the other seventy-nine occupants, seventy-four 
suffered serious injury.” 
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It is evident, even from such a brief summary, that this event was entwined with 
complex Human Factors issues. It was not just the flight crew who were involved in this 
situation, as the „team‟ extended to air traffic controllers, flight operations personnel, 
cabin crew and the passengers themselves. Confusion arose on the flight deck over 
which engine had suffered damage and the flight crew were unable to elicit the correct 
information from their instrumentation or from the cabin crew and passengers, some of 
whom had witnessed the damage occurring. This multitude of factors, still relevant to 
aviation today, makes the Kegworth crash, despite being quite dated, a good candidate 
for the multi-causal, multi-agent analysis offered by a network approach. Indeed, due to 
the age of this accident a number of studies have been published investigating the 
accident (e.g. Johnson 1995, and, Besnard 2004) and also the method of investigation 
and reporting itself (e.g. Johnson 1997). This results in a significant amount of data and 
information to work with. Therefore, since the aim of this chapter is to introduce the 
application of a methodology to an aviation accident rather than attempt to deduce new 
knowledge from the event, the previous investigation of this case study allows for a 
greater comparison of techniques and findings. 
3.4 Data Gathering 
The EAST methodology uses an Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) as the foundation of 
information retrieval from a defined scenario. In the case of this study, a formal report 
was used and as such an HTA-type technique could be used to analyse the text of a 
report. However, as a preliminary study, it was decided to keep the analysis at a macro 
level and the analysis was carried out by the author under the supervision of EAST 
specialists. The text was used in its original state to collate the information required for 
the formation of the networks. From the report and event transcript (i.e., the 
documentation pre-discussion and conclusion) it was possible to break the scenario 
down into three easily distinguishable action snapshots:  
1. Realisation of  problem and immediate actions 
2. Engine Shutdown 
3. Descent and Final Approach 
Within each of these sub-scenarios, separated temporally, task networks were 
developed to encompass the actions of the agents onboard the aircraft and those 
involved outside of the aircraft (e.g., ATC and Flight Operations). The tasks were 
identified from their coverage in the report and the author‟s knowledge of the phases of 
flight and are illustrated in Figures 3-2 to 3-4. 
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Figure 3-2 – Task Network in Snapshot 1 
©    Griffin, T. G. C.   Chapter 3 – A complex approach... 
 52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3 – Task Network in Snapshot 2 
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Figure 3-4 – Task Network in Snapshot 3 
EAST uses the HTA and other information gathered about the scenario to develop 
Communications Usage Diagrams (CUDs) and a Social Network Analysis (SNA), which 
illustrates the social network present at the time. In the same vein, the AAIB transcripts 
available through the formal report were analysed to construct communications 
diagrams (in the same sense illustrating the social set-up) for each of the three action 
sequences (Figures 3-5 to 3-7). The arrows represent the level of communication 
between agents; high, medium or low. These terms are based on the number of 
interactions recorded in the accident data (from the report stating an interaction 
between flight crew for example or recorded transcript evidence of a radio 
communication) and show the relative passages and levels of communication. 
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Figure 3-5 – Communication Network in Snapshot 1 
 
 
 
Figure 3-6 - Communication Network in Snapshot 2 
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Figure 3-7 - Communication Network in Snapshot 3 
 
The third network that completes this total system view of the aviation event is similar 
to EAST‟s Information Network. There is much discussion in the literature (e.g., Ogden, 
1987; Collins and Loftus, 1975) about specific uses of the terms and networks that are 
used to denote knowledge and the presence or lack of it. As such, it is important to 
clarify the exact representations illustrated in this approach to a knowledge network to 
work in conjunction with the CUD and Task type networks above. For the purposes of 
this study, the nodes present within the information network are words or terms taken 
directly from the AAIB report similar to methods used in task analysis techniques 
(including the narrative and transcript) to represent „available information elements‟ 
(i.e., raw information that is present within the system at any particular time). These 
information element words were identified in a novel way compared to the original 
EAST methodology. Information element nodes were populated through analysing the 
report text and compiling a list of noun-like words (i.e. those that name a person, place 
or thing (Allen, 1984)). 
These elements are then connected to each other using propositional terms such as 
„has‟, „displays‟, „causes‟ or „senses‟ to create the networks. Walker et al. (2009) 
identify, in the construction of information networks, this process as akin to practices 
common in linguistics research.  
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The EAST methodology then attempts to use the results of each of the three networks 
to create a theoretical 3-dimensional interconnecting network. However, in order to 
develop the method further, in this study the networks are further refined by highlighting 
those information elements that are „owned‟ or activated by any particular actor, human 
or machine, at any particular time (cf. Sarter and Woods, 1991). The author, again with 
guidance if required from the team that developed EAST, worked through the AAIB 
document and identified occasions when a node was referred to by an actor or in 
relation to a non-human agent. Examples of this would include where the first officer 
spoke of a fire; this would identify conscious ownership of the information element 
relating to fire. Additionally from the data recorders on board the aircraft details of the 
vibration indicator readings and fuel flow etc. could be gathered and from this it could 
be decided whether the aircraft systems owned the information or not. 
This ownership is denoted by colour in the networks. In this way, the network allows us 
to view which information elements could (or even should in an ideal world) be 
consciously owned, and which ones are actually owned. This allows us to identify 
where communication breakdowns can occur - that is, where crucial information is not 
being shared throughout the entire network. As such, it is the aim that in a prospective 
sense, this eventually shows us where the major problems and faults may arise to lead 
to an accident or incident. 
Due to the nature of the information gathered from aviation accidents it was not 
possible to use primary sources of information other than those reproduced, in part, in 
the accident report. However, the method has been developed so that analysis can be 
based upon evidence directly available to investigators at the time of any event 
including witness reports, flight data recordings and crew reports. 
Figures 3-9 to 3-11 represent the spread of information in the three separate action 
tasks for the events leading up to the crash of G-OBME at Kegworth (A key is provided 
as Table 3-1). The information networks presented here have moved on from the 
traditional EAST approach in that elements of the task and communication networks 
are included through the coloured ownership of nodes. It allows the focus to remain on 
the information networks and remove the need to draw on all three networks at once. 
Figure 3-8 guides the reader through the five-step methodology adopted to create 
these information networks: 
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Figure 3-8 – The five-step methodology to create the information networks 
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Figure 3-9 – Information Network in Snapshot 1 
Figure 3-10 – Information Network in Snapshot 2 
Figure 3-11 – Information Network in Snapshot 3 
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Figure 3-12 – Information Network uncoloured for clarity 
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Node colour (or part constituent) Agent consciously owning information 
Red Captain 
Blue First Officer 
Yellow Engine Instrument System 
Green Cabin Crew 
Purple Passengers 
Table 3-1 - Colour Key for Figures 3-8 to 3-10 (Figure 3-12 has also been included in the 
thesis without ownership colouring to make the node labels easier to read) 
3.5 Analysis of networks 
This section begins to draw conclusions from the networks that have been developed. 
Key to this section is the concept of ownership and where two nodes that are linked do 
not share the exact same colours (i.e. are owned by the same agents) there is an issue 
of information loss or gain that needs to be investigated further. Equally where a node 
is not active (or owned) where it may well be expected to be that too is an issue for 
further investigation. Later in the chapter the issue of time is also addressed as 
networks can be animated over time (snapshots or ideally continuously in future 
versions) and where nodes change colour (ownership) so again an issue of information 
entering or leaving the system between networks is identified. 
The task network for each snapshot illustrates the actions that are being carried out by 
all actors within the scenario and is a reference point from which to understand the 
communication and knowledge transfer that is in progress. The communication network 
too helps to ground the knowledge elements in the wider picture and allows for us to 
relate the transfer (or not) of these elements between humans and machines. These 
two networks in particular are envisaged to come into their own when further work is 
carried out to integrate and link the three networks together forming an inter-network 
and intra-network three dimensional network model of the accident sequence. 
The network of particular interest at this stage in the thesis is that of the information 
elements. Immediately visible, even without a detailed knowledge of the events, are 
elements of information that are present and “owned” at any particular time. This in 
itself is a novel approach to accident investigation and a new method with which to 
illustrate the information space in which the decisions were made and actions taken 
that led to the events reported. It allows for a positive visualisation of the particular time 
at which the networks are formed and by comparing a series of networks it shows the 
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changes over time of communication, tasks and most importantly conscious 
information within the system. The analysis highlights which aspects of communication 
between human and machine agents underpinned the event – that is, which 
information elements were present or absent for key agents at the right times. The 
analysis highlights which aspects of communication between human and machine 
agents underpinned the event – that is, which information elements were present or 
absent for key agents at the right times. 
The stylised network diagram immediately draws to the eye of an investigator the 
presence, or lack, of relevant pieces of information to a particular agent at any time 
during the event. Take, for instance, the node „vibration indicator‟ (Figure 3-13) from 
the overall network. Information elements linked with the indicator (e.g., „vibration‟ and 
„engine‟) are present for all of the agents on the aircraft.  However, only the Engine 
Instrument System (EIS) has ownership of this important node, and as such the 
communication has not effectively been transmitted to pilot and first officer. This is also 
true of other nodes and links within this knowledge network. It may be pertinent at this 
point to revisit the concept of ownership within the information networks. A key 
foundation of the EAST approach is that it does not differentiate between human and 
non-human agents as both are key to the flow of information within complex systems. 
Within human agents it can be said that an individual owns a piece of information within 
the system when they have conscious knowledge of it. With a non-human agent the 
definition is required to be slightly more flexible in meaning. In the case of the EIS, 
engine parameters are received via an airborne vibration monitor which analyses and 
converts engine vibration to a displayable reading. In the sense that the information 
“vibration level” has been recorded and is being displayed via the EIS on a vibration 
gauge it can be argued that the EIS has ownership of that information. This information 
is owned (being that it is present and correct) and displayed within the system.  
So from simply looking at this network structure we can deduce that communication 
has failed to bring the vibration indicator to the conscious awareness of the flight crew 
and as such highlights this node as a possible contribution towards the resultant 
situation. This in itself is a novel illustration and approach to highlighting design failures 
and where further investigation is required to assess management of the situation. 
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Figure 3-13 - Details of Nodes surrounding “Vibration Indicator” (See key Table 3-1) 
Taking this one step further, at the other end of the network (Figure 3-14) we can see 
that the captain and first officer both have ownership of the engine instrument gauges 
(Engine Gas Temperature (EGT), N1 Fan Speed, Fuel Flow) information nodes. 
However, neither of the pilots had ownership of the information node „fluctuations‟; i.e., 
they at no time acknowledged the fluctuations of values within these gauges despite 
having recollected awareness of having looked at these instruments and presumably 
their individual values. 
Together from this, we can see that neither the captain nor first officer were 
consciously aware of the high level of vibration indicated on the vibration indicator or 
the fluctuations of the engine instruments. Communication of information from the 
instruments to the flight crew has thus flagged itself as an important issue in the 
network and as such is a possible contributing factor towards the accident.  
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Figure 3-14 - Details of Nodes surrounding “Fluctuations” (See key Fig. 3-8) 
It is possible to study these findings in more depth. It is important to designers not only 
to be given information on when a system design has failed but also how and why it 
may have occurred and any risk management factors that were involved or could be 
incorporated. That is, it is not enough to highlight a problem but it is necessary to 
provide some options for risk reduction. The EAST networks allow us to identify where 
system design elements may be a central cause in erroneous events - whether that is 
through technically-designed machines or training-designed humans.  The following 
extract from the analysis highlights an example of not just what has gone wrong but 
also looks at the interaction of networks to understand why. 
At time 2005.05 hrs (the onset of vibration) until 2005.31 hrs, the Captain had 
ownership of the node „vibration‟ (if not „vibration indicator‟) and knew something was 
obviously wrong with an engine, although unsure of what or which engine it was. 
During this time it can be seen, by stepping the information network through different 
periods of time, that neither the nodes „engine fire‟ nor „shutdown‟ were owned by the 
captain until at, or after, 2005.31hrs. At this time, the first officer uses the phrase 
„…looking like an engine fire…‟ in a radio communication to London Air Traffic Control 
Centre (LATCC) (AAIB Report Appendix 4a, 1990). By viewing the corresponding 
communication diagram, we see that this leads the captain to the assumption of an 
engine fire despite the absence of usual cues (e.g., fire alarm visual warning or bell).  
Thus in the latter network the captain takes ownership of the nodes for both „engine 
fire‟ and „shutdown‟ (Figure 3-15). 
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Figure 3-15 The erroneous transfer of information on the flight-deck 
 
This example crudely illustrates the connection between the information networks for 
the pilot and first officer.  By applying the terminology of signal-detection theory (Table 
3-2; Green & Swets, 1966) we are able to fully describe the system situation at the time 
of these decisions and the false alarm that was the basis for many of the following 
incorrect actions. This communication failure is very different to the examples centred 
on engine instrument fluctuations above. The successful passage of erroneous 
information causes a false alarm as opposed to the unsuccessful passage of correct 
information (a „miss‟) in those previous examples. All of these instances have an effect 
on the system and hence on the outcome. Examples such as these can direct further 
study into specific elements of an incident and understanding, for example, possible 
latent issues of expectancy in this particular example. In this way, the method does not 
solely focus on the active issues of an event but can additionally elude to the latent 
factors beneath. 
 
 
Response “Absent” 
(Carry out vibration 
Response “Present” 
(Carry out engine fire 
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The use of these information networks in the analysis of an event allows a clearer 
picture to be developed for designers, highlighting those times or pieces of equipment 
with which higher than normal levels of confusion, communication, clutter or workload 
are related. It would appear that higher numbers of information nodes present, or 
active, within a system would relate to an increased workload in assimilating the 
information and „owning‟ it. The graphical depiction of such information bottlenecks, or 
areas of intense communicative activity, allows for easier interpretation and 
identification of risk factors for system breakdown. 
In the particular example of the „engine fire‟, we can see from the information networks 
of both pilots that the captain had no ownership of this information until such a time as 
the first officer passed his (erroneous) ownership of this node to air traffic control (ATC) 
– when the captain also assimilated it. This illustrates most clearly the relevance of 
these network models in identifying how situation awareness propagates across the 
system. Despite being a negative (false alarm) event for the system, this particular 
instance depicts how not all individual agents must own the same pieces of information 
(nodes) for it to become the team SA (Salmon et al, 2008). Even where all team 
members own the same information, such as conscious awareness of certain 
instruments, each individual‟s conclusions from that information may be unique and 
lead to differences in resultant behaviour. (Stanton et al, 2009). 
3.6 Implications for further work and limitations 
It is the ultimate aim of this new approach in accident causation investigation to link the 
separate networks and use the interaction between them to interrogate system events 
and produce possible prospective analysis. Therefore this preliminary study only 
begins to address the issues that must be resolved in order to develop a fully working 
model and fulfil the brief.  
Check list actions) actions) 
Stimulus Present 
(Engine fire auditory 
or visual alarms) 
Miss Hit 
Stimulus Absent 
(No engine fire 
auditory or visual 
warning) 
Correct Rejection False Alarm 
Table 3-2  Categories of signal detection (adapted from Green & Swets, 1966) 
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It is worth noting that the full accident transcript was not available to study (rather the 
significant portions were included in the report) so it is obvious that were this possible 
more work could be done to validate and make use of the communication/social 
network and then from this look for ways of integrating the three into a three-
dimensional model. This is of course a goal that further development of the modelling 
methods and techniques will work towards. There are also limitations associated with 
the use of a case-study born from official accident report documentation. The Kegworth 
accident was a complex event and the investigation no less so. Although it is rational to 
argue, as in section 3.4, that some validation is received from gaining similar 
conclusions to that of the official accident report it is possibly cyclical in nature. 
However, it can also be seen that to come up with the same conclusions as a hugely in 
depth investigation from a novel method is integral to the life of this model. Beyond this 
validation exercise though, this chapter works as a feasibility test. Despite there not 
necessarily being any new findings or lessons it does showcase a new method. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis looks more at new findings and applications whilst later 
chapters then address predictability and application of methods. 
What this new method brings to the table is a formalised method for investigating an 
accident whether from primary (and immediately after the event) information, 
secondary data or even elements of predictive data as long as information networks 
can be created. The network aspect of the approach removes the reliance on linear 
timeline approaches that dominate attempts to investigate and discuss an event. The 
networks have shown that equal measures, if not more, of information can be displayed 
and relationships between nodes and routes of information processing are clearer. This 
method is the first to truly centralise the theme of communication (information flow) and 
use that as a basis for analysing and describing an event but more importantly the 
whole system within which the event took place. This draws less artificial boundaries 
into an investigation and opens up the possibility of identifying communication channels 
or routes of information flow that are not obvious from the outset. The non-linear 
approach also prevents narrow-minded investigations from the point of view that it 
requires the investigator to follow up on the broader system as it is unlikely nodes do 
not develop links reflecting and directing analysis towards the broader system. This 
leads, as intended, to a more comprehensive accident analysis. It can be seen that 
further to this formalised method (something championed by the likes of Johnson et al., 
1995) the networks also continue to remove individual fault as a conclusion. The 
networks identify where the correct information was not available to the correct agent at 
the correct time; a system fault to a system event. 
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The repeatability, and usability, of the methodology between users needs to be studied 
as further work. This method is applied, at a base level, to live accident/incident 
scenarios with primary source data used to populate the networks in later chapters. 
Furthermore, this method is very much grounded in the ergonomic principles of 
accident investigation and work is ongoing to integrate effectively the more technical 
(or hardware) issues within the system model by studying parallels with methods well-
tested in this area, e.g., Fault-trees and Risk Assessment Tools. 
An HTA-type technique could be developed and utilised to analyse the text of a report, 
or used post-accident to analyse the scenario. This technique may also be employed 
for prospective analysis situations where communication of knowledge elements is very 
important. It wasn‟t necessary to use an HTA, as EAST would prescribe, in this study 
due to the macro nature of investigation and some limitations again with the full 
transcript etc. not being available for viewing. 
In a real life scenario application of this method, it would be possible to use a CDM for 
post-event interviews etc. but this was effectively done by the AAIB investigation team 
in order to gain crew statements for the report used. Further work also needs to be 
carried out to incorporate elements of organisational structure into the networks and 
thus model. This may be implicitly, i.e., implicit in a breakdown of communications is an 
organisational issue to be addressed, or, explicitly, i.e., incorporated into organisational 
nodes and thus into the model physically. 
3.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter has discussed the novel application of information networks as a 
methodology for understanding a complex event more holistically. The method 
improves the illustration and analysis of the information present within a system 
(represented by all the nodes), the information readily available to human agents (non-
human agents e.g. EIS owning information) and the information consciously received 
and processed by agents (i.e. owned nodes). In this way, the approach allows us to 
study not only communication and information within a system but also the concept of 
situation awareness (SA); both individual and team (Salmon et al., 2008). This concept 
is taken further in chapter 4. 
Chapter 2 highlighted shortfalls in the current resource bank of accident analysis 
models. A dominance of artificial linear chain models together with many subjective 
classification techniques left requirements for the field to change. Central to the gaps in 
current models was the need to understand more fully the system in which events took 
place rather than just the events themselves. In order to begin to achieve the removal 
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of these gaps, information networks have been developed within this chapter to 
incorporate elements of ownership and centralise this theme of communication 
(information transfer) that underlies the events. Central to the conclusions of this 
chapter then is that this new method of applying information networks to an aviation 
accident has gained results in several hours deskwork which are very similar to a high-
profile full investigation by several bodies that lasted months (e.g., Besnard (2004) and 
Johnson (1995) referred to earlier). By highlighting individual nodes of interest to the 
investigation from using the network diagrams similar conclusions to the official 
investigation could be made. This is not a negative thing since it is the purpose of this 
chapter to assess the validity of applying the method to aviation accidents and that 
validity has been shown. If it were argued that there has been no improvement over 
current methods then that is where chapter 4 and the quantification of networks and its 
related SA comes in. This chapter has set the shape of the work in this thesis. 
Key throughout has been the forward movement away from linear chain models 
towards something more dynamic and complex that retains the nature of the system 
reflecting the flow of information and bottlenecks that exist. 
Chapter 4 investigates methods of quantitatively objectifying the process and possible 
avenues for using suitable metrics. Chapter 5 then develops the quantitative theory in 
order to capitalise on the potential of this complex systems model. 
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4 Development of a study 
 
Chapter 3 applied a novel information network methodology to an aviation case study. 
Primarily, this resulted in the centralisation of communication as a theme of aviation 
accidents. The application of the method also highlighted many positive outcomes 
including improved visualisation of a system and avoidance of linear decomposition of 
the event. 
This chapter sets out to extract more from the information network approach in more 
detail and introduce comprehensive comparisons with an „ideal‟ scenario. Further than 
this, chapter 4 continues the work of chapter 3 by beginning to develop the approach 
and seeks to objectify the process. First non-accident scenarios are discussed so that 
there is a baseline to compare the accident networks from chapter 3 against. Next 
quantitative methods are discussed, evaluated and their integration into the information 
network model investigated. In particular social network analysis is used in this chapter 
before the evaluation of other methods and metrics results in a conclusion of how to 
take the work forward in chapter 5. 
4.1 The importance of centralising communication 
Where the EAST analysis provides qualitatively more information than its predecessors 
is in identifying the points at which information is not effectively being transmitted to the 
right people at the right time – that is, where the knowledge has not been salient 
enough. It is in their foundations as a truly systemic and holistic analysis tool that the 
information networks provide a new approach that envelop all areas of the system and 
not simply the design or human-element in isolation. From this it is possible to suggest 
ways of designing and developing systems (e.g., to increase relevant salience) and 
training procedures (e.g., the effect seen from limited conversion training above), 
feeding back to the design stages, to make the information more salient (or 
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communication channels stronger) and thus improve information transfer. The ability of 
the networks to illustrate information propagation through a system clearly supports the 
application of the method to the study of situation awareness and in particular team 
situation awareness (Salmon et al., 2008). This holistic use of networks to help 
understand Distributed Situation Awareness (DSA) in relation to developing training or 
designs is an important step in using SA as more than a label-cause of accidents and 
begins to address the requirements of the Human Factors community in this area 
(Salmon et al, 2008a). This is in itself a novel approach to accident investigation and a 
new method with which to illustrate the information-space in which the decisions were 
made and actions taken, thus centralising the construct of communication to any 
distributed and complex task. 
Taking this idea of saliency of information within the networks further, it is clear that 
certain nodes that should have been owned in an „ideal‟ situation but were not in the 
actual event can be described as being not salient enough for the relevant agents to 
have consciously locked onto them. If we take systems improvement to be akin to 
improving saliency of key information, these networks allow tidy observations from any 
post-event analysis and can easily highlight those areas where an increase in saliency 
is required in order to counteract possible communication failures which in turn can 
direct, or highlight, design related issues. Thus it appears as if there is scope for „ideal‟ 
networks to be integrated into the approach to gain a deeper understanding of the 
study of an event or system. Further to this, this chapter acknowledges the importance 
of identifying salient nodes and connections within this network before addressing the 
connection between networks and further development therein. Moving back to what 
can be concluded from the method this far, it has become apparent that an important 
difference with this novel work is that it concentrates on communication as a cause of 
all events. 
Much work has been carried out in recognising communication as a major contributing 
factor to risk in a number of domains, including aviation (see e.g., Gibson et al, 2006). 
In the current thesis, it is argued that communication failure can be seen as the basis of 
all aircraft accidents and incidents. Whether the communication is machine to machine, 
human to machine, or human to human, all are based on the passage of information 
between multiple agents (see Error! Reference source not found.). In the present 
analysis, it is crucial that we do not distinguish between human and non-human agents 
in the system in order to understand the impact of communication.  Indeed, it appears 
that the humans involved in these complex domains view the holistic system in that 
way (Stanton et al, 2006). Optimising communication is thus of central importance to 
managing the risks in complex systems; in turn, the design of interfaces and 
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communication channels is fundamental to avoiding failures that may occur in their 
use. Carvalho et al. (2007) discuss how through naturalistic decision making 
mechanisms, agents within complex systems often resort to using a number of 
heuristics to direct their decisions and how vague communication (in this chapter 
between human and non-human) often leads to incomplete situation awareness. 
Through identifying communication as key within the system space it is hoped that this 
method may identify, as in the Kegworth case-study, areas where saliency of 
information needs to be raised in order to govern the decision making process of 
agents. 
 
 
From/To Human Machine Job Aid 
Human 
Voice 
Written note 
Keyboard 
Mouse 
Writing 
Recording 
Machine Displays Data N/A 
Job Aid 
Checklist 
Procedure 
N/A N/A 
Table 4-1 Example Taxonomy of System Communications 
 
A new methodology based on network models of complex systems has, in this study, 
been applied for the first time to aviation accidents in order to elucidate the full 
aetiology of the incident and in an attempt to identify the complex factors involved in a 
system failure. Despite EAST‟s original development as a qualitative tool for 
understanding and improving system performance in toto, it does offer the possibility to 
analyse in detail the spatial and temporal development of an incident. These networks 
have been seen to allow a new pathway for preventing accidents focusing on the whole 
system and not any one part in isolation. 
Individual situation awareness (SA) is often the centre of attention in accident analysis 
and yet we can see that any one agent, e.g., the pilot, is just a small part of a wider 
system, supporting and being supported by others, with information changing hands 
continuously. As the debate continues in the literature about models of individual 
situation awareness, team situation awareness has begun to attract increasing 
amounts of attention amongst ergonomists. The complexity of team SA being a 
concept beyond that of combined individual SA is clear in work across the community 
(e.g., Salas et al, 1995, Gorman et al, 2006 and Salmon et al, 2008). However, Stanton 
et al (2006b) introduce a concept that all relevant information is held within a system 
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and individuals may have different views of that information, thus developing a 
compatible SA rather than a shared SA. Thus, it is the capturing of all the information 
present within a system that is central to this work and developing an understanding of 
DSA in accident scenarios. 
Applying information networks to aviation accidents allows us to illustrate and 
understand more clearly the information space in which decisions were made and 
interactions between agents took place. In this way information networks provide an 
improved method of investigating the setting and „why‟ of individual‟s actions which has 
been highlighted as an important issue in literature (e.g., Li et al., 2009). Latour (1991) 
speaks of the use of networks to define the „actants‟ within a socio-technical system in 
relation to incidents and suggests that once the description is saturated, the 
explanation emerges. The networks that have been introduced to aviation accident 
analysis in this chapter propose, in a more objective way, to describe a situation to this 
saturation point and not attempt to explain an accident. It should become evident from 
a thorough understanding of the system as it stands and works where situations have 
been less than „ideal‟. 
By analysing the event through the application of information networks, we are able to 
highlight particular instances of verbal communication, such as that illustrated with the 
erroneous passage of the „engine fire‟ node of information between the captain and first 
officer. Verbal communication has long been discussed in the literature and there is 
little debate about its importance in team, or complex, situations. So much so in fact 
that NASA‟s ASRS (Aviation Safety Reporting System; a voluntary confidential 
reporting program) related 70% of its first 28,000 reports to issues with communication. 
(Connell, 1995). Further than this though, the networks allow us to identify and address 
instances where non-verbal or non-human to human communication (e.g., passage of 
information from a display to the pilot) has played a significant role, whether negative or 
positive, in affecting the teamwork and team situation awareness within a complex 
system. 
Most importantly we are now able to concentrate on the flow of information throughout 
a system and highlight the communication that does, or should, occur at any particular 
time. Through analyses of these networks, concentration on communication of 
information and further development to highlight significant nodes and saliency 
amongst nodes, the application will allow much better feedback to designers where a 
system might fail about what, how and why it failed. This will in turn inform the designer 
how to improve interaction between agents and in particular at points in time with 
peaks of workload. 
©    Griffin, T. G. C.   Chapter 4 – Development of a study 
 74 
As a method of mitigating risk not only through the design process (focusing on 
equipment) but balancing that with training (the people) and the task (job in hand), 
information networks, and their associated study of DSA, allows for a new form of 
feedback pivotal to the flow of information within the system environment. Accident 
investigation reports are often criticised as being too broad and that they „are not 
primarily intended to be used directly by designers‟ (Brusberg et al, 2002). By 
visualising the information space, this method allows for the scope of an investigation 
to concentrate on selected areas of communication and information transfer. It is after 
this narrowing, when communication bottlenecks or information flow centres are 
identified, that communication taxonomies or social theories such as Activity Theory 
(cf. Bedny and Meister, 1999) or Actor Network Theory (Latour, 1987) can be applied 
to search the deeper issues. Where a methodology such as EAST drives the 
investigation and elicitation of information flow failures so human cognition models 
such as Naturalistic Decision Making models or Efficiency-thoroughness trade-off, 
ETTO, (Hollnagel, 2004) can be applied to those specific interactions. Such 
applications can in turn address the social, psychological, cultural and regulatory 
issues central to the overall aim (Carvalho et al., 2009) that are often investigated but 
with the aid of such models can help better direct the search for significant factors. 
Unlike many other frameworks that are in present use, this method and model is not 
exclusively about classifying errors. This is atypical to most developments in recent 
years and also allows for positive as well as negative issues to be highlighted and 
investigated in a situation. This is apparent where a positive link is found in an analysis 
of a particular situation and that may be of use to a different situation but under similar 
circumstances. In addition it is hoped as the model progresses, actions and links that 
help prevent or correct a negative event may become salient and be used to feed other 
similar situations. 
Steering towards the use of these network models to investigate incidents and 
accidents is not to detract from or replace the holistic approaches adopted by many in 
risk situations (for instance, greater study at a behavioural level e.g., Bennett, 2004). 
The use of networks to describe and understand the system at the time helps focus the 
attention of investigative processes in eliciting what happened. These then have to be 
developed further into understanding the reasons why. In this way, the networks begin 
to rebuke the developing nature within aviation to avoid the „sharp end‟ completely in 
an incident investigation in favour of focusing on an upper-echelon search for factors. 
Instead, this methodology directs an investigation from the sharp end up whilst adding 
much needed objectivity to the process. 
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It was discussed in chapter 2 that it is possible accident investigations (and thus the 
models and methods) have moved away from fully addressing the active factors to 
concentrate more on those latent issues and a possible explanation for this is a fear of 
blame. This approach, however, re-evaluates the digression from realising the potential 
of fully investigating the active factors and suggests a way of investigating active 
failures by dissecting the situation without the need for blame being intrinsically linked 
to failure (i.e., failure of communication at some point in a complex network system 
cannot be attributed to one person). The method allows us to concentrate on the actual 
event and not be drawn into a full audit of the airline‟s safety health for the sake of it. 
This does not however attempt to annul the importance of latent factors either. This 
model also directs and constrains an accident investigation; by creating networks of the 
situation an investigator is kept within the confines of the accident itself (which can, and 
will, include latent and socio-organisational factors) and this is beneficial to the process 
of accident investigation in my view. If these network models are animated over time 
then the investigator, or relevant person, has a storyboard of the event whilst retaining 
the dynamic and complex nature of a non-linear networking approach. 
This far in the thesis, specific nodes central to the development of an accident have 
been identified leading to an increased understanding of the information flow and 
situation awareness within a system. A central theme that keeps returning is the need 
to develop a greater understanding of normal and abnormal situations without losing 
sight of the overall system. Therefore, the rest of this chapter looks to tie together the 
issues discussed so far and incorporate „ideal‟ events in order to elicit differences and 
possible greater understanding of the negative outcome event. 
4.2 Expanding on the idea of „ideal‟ networks 
Of primary importance to this study, with its relation to SA, is the need to objectively 
identify nodes of significance. The analysis of the crash at Kegworth highlights the 
aspects of communication present between human and non-human elements that 
underpin the event. By developing these network models from only the objective 
information within the narrative and transcript of the AAIB report (i.e., with no reference 
to their conclusions or discussion) it can be seen from the full results that very similar 
conclusions can be made using this method. Having identified some of the key 
contributing factors for the accident, the next step was to improve upon the standard 
method and investigate the possibility of developing the method to be more complete. 
©    Griffin, T. G. C.   Chapter 4 – Development of a study 
 76 
In order to further objectify the identification of information-flow issues, a set of non-
accident scenario networks were constructed that could be used in comparison to 
those for the accident scenario and the detail of this process is covered next.  
These „ideal‟ networks (e.g., figure 4-1) were based on information from company 
operating procedures and the checklists that were made available in the formal report. 
A series of „ideal‟ task, communication and information networks were produced by the 
author with reference to Boeing 737 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), the AAIB 
report which included extracts from the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) for 737 
pilots, observations from equally qualified pilots and checklists that were present on the 
aircraft at the time. The method of creating the information networks reflects the same 
process for the actual event in chapter 3. The emergency checklists and relevant 
pages from the QRH and SOPs were analysed and it is these that produced the nodes. 
As would be expected the nodes found were comparable to those identified in the 
actual analysis but the ownership of each node was inferred from either the pattern of 
work, communication practices and checks dictated in the literature rather than solely 
the AAIB report. An example of this is given in the following extract from the AAIB 
official report which refers to a drill in the British Midland 737 QRH: 
“It defined 'high engine vibration' as a condition indicated by a reading on the vibration 
indicators in excess of 4.0 units accompanied by perceivable airframe vibrations. It 
introduced the following procedure: 
Thrust lever........ RETARD 
Flight conditions permitting, reduce N1 to maintain AVM below 4.0 units. 
 
NOTE: Engine shutdown is not required as AVM indications will decrease with thrust 
reduction. If the AVM indication does not decrease when the thrust lever is retarded, 
other engine problems may be indicated.” (AAIB Aircraft Accident Report Number 4/90 
(EW/C1095)) 
This drill would be assessed in the way Figure 3-1 dictates and deductions made. An 
example of these deductions would be that given this drill neither the first officer nor 
captain should have conscious ownership of the node “Engine Shutdown” given the 
note that it is an unnecessary action in an „ideal‟ world. Conversely the node “QRH” 
should be consciously owned by both the flightcrew as they should be referring to it for 
drills such as this. 
The author (a qualified commercial pilot) also validated the networks, albeit informally, 
with two current Boeing 737 pilots to ensure that no obvious mistakes or presumptions 
away from the factual report and pilot-literature had been made. This also served to 
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overcome any ambiguities in terms of conscious ownership of nodes and who should 
have what information at what time. This method of detailing what steps should be 
taken in abnormal operations, what information should be gained and what actions 
should be taken and when are standard practise in aviation and the basis for training 
and operational flying. In future use, the regulatory authority or company conducting 
the analysis of an event or system will be able to dictate the „ideal‟ scenario as they do 
already with the QRHs, SOPs and other literature they publish and adapt. 
By comparing the task and communication networks and imposing the findings on the 
information networks it was possible to see where communication links have been 
added or lost. As such, possible routes into the system for misinformation, false alarms 
or missed knowledge objects can be identified. It is, however, in the information 
network that the most obvious differences are visible. In our example, comparing the 
ideal and accident scenarios reveals that the node “vibration indicator” should have 
been owned by the first officer and captain in addition to the EIS – whereas in actual 
fact it was only owned by the EIS.  This supports one of the major conclusions from the 
AAIB report, in that the information was available on the flight deck to suggest a 
problem with engine No. 1, and that the shutdown of the wrong engine may have been 
prevented had this information been transmitted effectively to the flight crew. It is 
important at this stage to emphasise that at no point is the purpose of this study to lay 
the blame for any event with any individual or system component but to understand 
where the EAST analysis provides qualitatively more information. This is in identifying 
the points at which information is not effectively being transmitted to the right people at 
the right time – that is, where the knowledge has not been salient enough.  From this it 
is possible to suggest ways of designing and developing systems and training 
procedures to make the information more salient (or communication channels stronger) 
and thus improve information transfer. In a prospective sense, it is hoped this method 
may eventually show us where major problems and faults may lead to an accident or 
incident without the negative event having had to occur. 
Through comparing the actual and „ideal‟ networks fully and removing those nodes that 
are owned and conscious elements in both, we can deduce that the remaining 
knowledge elements will have affected the outcome of the situation, the decisions 
made, and actions taken (figure 4-2). Since these nodes are the differences between 
an „actual‟ and „ideal‟ scenario they must play some part in the resulting event whether 
negative or positive. Elements including “standard operating procedures” (SOPs), the 
“quick reference handbook” (QRH), “vibration indicator” and “fluctuations” (in the 
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Figure 4-1 - „Ideal‟ information network in snapshot 1 
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relevant engine instruments) were all highlighted in the comparison as being relevant to 
the decisions taken (all present in figure 4-2). These nodes may be described in signal 
detection terms as “False Alarms” or “Misses”. By animating the nodes over time to 
show ownership in a temporal sense, it is possible to display in a novel way the 
storyboard of information (together with communication and tasks) in the scenario and 
investigate in a step-by-step method that still encapsulates the complexity of the 
system and doesn‟t break a dynamic reality down into an artificial linear chain; the crux 
of the model‟s objectives. 
 
 
Figure 4-2 - Snapshot 1 with only nodes remaining that contained differences between 
„actual‟ and „ideal‟ scenarios 
Figure 4-3 illustrates in a simplified manner one section of the snapshot raised by 
contrasting the „ideal‟ scenario against the actual one which is developed from figure 3-
14 above. By comparing the task and communication networks it was possible to see 
where communication links have been added or lost. From this comparison we can see 
where information may bottleneck, or conversely becomes over-salient, in an actual 
event compared with the ideal outcome that is central to the design of any system. As 
such, possible routes into the system for misinformation, false alarms or missed 
information objects can be identified. By comparing the actual with an „ideal‟ scenario, it 
can be seen that in the „ideal‟ situation the first officer would not mention an engine fire 
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in his radio communication as there are no precursors for this assumption present in 
his information network. Alternatively, a second „ideal‟ outcome would be that the first 
officer uses the same term but the captain assimilates the information present in the 
system to counter the theory (illustrated as “alternative ideal” in figure 4-3). 
 
Figure 4-3 - Comparison of a section of actual and „ideal‟ information networks relating to 
false-alarm with engine fire 
The significance of the „vibration indicator‟ node within the system, as discussed 
earlier, is mirrored through this new analysis as being a node of central importance 
within the „ideal‟ versus actual comparison. In the AAIB formal report, it was concluded 
that all of these factors, and in particular the „vibration indicator‟, were significant in the 
cause of the accident. This external validation, as discussed earlier, is an important 
point in the use of a new tool for analysing accidents in that the conclusions remain 
ecologically valid and the relationships to system design are made clear. Further than 
this though, these network models provide a springboard for prospective analyses of 
other scenarios and this idea is built on later in this thesis through looking at „ideal‟ and 
actual modelling. This idea of validation is not to say, however, that had the AAIB 
investigated an identical accident today that the conclusions would have been identical. 
Methods of investigation, tools and even attitudes have changed and will continue to do 
so as we develop in the area of advancing safety (Ayeko, 2002). However, it could be 
argued that the central arguments of the conclusions would remain valid whilst the 
detail, emphasis and scope might change over time. More importantly, the information 
network method produced here removes a level of subjectivity associated with some of 
the linear models discussed in chapter 2 which would increase the likelihood of 
reproducibility. 
 The AAIB suggested if the crew had „sat on their hands‟ and taken time to refer to their 
operating procedures and checklists, together with fully assimilating the information 
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from the engine indications, the event may have been averted. This is an especially 
important conclusion given the increased chance of comprehension errors and 
expected limited capacity of pilot‟s memory under the high workload of an abnormal 
scenario (Morris and Leung, 2006). This is only at the superficial level, though, and the 
report goes on to explain that in the change from Boeing 737-300 to -400, limited 
conversion training took place and as such, the changes in design of instrumentation 
contributed to the communications breakdown (compounded by a view from older 
models that the vibration indicator was an unreliable instrument – which was not true of 
the -400). This is not to say the designs themselves were a cause of the accident but 
rather the lack of integration between the operators, the designs, the designers and the 
risk managers further up the line (Busby and Hibberd, 2002). 
4.3 Statistical analysis of networks 
In chapter 3, and again here in section 4.2, initial studies of aviation accident 
case studies using information networks resulted in an improved understanding 
of the system in which the events took place. Further to this, with 
communication centralised, the study acknowledges the importance of 
identifying salient nodes and connections within these networks. This can then 
be extended to the connection between networks and further development 
therein. In particular, metrics can be applied to the comparison of the networks 
in order to suggest key nodes or factors resulting in the event. In this way, it is 
hoped nodes can be identified as being those that may be present and result in 
normal operations or a near-miss but key factors, or breakdowns in 
communication, which may result in an accident and must be removed by 
prospective analysis at the design or training stages. Work in this vein 
approaches the theory of the biological sciences with similarities to the study of 
neural networks. The importance lies in identifying activation levels and transfer 
functions within nodes to highlight those which are key to an event. It may also 
be possible to identify those with high levels of redundancy through which an 
event can still occur despite nodes required not being present or others being 
present that should not. 
It was important to identify a suitable metric for deducing node importance or 
salience for the information networks. Such a metric was sought and traditional 
methods of social network analysis (SNA) tested against the data to try and 
provide an insight into the results; adding the desired quantitative element. SNA 
has enjoyed multi-disciplinary use, for example, in helping to illustrate modes of 
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communication and information flow, company structure and in medical 
environments (Houghton et al., 2008). 
In order to introduce these quantitative factors in the first instance, a software 
program developed by the EAST team called WESTT (Workload, Error, 
Situational Awareness, Time and Teamwork; Houghton et al., 2008) was used. 
By entering the information network data (nodes and links) in to the computer 
program, statistics such as the Bavelis-Leavitt index of centrality and 
measurements of sociometric status can be applied to the networks produced. 
Sociometric status aims to identify the overall contribution of an agent to the 
communication (in all forms) within a network. Centrality is a metric that 
indicates the most central agent. This is calculated in terms of the smallest 
geodesic distances from all others, where a large geodesic distance results in a 
long period of communication and more chance for distortion of the information. 
Both of these metrics arguably attempt, in different ways, to identify key agents 
or nodes within the network graph. 
Turning to the information network analysis of the Kegworth case study, it was 
decided to at first concentrate on the first snapshot only. The actual and ideal 
networks were focussed on in order to elicit as much detail as possible from 
one section before moving on and combining multiple network data. The results 
of the initial statistical analysis as carried out using Agna (Benta, 2003) are 
produced in a simple chart below for comparison (Figure 4-4). 
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Figure 4-4 – SNA Analysis of Kegworth (snapshot 1) 
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This original data-mining used the information from the WESTT analysis and as 
such centred on the actors (e.g., Captain or First Officer) in the analysis. Since, 
in the application of the information network approach to Kegworth, agent‟s 
owner ship of a node could be identified within the network, the agents no 
longer needed to be considered independently for the SNA. Thus, it was then 
important to apply the metrics to only the nodes within the information networks 
which removed the actors from appearing in their own right for the remainder of 
the analysis. In this new way, instead of applying SNA to a communications 
network, it was applied to the information network with communication being 
implicit in the linkages between those nodes present within the system. This 
could help elicit what is central, or key, within the information network and what 
information is not being communicated effectively; an aim of the application of 
this methodology. 
In the context of our information model, sociometric status appears to be a 
more valid metric with which to contribute towards node importance since it is 
this that illustrates the information communication power of any particular node 
most closely.  The nodes identified in chapter 3 as being of most interest (i.e., 
those central to the development of the scenario) in this particular case study 
and their associated metric values are given in figures 4-5 and 4-6. 
For the purposes of this first stage, all nodes that were active were given a 
value of 1 in the social network matrix used as the basis for the analysis (see 
Agna user guide for more details). We can see that this has had an effect to 
essentially mask some of the more subtle data within the network such as 
magnitude of ownership and position in the graph field. 
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Figure 4-5 –Analysis of Sociometric Status of Key Kegworth Nodes (snapshot 1) 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Sociometric Status Actual
Sociometric Status 'Ideal'
©    Griffin, T. G. C.   Chapter 4 – Development of a study 
 86 
 
Figure 4-6 – Analysis of Centrality of Kegworth Key Nodes (snapshot 1)
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From the graph, it can still be seen, however, that there are clear differences 
between the „ideal‟ and actual in cases such as the inappropriate deselection of 
autopilot or the use of SOPs and the QRH. It is particularly interesting to see 
that this sociometric status metric does indeed show real differences in the 
importance of nodes between the two networks. The best example of this is the 
increase of information flow surrounding the vibration indicator (hence the 
higher sociometric status by definition), and its associated excessive level, in 
the „ideal‟ versus actual case. The additional flow of information surrounding 
important nodes such as these are the probable basis for an „ideal‟ opposed to 
the actual outcome and need further investigation. 
In order to take this further and begin to incorporate the ownership of the nodes 
into the statistical analysis, methods of weighting the nodes and links between 
nodes were investigated. Following discussion with a graph theory specialist it 
was found that there is no formal method for attempting to do this in SNA. 
Instead, it is normal practice to define a relationship on the edges of the graph 
(the links) and establish whether a weighting system works. The second 
method of statistical analysis used therefore, was to weight the links in the 
analysis using the number of owners of the originating node (i.e., if three agents 
owned the originating node, regardless of the ownership of the receiving node, 
the link was weighted “3”).  
Nodes 
Sociometric Status 
(„Actual‟) 
Sociometric Status 
(„Ideal‟) 
Vibration Indicator 0.368421 0.473684 
Excessive Level 0.157895 0.289474 
SOPs 0 0.342105 
QRH 0 0.105263 
Autopilot 0.052632 0 
No. 1 EGT Gauge 0.157895 0.157895 
No. 1 N1 Gauge 0.157895 0.157895 
No. 1 Fuel Flow Gauge 0.157895 0.157895 
Fluctuations 0.236842 0.236842 
Vibration 0.368421 0.5 
Table 4-2 - Weighting Method 2 Sociometric Status of Key nodes 
Unsurprisingly, the centrality remained unchanged between the un-weighted 
first method and this. This is due to the nature of the metric in that it does not 
centralise the information passing through it but its relative position in the 
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graph. Sociometric status results were affected (table 4-1) but the relative 
comparison of figures was unchanged from the un-weighted graph. 
The third method applied to this data was to weight a link dependent upon the 
number of owners of the originating node added to the number of owners of the 
recipient node. The comparison between actual and „ideal‟ centrality figures 
revealed some differences in sociometric status values for the first time (table 
4-2). Nodes such as “Excessive Level”, “SOPs” and the engine gauge 
instruments‟ “Fluctuations” were all of a higher value in the „ideal‟ as would be 
expected. This higher value would indicate the central importance of these 
nodes to an „ideal‟ event outcome. For the first time however, the sociometric 
status of the engine instruments (No. 1 EGT, N1 and Fuel Flow Gauges) were 
not identical in the actual and „ideal‟ situations. The sociometric status was 
higher in the „ideal‟ than the actual scenarios. The ability of the model to pick up 
differences such as this quantitatively is what this testing sets out to do. 
Nodes 
Sociometric Status 
(„Actual‟) 
Sociometric Status 
(„Ideal‟) 
Vibration Indicator 0.473684 0.921053 
Excessive Level 0.210526 0.5 
SOPs 0 0.552632 
QRH 0 0.210526 
Autopilot 0.078947 0 
No. 1 EGT Gauge 0.263158 0.315789 
No. 1 N1 Gauge 0.263158 0.315789 
No. 1 Fuel Flow Gauge 0.263158 0.315789 
Fluctuations 0.315789 0.473684 
Vibration 0.789474 1.026316 
Table 4-3 - Weighting Method 3 Sociometric Status of Key nodes 
With sociometric status weighted in this way then, the values identified for the 
nodes in the „ideal‟ versus actual give credence to the observational results 
made in chapter 3 of the thesis. 
There were, however, some anomalies in the centrality results. The node 
“Vibration Indicator” (a node seen to be highly significant to the events in the 
accident report and the initial findings of the network reports) had a lower value 
of centrality (6.91) in the “ideal” than the actual (7.38) using this weighting 
method (and similar results using the fourth method). Sociometric status has 
already been determined as a more suitable metric than centrality as its 
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definition suits more closely what is trying to be established within these 
networks. That is, the information communication power of any particular node 
rather than its position within the network. 
A fourth method was then applied to the case data (table 4-3). The weights for 
the links in this instance were derived from the number of owners of the 
originating node multiplied by the number of owners of the recipient node. The 
intention behind this was that any node with owners at the originator but not at 
the recipient would become zero due to the multiplication as opposed to 
addition in method three. This would eliminate values for links that in fact are 
not active and would highlight the importance of this state.  
Nodes 
Sociometric Status 
(„Actual‟) 
Sociometric Status 
(„Ideal‟) 
Vibration Indicator 1.157895 1.789474 
Excessive Level 0.157895 0.789474 
SOPs 0 0.684211 
QRH 0 0.210526 
Autopilot 0.052632 0 
No. 1 EGT Gauge 0.315789 0.473684 
No. 1 N1 Gauge 0.315789 0.473684 
No. 1 Fuel Flow Gauge 0.315789 0.473684 
Fluctuations 0.236842 0.710526 
Vibration 1.842105 1.842105 
Table 4-4- Weighting Method 4 Sociometric Status of Key nodes 
Again it can be seen from table 4-3 that those nodes identified in chapter 3 as 
being of key importance have a higher sociometric status in the „ideal‟ scenario. 
Further than this, the fourth method also identifies, as in the third, that the 
sociometric status of No. 1 engine‟s instruments is higher in an „ideal‟ scenario 
(i.e., has a more important part to play in information transfer). One difference 
has resulted in the fourth method when compared with all others in that the 
sociometric status of the node “Vibration” is equal in both scenarios. This would 
appear initially to be a spurious result given the expected higher value in „ideal‟. 
The exact calculations carried out by Agna would have to be tested to be sure 
of the reasons behind this result but it may be indicating that the node had the 
same potential for information flow in both situations and was not a node that 
needed, or had, changes applied to it for the „ideal‟ event. 
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 Correlation 
(sig.) 
df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Paired Samples Test .896 (.000) 9 .007 
 
Table 4-5 – Paired t-test results for Sociometric Status (Method 4) 
Table 4-5 illustrates one set of results from a statistical analysis of the Kegworth 
snapshot one actual versus „ideal‟ sociometric status values. The significance 
value is below that of the required p < 0.01 leading to the acceptance of the 
hypothesis that there is a significant paired difference in values between the 
actual and „ideal‟ scenario analyses. Each of the other methods were also 
subjected to the same statistical test but the results were less significant than 
the fourth method. 
Through the majority of these methods and in the majority of cases, the results 
from the observations made of the network have been validated in quantitative 
terms. There also appears to be a statistically definitive advantage in applying 
these metrics when weighted. However, this area of graph theory is 
experimental and requires further work and foundation building. It is clear from 
the results of this application of the SNA metrics that sociometric status is the 
more suited to an information network method. However, neither centrality nor 
sociometric status appear to elicit the information completely from such a 
network analysis of accident causation that is required. In particular, 
sociometric status lacks the necessary abilities to identify potential, rather than 
existing, links. This is an area that requires exploring since this element of 
identifying all potential information paths is central to a comprehensive model. 
The introduction to this chapter highlighted the potential this new method holds 
when looking to understand more fully SA within a system. The comparisons so 
far, both qualitatively and more latterly quantitatively, introduce the ability to not 
only identify when an agent‟s SA is intrinsic in the event outcome but also 
where SOPs, QRHs and regulators etc. are unrealistic in their demands and 
reasonable expectations of what SA should be within a system. The method 
further defines where these shortfalls occur in terms of the information flow and 
links between nodes. What is certain is that the idea of a level of activation 
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above (or below) which a particular node becomes critical is a developing 
theme in the research of metrics and the rest of this chapter reviews several 
alternative multi-disciplinary skills and research themes that have some relation 
to the ongoing work.  
4.4 Selection of a suitable metric 
Following the study of the statistical methods for the Kegworth disaster outlined 
above, it is noted that although they validate and give grounding to the network 
theory for mapping accident causation, there is still a fundamental flaw present 
in that no activation level or comprehensive statistical relationship can easily be 
identified between critical and non-critical nodes. It is a central aim of this thesis 
to develop an integrated qualitative and quantitative model with potential for 
developing a predictive nature. Sociometric status has shown that metrics can 
be applied successfully to the information network approach at the core of this 
work but that maintains use only in post-mortem investigation. In order to move 
forward towards proactive, or even a predictive methodology, avenues of data 
integration into the networks must be investigated. 
This section describes briefly, a number of considerations made in the project 
journey to possibly apply to the information network model. These were 
investigated as to their suitability for purpose. A number of these considerations 
have had to be discarded due to the nature of the project or the nature of their 
irrelevance. Some may well be useful in the future beyond this thesis as the 
model evolves. 
4.4.1 Critical Path Analysis 
Critical path analysis (CPA) was developed in the 1950s as a project 
management tool to identify and predict those areas within a project which 
could not be delayed without an overall delay to the eventual goal. This 
mathematically based algorithm identifies critical activities and it is this idea of 
criticality that is relevant to the accident causation networks. The way CPA 
does this is by relating the order or activities, and their dependency to having 
preceding activities completed (or otherwise), to the overall project network and 
identifying potential bottle-necks in the process. Due to the sole dependence on 
time however, a value that has already been identified as one of the main 
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restrictions to linear models, it has become apparent that this method will not 
develop the model any further. 
4.4.2 Information Theory 
Claude Shannon is attributed with the birth of information theory in the late 
1940s. Originally developed in research into telecommunications it essentially 
incorporates data compression, coding of data and the passage of bits of data 
through noisy channels without loss.  
Within this concept, information theory calculates the information content of 
data based on logarithms of the inverse probability of those data occurring. An 
example in language is that the word “the” has very little information contained 
in it and its probability is very high (Pierce, 1980). This idea may be interesting 
if applied to the ideas of the accident causation network whereby a node such 
as “vibration indicator” could have a lot of potential information associated with 
it as the relative probability of abnormal readings is rare. Information theory 
allows for analysis of communication channels between, e.g., air traffic 
controllers and pilots, and communication between towers and pilots can then 
be analysed based on entropies found to be associated with accidents as a 
possible prevention (or alerting) method. This concept includes highlighting 
possible information “bottlenecks” and may be applicable to the model at a later 
stage of its development if an acceptable association with probability theory is 
found to be suitable. 
4.4.3 Latent Semantic Analysis 
Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA), or Latent Semantic Indexing, is a technique 
developed in the 1980s by a team of psycholinguistic researchers and first 
published by Deerwester et al. in 1990. 
LSA produces a measure of word-word, word-passage and passage-passage 
relationships to attempt to objectively predict the consequences of overall word-
based similarity between different passages of text. In this way LSA could prove 
to be a useful methodology to apply to, for example, incident transcripts or 
reports in order to identify relationships or similarities in an objective way. 
“LSA is a fully automatic mathematical/statistical technique for extracting and 
inferring relations of expected contextual usage of words in passages of 
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discourse.” (Landauer et al., 1998, p.263) LSA represents text in a matrix 
containing frequency of word use in a passage. A function then weights the 
frequencies expressing a measure of the word‟s importance in that passage 
and the extent to which any particular word carries information in general. 
Further factor analysis is then used to identify key words or phrases within 
passages. For further information and more detailed explanation of the statistics 
involved the reader is directed to Landauer et al. (1998) as an introductory 
paper. 
It is important in such a method to note that the “similarity estimates derived by 
LSA are not simple contiguity frequencies, co-occurrence counts, or 
correlations in usage, but depend on a powerful mathematical analysis that is 
capable of correctly inferring much deeper relations.” (Landauer et al., 1998, 
p.260) 
There are, however, many limitations currently discussed in the literature for 
LSA in current practice including suspicion of high levels of incompleteness or 
error (Landauer et al., 1998). 
Interestingly, though, it has been proposed that LSA constitutes elements of 
computational theory capable of further understanding the acquisition and 
representation of knowledge (Landauer and Dumais, 1997). This includes, they 
argue, developing further understanding of how individuals acquire more 
knowledge, or information, than is evident purely on the surface. 
As mentioned above, there appears to be some scope to use LSA at initial 
stages of investigation instead of HTA particularly when dealing with transcripts 
and reports. However, current limitations and uncertainties within the method at 
this early stage ultimately preclude it from this project. 
4.4.4  Bayesian Theory 
"Graphical models are a marriage between probability theory and graph 
theory. They provide a natural tool for dealing with two problems that 
occur throughout applied mathematics and engineering -- uncertainty and 
complexity.  Probability theory provides the glue whereby the parts are 
combined, ensuring that the system as a whole is consistent, and 
providing ways to interface models to data. The graph theoretic side of 
graphical models provides both an intuitively appealing interface by which 
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humans can model highly-interacting sets of variables as well as a data 
structure that lends itself naturally to the design of efficient general-
purpose algorithms.” (Jordan, 1998, p.1) 
Bayesian networks are one such graphical model. Jordan (1998, p.1) goes on 
to say of such models that “many of the classical multivariate probabilistic 
systems studied in fields such as statistics, systems engineering, information 
theory, pattern recognition and statistical mechanics are special cases of the 
general graphical model formalism.  Examples include mixture models, factor 
analysis, hidden Markov models, Kalman filters and Ising models. The graphical 
model framework provides a way to view all of these systems as instances of a 
common underlying formalism. This view has many advantages; in particular, 
specialised techniques that have been developed in one field can be 
transferred between research communities and exploited more widely.” This 
last point is essential in this author‟s view where developing a method with real 
usability, multi-disciplinary application and real-world foundations is key to the 
thesis. “Moreover, the graphical model formalism provides a natural framework 
for the design of new systems.” (Jordan, 1998, p.2) 
Bayesian networks are complex diagrams that organise the body of knowledge 
within a system by mapping out cause-and-effect relationships. The key 
variables are coded with numbers that represent the extent to which one is 
likely to affect another. Bayesian networks hail from the work of Rev. Thomas 
Bayes and in particular his posthumously published essay of 1763. In the 
essay, Bayes produced a mathematical formula to calculate probabilities for 
causally related variables for which relationships can‟t easily be derived through 
experimentation due to their inherent complexity. 
Social scientists worked on this idea much later and began using the theory to 
clarify which are key factors within a particular event and it is this potential 
usefulness of the theory that leads to the suitability of study within this project. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, neural nets were popularised as computers were 
able to deal with large amounts of data and identify patterns. There were 
limitations however where the neural nets couldn‟t predict as they couldn‟t be 
„trained‟ as such and would therefore require an infinite source of data 
exclusively covering all possible outcomes; not realistic in aviation or other 
complex systems. 
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During the late 1980s, however, researchers in the field of Artificial Intelligence 
discovered that Bayesian networks offered an efficient way to deal with the 
lack, or ambiguity, of information that had hampered previous attempts. Eric 
Horvitz (a pioneer in the field working at Microsoft during the 1990s and 
producing papers over many years, e.g., Horvitz et al., 2001) asserts that the 
approach “...was efficient because you could combine historical data, which had 
been meticulously gathered, with the less precise but more intuitive knowledge 
of experts on how things work to get the optimal answer given the information 
available at a given time.” (Helm, 1996; from an interview with Horvitz) This 
intertwining of both historical data and specialist knowledge (utilising subject 
matter experts (SMEs) for instance) lends itself to the application of our 
information network models. 
4.5 Conclusions 
Chapter 4 has shown the direction of development that the research has taken 
since the successful application of information networks to aviation accidents. 
The introduction of an „ideal‟ set of networks as a tool of comparison allowed for 
significant nodes to be more easily identified. Further than this it opened up the 
opportunity of a quantitatively comparable network to an actual system and thus 
smoothly transitioned into the second half of the chapter. Returning to Salmon 
et al. (2008a) introducing a quantitative element to the networks has really 
started to identify levels of situation awareness and introduced the concept of 
activation levels of particular nodes (i.e., information actively owned) within a 
system. 
Social Network Analysis was adopted as a suitable starting metric to attempt to 
identify these key nodes and significant trends, or differences, between actual 
and ideal system networks. Together with weighting of nodes based on agent‟s 
ownership, sociometric status was found to be a way of identifying statistically 
significant differences between actual and „ideal‟ scenarios. This method could 
be applied in situations where systems are compared in a current snapshot 
state to the „ideal‟ for that system. From this, nodes that are statistically 
significantly different in terms of their information communication power can be 
highlighted and investigation of those nodes implemented. It is likely, given the 
central importance of communication, as discussed in the introduction in 
relation to Gibson et al. (2006), in understanding these events, that those 
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nodes performing most differently from an „ideal‟ scenario would stand the 
greatest chance of influencing a negative event (or at least an event not 
modelled by the „ideal‟ scenario). 
Technique Advantages Disadvantages 
Critical Path Analysis Used and tested in 
critical activities 
Linear foundations 
Information Theory Centralises 
information transfer 
Limited to analysis of 
qualitative networks 
Latent Semantic Analysis Addresses 
relationship of 
information 
Currently limited to 
passages of prose 
Bayesian Theory Integrates SME 
knowledge and 
transferable between 
domains 
Complex in large 
systems 
Table 4-6 – Summary table of theories with potential for integrating into 
information network models 
Several methods of looking to further analyse the information networks are 
discussed and despite promising aspects to more than one, the chapter 
unearthed a potentially very useful statistical methodology in Bayesian 
networks. Table 4-6 illustrates the major advantages and disadvantages 
discussed for each method. Despite the complexity that may occur in Bayesian 
networks, and this is something that needs addressing, the limitations of the 
other methods mean they are not suitable at this time for integration into the 
model. It is for the very reason that Bayesian methods appear to work well with 
information networks that the following three chapters of this thesis look at 
extending the application beyond accident investigation towards a proactive 
and even predictive methodology. Chapters 5 and 6 look at developing the 
information networks further by combining the theories of Bayesian statistics 
and testing against a situation-based study. Chapter 7 then looks at the real-
world industrial application of the information network methodology with a 
legacy airline. 
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5 Extending the potential of 
information networks; a 
Bayesian Approach
7
 
 
 
5.1 General Aviation; the „unprofessional‟ genre?  
In Chapter 4 we saw how the information networks can be analysed using 
social network-style metrics, and also looked into developing the method with a 
variety of subject-areas that may be applied. The aim of this chapter is to 
investigate the possibility of developing the quantitative power of the 
information networks on the basis of the findings from chapter 4. Bayesian 
networks have been identified as a potential method that could be integrated 
with information network theory in order to objectify the model further. This 
chapter looks at combining the two methodologies and making use of an oft-
underused source of data.  
It is undoubtedly a good thing that aviation accidents are incredibly rare. 
However, due to the lack of more Kegworth‟s, QF1‟s and other catastrophic 
events it makes it very hard to begin to develop a methodology based on 
probabilities and number of events. It is for this reason, and in the interests of 
                                               
7
 This chapter is the basis for the following published paper: Griffin, T. G. C., Young, M. 
S., Stanton, N. A. (2009). Barriers and accidents: The flight of information. In D. De 
Waard, J. Godthelp, F. L. Kooi, and K. A. Brookhuis (Eds.). Human Factors, Security 
and Safety . Maastricht, the Netherlands: Shaker Publishing. (Attached in Annexe 1) 
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studying aviation comprehensively rather than solely commercial large-scale 
incidents that this chapter begins to turn to the world of General Aviation (GA). 
Although it would be untrue to suggest that there are a plethora of regular 
aviation accidents in GA, there are undoubtedly more than in commercial 
aviation and as such that makes this a useful, and comparable, area of study. 
This chapter sets out to ensure that GA is a suitable area of study for 
information networks, and Bayesian application, before then discussing a move 
from taxonomic classification systems and increasing the amount of quantitative 
analysis. It is the author‟s opinion that these two aspects combined provide for 
real strength in the analysis of aviation accidents. Finally in the introductory 
section, Bayesian mathematics and their application to information networks 
and barriers is then discussed in relation to current, albeit limited, literature. 
This is not a negative thing though since that makes this a new, upcoming and 
exciting area of research. 
5.1.1 Are GA accidents fundamentally different to Commercial 
Aviation accidents? 
General aviation is defined, in the UK, as any aircraft in use excluding military 
or commercial air transport. There is no limitation on size or design within the 
legislation and yet GA is more commonly understood as light aircraft flying for 
non-commercial transport (including flight instruction). This still includes a wide 
range of operations, flying aims, roles, procedures, training levels and aircraft 
types. 
In the twenty-eight year period of full record keeping, up to 2008, 359 fatal 
accidents occurred to UK GA aircraft (GASCo, 2010). This is not starkly in 
contrast, as would be expected were GA so very different in safety and 
professionalism, to commercial aviation fatal accidents (28 in 2009 and 34 in 
2008 being typical figures (Learmount, 2010)). However, the majority of 
commercial aviation accidents (as opposed to incidents), by their very nature, 
result in fatalities whereas the majority of GA accidents do not (National 
Transportation Safety Board; NTSB, 2006). For this reason, GA provides many 
times more non-fatal accident reports which give a suitable number of events 
with which to work. Like with all figures it is often hard to get a clear picture of 
the „market share‟ in aviation accidents (including non-fatal) but the Australian 
Transportation Safety Board (ATSB; 2007) studied American and Australian 
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data from the nine years up to 2002 and reported that between 70% and 85% 
are from GA flying despite the number of flying hours being just under half of all 
hours. 
Studies have shown that pilot error is identified as a key contributing factor in 
many more GA over commercial accidents (a difference of almost 50% of 
reports) and that this is likely to reflect differences in training and experience 
between crews (Li et al., 2001). GA flying is identifiably different to commercial 
in a number of ways including the fact that the aircraft are hit harder by weather 
variances, there are different and less checked training (both initial and 
ongoing), less automation and systems management (although this is changing 
in light of new „glass-cockpit‟ technology) and variable levels of maintenance. 
Lenne and Ashby (2006) carried out a study on GA aircraft in Australia and 
concluded that almost three-quarters of the crashes studied involved aircraft-
handling or pilot-control errors. This is further supported by US data that 
identified 71% of accidents having those issues as central causes (NTSB, 
2006). It is not enough, however, to merely report such issues and expect an 
improvement in safety. This are the tips of the iceberg in terms of accident 
causes and further work must be done to understand the whole system of GA 
flying and where interactions occur between causes and other factors. Lenne 
and Ashby (2006) report that there are many associated or explanatory factors 
reported alongside those accidents which had pilot control errors at the centre. 
Li and Harris (2006) take this further and highlight the importance of further 
data and investigation to really understand the importance of these explanatory 
or contributory factors; a true systems approach to GA accidents. 
It is often argued that due to the implicit differences, some of which have been 
discussed, in GA as opposed to commercial aviation flying that they are not 
comparable. Although it is certainly true that the types of accidents tend to 
show different causal structures, it is not the aim of this thesis to suggest that 
the two types of accidents are comprehensively similar. Moreover, it is in 
removing this need to compare and contrast event „types‟ within the different 
areas of aviation that information networks are investigated and applied to GA 
in the hope that they elicit suitable analyses of the system regardless of flight 
type. This also applies to the argument over fatal and non-fatal accidents being 
born from different event foundations. 
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5.1.2 A new approach that aims to remove the limitations of 
classification methodologies 
Not only will this study look to use GA accidents to further the understanding of 
the system of flying and flying accidents in general, but non-fatal accidents will 
be used in addition to those that resulted in fatalities. The reason for this is 
simple; increased data with the hope that this leads to increased understanding 
of the GA system surrounding aviation accidents. This is in line with the ethos 
of applying information networks since the more comprehensive any network 
can be made, the more understanding can be comprehensively gained. The 
literature is far from conclusive as to whether non-fatal and fatal accidents are 
intrinsically different. It is clear that for many events, the factors and 
characteristics are very similar (Lenne and Ashby, 2006) and as such provide a 
great resource of data to be mined. However, it has also been shown that in 
some areas the factors and characteristics of non-fatal crashes can be at odds 
with those of fatal accidents (Haworth, 2003). In their discussion, Lenne and 
Ashby (2006) actually request future emphasis on using data to discern if non-
fatal and fatal landing accidents are similar in the nature of development or 
whether differences are more than superficial. In the same way that the 
information networks should preclude the need to label an accident as GA or 
commercial it is hoped this novel network approach can remove the bias of 
fatality on any study. Through attempting to illustrate and understand the 
information-space within which any accident occurs (fatal/non-fatal, 
GA/commercial) the limitations imposed by classification of accidents can 
potentially be removed. The information space within the networks are created 
based on information present within the system and not restricted or enhanced 
by the particular outcome or classification of an end-result. This is an 
advantage over methods which limit themselves through inflexible grouping and 
fitting. There are often inconsistencies in the classification or labelling of 
accident types and consequences let alone the factors and causes behind them 
(Jarvis and Harris, 2009). Indeed, classification methods such as the Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) have revealed limits in 
application to GA studies both in powered and non-powered flight (Lenne et al., 
2008; Jarvis and Harris, 2009) due to the lack of solid organisational structures 
further up the causal ladder. Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) take this a step 
further and suggest the unsuitability of methods that looks at higher level 
factors in GA accidents, doubting that they would be evident or comprehensive. 
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The information network methodology does not presume to replace a 
classification procedure but add an alternative and additional direction from 
which to attack the system and elicit areas, or issues, of concern and causality 
(or prevention in ideal terms) of accidents. The information networks focus not 
on the classification of definition of an event‟s outcome but on the system in 
which that event took place. The emphasis is shifted from an event (which has 
been shown to be difficult to classify and often full of slight variations that 
recurrence is limited) to the barriers and links between information nodes 
surrounding any event, or non-event.  
In other words, communication is still purported to be central to any event and 
the information networks represent this flow of information (communication) 
well. It is true that in GA the types of information and communication will be 
different to commercial aviation. However, it is still effectively communication 
whether between the pilot and, the now more basic, instrumentation, pilot and 
visual cues (so often not necessary for commercial flying), pilot and the controls 
(which are mostly direct feedback controls with factors such as stickforce 
important) or between instrumentation and the environment. All information 
within the system may be consciously acknowledged and interpreted correctly 
(successful link), missed completely (failed link) or misinterpreted as seen in the 
case of Kegworth (chapter 3). Information networks do not differentiate the way 
in which information is processed but instead allow for the study of information 
in its more raw state regardless of environment or technical surroundings. In 
this way it is irrelevant whether the system being studied is GA or commercial 
so long as the respective information can be modelled comprehensively.  
This step away from outcome-classification and event-by-event investigation 
removes the limits of reproducibility and the need to encompass varied small 
changes to look at the barriers within which remain constant despite the 
ultimate outcome. It is hoped the information network, with Bayesian 
mathematics, approach is more suitable to the analysis of GA accidents and 
works equally as well as with commercial accidents studied thus far. 
5.1.3 Quantitative and Qualitative methods; a balancing act 
Any comprehensive ergonomics method needs to balance the qualitative and 
quantitative aspects in order to be as complete as possible. As in the plan for 
this thesis as a whole, any method should also maintain an effective interaction 
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between industrial practice and academia. Hignett and Wilson (2004) very 
neatly summarise this fusion of styles in order to produce the most effective and 
reflective view of a system (Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5-1 - The interaction of facets required for a comprehensive method 
(Adapted from Hignett and Wilson, 2004) 
HFACS, for example, uses a qualitative approach for analysis but then 
quantitative methods are often applied to the data that are produced. A more 
complex methodology must delve further into really integrating the qualitative 
and quantitative aspects though. This chapter looks at a method of fulfilling the 
ideal set out in figure 5-1 where all aspects are integrated to form a more 
comprehensive and representative model. The method proposed, in using 
information networks, addresses the qualitative aspects of the accident reports 
without artificially simplifying or classifying and then looks to incorporate 
quantitative aspects by way of historic data and mathematical manipulation 
introduced in chapter 4. In this way the method attempts to strike a balance 
using both qualitative and quantitative data so as not to artificially adopt one 
method at the expense of the other. This is favourable since each represents 
different facets of the real-world system and therefore both need to be present 
in a usable and realistic model. Risk models incorporating both qualitative and 
quantitative qualities allow understanding of system design (through 
predominantly qualitative means) but also a visualisation of actual practice 
within the system (quantitative historical data for example) (Marx and Westphal, 
2008). 
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There is no doubt that this area of ergonomics is developing and probabilistic 
risk assessment (PRA) is an area of study being swiftly advanced. However, 
much of the use of PRA has been with mechanical or engineered nodes and 
barriers since these mechanical systems have easily identifiable probabilities of 
failure etc. Over the past ten years there has been much research into the use 
of PRA with Human Factors (e.g., Marx and Westphal, 2008; Baybutt, 2002). 
This has centred on treating the human probabilities very differently to the non-
human which is contrary to the approach that information networks may be able 
to provide. Information networks using historical data to compute probabilities of 
node occurrence and link success/failure remove the highly subjective 
probabilities currently associated with these other methods; resulting in a more 
objective, less ambiguous unified approach. Indeed, Ale et al. (2005) suggest 
the power of these types of models “can be greatly enhanced if probabilities 
and logical dependencies can be quantified” using a variety of methods (p.37). 
Additionally, in using historical data, the reliance on SMEs to calculate 
probabilities for hundreds and thousands of nodes is removed. This also 
removes a large amount of the subjectivism that is criticised in current methods 
(Trucco et al., 2007).  The major difference in proposition of this study is that 
the aim would be to extend the method to the complex non-linear networks that 
are the ultimate aim of the approach. This would be a large step forward when 
compared to the current fault tree style linear approaches. How exactly these 
facets can be incorporated in the information networks is addressed next. 
5.1.4 Why Bayesian? 
Fault-trees are the bread and butter of current PRA techniques within industry 
and academia. This study proposes extending the application to non-linear 
information networks and this requires an advanced mathematical model. 
Chapter 4 introduced Bayesian modelling and highlighted significant potential 
that could be utilised with the information networks. 
The information networks used in the thesis thus far are reminiscent of several 
graphical models used throughout maths, science and engineering. Since a 
quantitative measurement is sought and there is a large pool of historical data 
then probabilistic graphical models could offer the necessary facets required to 
improve the information networks still further. There are two significant groups 
of probabilistic graphical models; directed and undirected. Undirected models, 
also referred to as Markov networks or chains, are used to represent 
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conditionally independent items, or nodes. Since this is an oversimplification 
and not reflective of the true nature of aviation accidents the alternative, 
directed graphical models, are of more interest. 
Within this group of graphical models, a Bayesian Belief Network is referred to 
as a directed acyclic graph. The name, and underlying theory, of these 
networks stems from Thomas Bayes‟ theorem (Bayes, 1763). Bayes theorem 
takes into account the effect of the hypothesis occurring on the probability of 
the evidence actually being observed. In other words, it is not only the 
relationship between events that is taken into account but also the marginal 
probability of each event ever having occurred. This allows for more complex 
relationships to be illustrated and investigated. Due to the complexity of the 
relationships being reflected by Bayes, each network is built from a series of 
conditional probability tables (CPTs). Each node, in this case representing each 
node within an information network, within a Bayesian network has its own CPT 
and together with the arcs between nodes the graphical model represents 
causal influence. 
Figure 5-2 illustrates a simple Bayesian network complete with CPTs for each 
of the binary (i.e. either true or false) nodes. Each node is connected by a link 
of singular direction indicating causality. As the variables are discrete, the CPT 
lists probabilities that the node is either true or false given each of the parent‟s 
nodes values. 
©    Griffin, T. G. C.   Chapter 5 – Extending the Networks 
 105 
 
Figure 5-2 – Simple Bayesian Network (from Murphy, 1998) 
In the bottom CPT it can be seen that the probability that the grass is wet 
(P(W=T)) is 0 if both the sprinkler and rain nodes are false (i.e., S and R = F). 
This makes sense since given this simplified network the grass can only be wet 
from either rain or a sprinkler. In this way all possible outcomes can be 
predicted given the evidence observed of parent nodes. This also illustrates the 
advantage gained from using a network even if it can be argued that it isn‟t 
comprehensive; lessons can still be learned and networks investigated. 
CPTs are typically developed with a mix of historical data and subjective 
specialist knowledge. This allows know, or expected, relationships and effects 
to be modelled. This is particularly useful in areas such as aviation accident 
investigation where events are rare and historical data may not be a good 
predictor of future events, causes and outcomes. However, there is a certain 
amount of criticism that can be levelled at such an approach where the very 
foundation of a graphical model is based upon the subjective “belief” of an 
expert. Luxhøj and Coit (2006) level this criticism at Bayesian networks and 
suggest that in order “to achieve objective results, that expert judgement must 
be quantified through a structured and traceable process.” They go on to 
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suggest a system that relies partly on historical data, as does the approach 
adopted in this chapter, and partly on trying to objectify the process of the 
experts through frameworks such as HFACS. Where this work attempts to 
divert from previous applications is by not adhering to the rigidity and 
restrictiveness built in using taxonomic classification systems. Additionally, it is 
the aim of this study to remove the focus from causal factors (the basis of 
Luxhøj and Coit‟s approach) of a particular event (i.e. an accident) and instead 
look at a system regardless of outcome and removing the focus from 
catastrophic events alone (Ale et al., 2005). It is interesting to note that 
although a Bayesian network is very capable of illustrating causal relationships 
there is no necessity for a directed edge (link between nodes) to signify a 
causal dependency. This opens up the use of the information networks where 
the links are propositional or identifying the flow of information rather than 
imposing a causal structure. In this way the approach tested here uses actual 
information nodes thereby delving deeper into any situation and system without 
attempting to artificially classify interactions. 
Significantly, Bayesian networks are able to model feedback loops, exclusivity 
and probabilistic rather than simple strict causal relationships (Ale et al., 2007) 
with unlimited variables given enough processing power. This type of 
manipulation would be required in order to apply quantitative theories to a 
complex 3D network with potentially thousands of nodes and links. Of real 
interest to this work is also the development of methods, as discussed, to 
remove the subjectivity of SMEs in applying probabilities to the networks. This 
continuing work in the field of Bayesian mathematics and modelling reveals the 
potential usefulness of the method and is central to this chapter. The next 
subsection revisits the idea of barriers within a network, a central theme of the 
thesis, and how this may provide a new way of looking at safety improvements 
combined with the methodology outlined here. 
5.1.5 Barriers and Error Migration 
Barriers are ubiquitously linked with safety in the literature and yet their use 
within aviation, outside physical barriers (e.g., engineering related or physical 
safety barriers), appears to be limited.  Within network models of a system, it 
would be possible to change probabilities of occurrence of events, or 
probabilities of conscious ownership of information, by inserting (or removing) 
barriers into the links between nodes. It is these arrows, or links, that result in 
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the flow of information within a system and any action to affect them should 
manifest itself as changes in outcome or changes in the probability of an 
outcome. Barriers, in this sense, can be seen as safety measures, i.e., the 
quality of a barrier defines the increased metaphorical „distance‟ it creates from 
a negative outcome in this instance. Luxhøj (2002), a leader in the application 
of Bayesian networks, introduces new nodes into what he terms an „influence 
diagram‟ (similar in form to a fault-tree) to represent potential barriers in a 
system. These nodes can take on structural type barriers or human acts such 
as inspection and management roles. Probabilities can then be applied in the 
same way as any other node to affect the overall probabilities of the system. 
Where this study looks to differ is by reflecting the effect barriers have on the 
links between information elements; being more reflective of the real-world 
system and not inserting superfluous nodes if they are not necessary. This is 
important since a particular barrier may in fact effect several links in different 
areas of a system in different ways and this would be hard to contain within a 
single additional node. The study discussed here is looking to investigate how 
barriers may be incorporated into an information network and whether the 
method is suitable for predicting the potential effects of the introduction of new, 
or adaptation of existing barriers. If a barrier effects the link between nodes 
then it would infer the probability of that node now occurring is affected.  
However, if probabilities must add up to one (i.e., the event will occur on 100% 
of occasions) and the barriers are affecting the probability of any node 
occurring within a network, then the value of the probability difference cannot 
simply be lost, so we must therefore look at alternatives to this. An adiabatic 
process, in relation to thermodynamics, is one where there is no heat lost or 
gained from/to the system (e.g., a gas or fluid) despite changes occurring 
within. In a similar vein, the probabilities within our aviation network system also 
cannot be simply lost or gained to exceed a probability value of one leaving an 
adiabatic style information system. If these probability values cannot simply 
disappear then the only option is migration of probability around the network 
and, given that any network model developed is aimed to be as comprehensive 
as possible, this may give some scope as to predicting the migration of the 
values around the system. Ideally, of course, the simulations should allow us to 
identify what barrier implementation or changes would allow for maximizing the 
positive, or safe, outcomes within a system. This, the nature of barriers that are 
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effective and methods of testing the prediction of such networks against 
simulation of a system are tested as novel methods. 
5.2 Investigating GA Accidents 
This design and method section identifies the source of historical data for use in 
this chapter and chapter 6. Additionally it outlines the method of database 
creation from a number of GA accidents by the author. The rest of the chapter 
is discussed following section 5.2.1 below. 
5.2.1 Data Repositories 
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) is an executive arm of the UK 
Department for Transport. It is the duty of the AAIB to investigate civil aircraft 
incidents and accidents both within and outside the UK where there are British 
interests. The Chief Inspector, David King, states that the aim of the AAIB is “to 
improve safety by determining the causes of air accidents and serious incidents 
and making safety recommendations intended to prevent recurrence...it is not 
to apportion blame or liability.” (AAIB Website, 2010) 
The AAIB are responsible for investigating the majority of „reportable‟ incidents 
to GA aircraft, i.e., those that do significant damage or injure people. The 
majority of these incidents are reported and dealt with by correspondence 
leading to the issuing of a report in a monthly bulletin. The more serious 
accidents, including those that are fatal, have dedicated investigation teams 
similar in composition to a commercial accident investigation. 
It can often be considered difficult ground to investigate an accident, in 
particular at the „active‟ end, and report without any perceived blame or liability. 
However, the information network approach demonstrated in chapter 3 re-
evaluates the digression away from realising the potential of fully investigating 
the active factors. The approach suggests a way of investigating active failures, 
which has been shown to be applicable and useful in chapter 2, by dissecting 
the situation without the need for blame being intrinsically linked to failure since 
the central theme is failure of effective communication at some point in the 
system network. 
In chapter 2 it was suggested that linear models lead towards a search 
focussing on latent factors at the expense of the often more controversial active 
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factors. Linear chains draw the investigator‟s attention away from the sharp end 
in an effort to understand the build up to an accident. It is suggested in this 
thesis that a dynamic network allows more comprehensive understanding of the 
entire system without necessarily separating nodes into latent and active 
(proximal and not). In this way we are not losing the link between “latent 
factors” a long way back in a chain. In having to draw the linkages between 
nodes in a network and having that visual and “solid” link present, it is easier to 
visualise the links between the active and latent nodes. This reintroduces the 
dynamic and complex concept of the active space - suggesting that latent and 
active factors are inextricably linked. Latent and active factors are one and the 
same in the dynamic world and should be addressed together as a single issue 
not separated into latent and active causes. It can be considered that the 
information network approach attempts to identify active failures yet leads to an 
understanding of latent reasons through study of the links. 
In an attempt to apply this information network approach to GA accidents the 
rest of this chapter looks at developing a database and from that populating 
networks with historical data. In this way the focus, on the surface at least, is 
active factors and yet it is hoped the links that are defined between the nodes 
highlight the latent and underlying reasons behind any incident as has been 
introduced in chapter 3. 
In order to create a Bayesian network to manipulate and learn lessons from the 
following steps will be taken: 
1. 200 accident reports published by the AAIB will be studied and a series 
of factors (or information elements/noun-like words) will be recorded. 
(Section 5.2.2) 
2. An information network will be built joining these factors whenever a 
propositional or information-flow link exists. (Section 5.3.1) 
3. A section of this network will be modified and made suitable for 
conversion into a Bayes Network formula using computing language. 
(Section 5.3.1) 
4. Probabilities will be applied to the nodes (or links) of the network as per 
the historical data collected in section 5.2. (Section 5.3.2) 
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5. MATLab will be used to code the Bayesian network that has been 
developed using a toolkit approach with all the algorithms necessary for 
successful calculations built in. (Section 5.3.3) 
Section 5.4 then looks at the preliminary results and discusses the usefulness 
of this approach. Chapter 6 is where the method comes to life and a novel 
approach of validating a Bayesian network prediction using simulation studies is 
carried out. 
5.2.2 Creating a Database 
As described in section 5.2, GA events are released to the public in monthly 
bulletins and so in order to create a database of incidents these records were 
analysed for a period from January 2005 until January 2007. For the purposes 
of clarity, the accident scenarios used involved single-engine piston fixed wing 
light (5,700 kg maximum gross weight or less) GA aircraft, e.g., the Cessna 152 
or Piper Warrior. 
Due to the nature of current reporting methods, as described in section 5.2, and 
the limits of information released to the public it is not possible to create 
comprehensive information networks for individual, or grouped, events. 
However, the investigation of a new method should not be limited by current 
restrictions or shortcomings and instead should look to developing reporting 
based on the method and not vice-versa. As such, each of the AAIB formal 
report transcripts were studied and, using no additional external information so 
as to limit bias, a database of factors reported in the accident was developed. 
The constituent incidents were classified by the AAIB primarily in terms of 
„causative‟ and „outcome‟ events. Further data including date of flight, aircraft 
type, licence held, hours flown in recent time and total, nature of flight and 
stage of flight were recorded. Table 5-1 a sample of factors recorded for the 
accidents as playing a key role. The method of deducing the factors to be used 
can be likened to the method of retrieving noun-like words to create information 
elements in chapter 3. 
Sample of Factors From the Accident Database 
Vibration Bounce Wind/Turbulence/Downdraft 
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Low Sun Icing 
Command G/A (Not 
command G/A) 
EFATO Inadvertent Stall 
Complex Op Procs (e.g. 
noise abatement) 
 
Table 5-1 – Example of GA Accident Factors 
A sample of database entries is included in annexe 2 of this thesis. Of the 200 
analysed incidents, 100 were during the landing phase of flight and so this area 
was focused on during the subsequent sections of this chapter. This choice, 
and the underlying data, also reflects the more general picture where the 
landing phase of flight has been found to have the highest proportion of GA 
crashes (Lenne et al., 2008; Lenne and Ashby, 2006). 
5.3 Developing a Bayesian-Information Network 
approach 
5.3.1 Manipulating the Network 
All of the landing incidents‟ causative and outcome factors were listed and an 
information-network style diagram built linking nodes where possible. Figure 5-3 
shows a stage in this process of building a network from the nodes. 
Originally, similar to those in chapter 3, information networks were modelled 
using knowledge objects taken from a Hierarchical Task Analysis for the nodes 
with propositions such as „has‟ or „causes‟ forming the links. However, for this 
study, the taxonomic labels, e.g., “too high/fast on approach”, are entered as 
nodes into the information network and the links between nodes are drawn up 
to represent viable relationships, thus representing possible incident pathways. 
Due to the nature of these nodes, it is possible to consider some as „influencing 
factors‟ (yellow nodes in figure 5-4), others further along the information 
network as „intermediate outcomes‟ or „further influencing factors‟ (grey nodes 
in figure 5-4) and finally as „outcomes‟ (white nodes in figure 5-4). More 
importantly, though, each node represents information objects that are present 
within the system at that time. Further to this, an event cannot occur without the 
information being present in the system to indicate that event (even if that 
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information goes unnoticed). The links, or arrows, between nodes represent the 
flow through this information network resulting in a specific outcome.  
In order to begin formulating a workable network, i.e., one that could then be 
manipulated using Bayesian mathematics, all nodes with an occurrence value 
of one were either grouped together or moved into the node “other rare event”. 
This allowed for a more manageable network that still retains the potential to 
extend the networks to include hundreds or even thousands of accident 
pathways and additional nodes, limited only by computing power as will be 
seen later in the chapter. This resulted in the generic landing case illustrated in 
figure 5-3. 
For development of the Bayesian element of the information network style 
scenario it was necessary to isolate a smaller portion. This would make the 
nodes more manageable to be manipulated with the conditional probabilities 
and a Bayes network produced. Therefore, to further limit the calculations 
required at this stage, a typical „influencing factor‟, “too high/fast on approach”, 
was selected. Only the associated nodes were kept, and all others removed 
from the network. The „influencing factor‟ “too high/fast on approach” occurs 
seventeen times out of the one hundred accidents. The nodes associated with 
this network pathway are: “approach to landing”, “too high/fast on approach”, 
“heavy landing”, “heavy landing & overrun”, “overrun” and “nosewheel 
collapse”. There are also the associated nodes of “go-around” (an approach 
that fails and results in another attempt), “decision to land” and “other rare 
event” included for completeness. 
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Figure 5-3 - Generic Landing Case for GA aircraft (sample step of linking) 
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Figure 5-4 - Generic Landing Case for GA aircraft with singular nodes removed
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5.3.2 Probabilities and Possibilities 
The frequency of occurrence of each node was recorded and from this, 
conditional probabilities given the occurrence of the preceding node(s) were 
calculated using adjacency matrices. Figure 5-5 shows the simplified 
information network for a “too high/fast on approach” landing scenario. The 
probability of each node occurring in the one hundred accidents, non-
conditionally, is given on each link. The additional node of “land decision” was 
created in order to allow statistical computation and comparison to the “go-
around” node.  
Once a network has been created, the conditional probability distributions of 
each node given their parent nodes are ascertained. By developing a series of 
equations in MATLAB (a numerical computing programming language) and 
populating them with the conditional probability data, it will be possible to use 
the software to manipulate the values and calculate the effect on occurrence 
probabilities of each node in a Bayesian style (allowing the investigation of 
barrier effects on a system). 
 
Figure 5-5 - Information network with non-conditional probabilities applied 
These modified networks essentially allow a level of prediction of the effect on 
the whole network of manipulating event probabilities.   
©    Griffin, T. G. C.   Chapter 5 – Extending the Networks 
 116 
5.3.3 Building the Bayesian Network 
It is important, if predictions and progress in the field are to be made, that the 
model and methods used in this study are qualifiable. Bayes networks allow all 
of the necessary facets discussed in earlier sections and so an approach that 
envelops the theory and algorithms is key to the method. MATLab has the 
ability to append toolkits to carry out complex calculations and as such 
becomes a workable solution when paired with Kevin Murphy‟s Bayes Net 
Toolbox. 
It was decided this was the best platform to create a Bayes network type 
methodology of identifying all possible outcomes (i.e., effects on probability of 
related nodes) from modifying a particular link‟s probability with the addition, or 
manipulation, of a barrier. This would comprehensively identify information, and 
hence error, migration routes created when attempting to mitigate the accident 
pathways described in the information network. The benefits of developing a 
semi-automated mathematical program are that the calculations for a simple 
network such as that described in this paper are extensive yet once developed 
it is hoped the system could work on a much larger scale. 
The following describes the process of modelling a simple information network 
as a Bayesian network and populating that network with probabilities based on 
historical data as has been carried out for use in chapter 6. 
The simplified information network shown in figure 5-5 now had to be coded to 
a Bayes network within MATLab. This process involves the specification of a 
directed acyclic graph. This converts the graphical network into a non-graphical 
model by identifying which nodes are related to others and in which direction 
(i.e. identifying parent and child nodes as in Figure 5-8). This is termed an 
adjacency matrix. Figures 5-6 and 5-7 show the code as it stands in the 
program and the following paragraphs explain its meaning. 
In MATLab any line of code which is preceeded by a “%” symbol is considered 
a comment line and generally ignored when the program is being executed. 
These comment lines are included to make reading the code simpler. Line 4 
simply tells the program how many nodes are present in the system; in this 
case 6. An adjacency matrix is a method of telling the program which nodes are 
linked and which are not. Line 6 empties the adjacency matrix so that lines 9 
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and 10 can inform the program where links are present in this case. A dag is a 
directed acyclic graph (a network of sorts) and, for example, line 9 states that 
node 1 is linked to nodes 2, 3, 4 and 5 as the link is “1”. 
Line 12 then defines each node as discrete, i.e., having a certain number of 
possible values, and line 14 further defines the nodes as binary. This identifies 
the nodes as either being “true” or “false” which is a valid representation of the 
nodes within a system which are either present or not. 
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Figure 5-6 - Screencapture of the MATLab code (Part 1) 
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Figure 5-7 – Screencapture of the MATLab code (Part 2)
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Line 17 then informs the program of each node‟s name before line 20 then 
instructs the program to draw a graph to display the network formed and this is 
shown as figure 5-8. 
 
Figure 5-8 - The scenario network as programmed in MATLab 
When compared with figure 5-5 it can be seen that this network is only 
modelling from the point at which the pilot decides to land. The method can be 
extended much further but it is important in this original exploratory study to 
maintain a reasonable level of understanding whilst limiting the number of 
additional errors or variables that might creep in through expanding the network 
tested. 
Line 21 now instructs the program to make this Bayes net referring back to the 
previous lines in the script.  Lines 25 to 28 inform the program of the probability 
of each node occurring in the historical data collected earlier in section 5.4. 
Each node has been assigned a letter to simplify the code. These are shown in 
figure 5-9. 
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Figure 5-9 - Network diagram illustrates letters as used in MATLab code 
Line 35 allows the user to define „df‟ which is the new (and changeable) value 
of „DF‟ shown in line 28. It is this value that represents the probability of a heavy 
landing occurring and as such changes to this value can be likened to changing 
the strength of the barrier leading up to the node „heavy landing‟.  
Lines 36 to 39 code the redistribution of any probability of occurrence „lost‟ from 
the „heavy landing‟ node. Line 36 ensures that the probability adds up to 1 at all 
times whilst 37 to 39 model the redistribution of probability according to the ratio 
of probabilities of the other nodes. In this way, the original model (as coded) 
infers that any probability value lost from the node „heavy landing (F)‟ migrates 
to the nodes „overrun (B)‟, „overrun and heavy (E)‟ and „rare event (A)‟. 
Lines 45 to 50 are where the data from the GA database are entered into the 
program. Bayes nets use Conditional Probability Distributions (CPDs) to model 
the probability of each possible outcome. In order to make the model usable at 
this stage it was necessary to treat each node as mutually exclusive. This 
precludes the chance of an „overrun‟ node being „true‟ at the same time as a 
„heavy and overrun‟ node. This should not, on the surface at least, affect the 
result of the network since each event had been classified as separate when 
harvesting the data. A 0 in the CPD is usually the result of two nodes being 
„true‟ at one time. An example Conditional Probability Table (CPT; which is 
used to calculate the CPD) is given in table 5-2. The order of the CPT is 
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important and the first column must begin with a „false‟ and then work 
alternately with „true‟. In this way, each alternate line must add up to 1 if nodes 
are mutually exclusive. From the first and third rows of table 5-2 it can be seen 
that if there is no decision to land there can only be a „false‟ for the node heavy 
since no landing is made. Row three therefore has a probability of 0. The data 
from the GA database have given the probability of a „heavy landing‟ (given the 
decision to land being „true‟) as 0.411765 (row 4) so in order for the CPT to 
work the probability for row two must be 1- row 4 which is equal to 0.588235. 
Node D Node F 
Prob DecisionToLand Heavy 
F F 1 
T F 0.588235 
F T 0 
T T 0.411765 
Table 5-2 - CPT from line 49 (probability of node „heavy landing‟) 
Line 50 of the code illustrates the CPD for the node „nosewheel collapse‟ and 
as such has the greatest number of possible options, thirty-two, although many 
of these are limited to zero by mutual exclusivity. 
Lines 52 and 53 tell the program that the node „decision to land‟ is true. This is 
a useful limitation for the purposes of the study in chapter 6 but open to 
manipulation in the future through the addition of many pieces of evidence prior 
to the node in question. The next four lines of code cause the program to run 
the scenario and produce, through inference, the marginal distribution of 
probability. The reason the results are considered marginal probabilities is that 
the analysis has artificially reduced the number of variables that are being 
considered compared to the real situation. This does not, however, necessarily 
result in inaccurate data since the quality of the historical data and any inferred 
©    Griffin, T. G. C.   Chapter 5 – Extending the Networks 
 123 
relationships between nodes is what the inference engine uses to calculate 
probability relationships.  
To test the coded network we can execute the program with line 35 (df) as the 
original value of DF 0.411765. In this case, the program calculates that the 
probability of nosewheel collapse is 0.2627. If, as in figure 5-7, we halve the 
probability of the heavy landing (df = 0.411765/2) then the resultant probability 
of nosewheel collapse is 0.1201. It is clear that this is not half of the previous 
probability and so there is a relationship that is being modelled within the 
network that is not strictly linear. 
This value of df will be investigated in chapter 6 in a flight simulator study. If a 
barrier can be given a quantitative value, such as reducing the number of heavy 
landings by half, then the program can attempt to predict the effect on all other 
nodes. Although this is very limited at this point, in terms of the number of 
nodes being used, if the method is shown to work or produce at least positive 
results, then the expansion, as previously noted, is less problematic. It would be 
possible to produce a program capable of automatically filling such a Bayesian 
model as the numbers become too unwieldy to use first principles and manual 
CPTs. 
5.4 Outcomes, Limitations and Future Work 
5.4.1 Current limitations 
It is important at this developmental stage of a novel method to acknowledge 
and address any limitations that are currently present. Methods for further work 
to overcome and combat these limitations are discussed here and further in 
chapter 6. 
The analysis detailed in this paper uses only negative-outcome data (i.e., 100% 
of flights used resulted in an accident) and this currently limits the migration 
issues relating to a “safe outcome”; a central element of this work. The addition 
of positive-outcome data is not without its challenges but commercial aviation 
certainly has the equipment and ability to record and observe vast amounts of 
normal operation data should it prove useful to do so. This mixed-outcome data 
then can be incorporated to populate comprehensive networks. The acquisition 
of such data is harder in the GA environment but if the method proves useful 
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then action can be taken to improve this. Once positive outcome data are 
included then it would become clearer which barriers are most likely to result in 
the migration of probability towards more positive results, or at least a result 
which results in the increase of activation of fewer negative outcome nodes 
than other network manipulations at the barrier level. 
Within the Bayesian information network method itself the main limitation in this 
initial form is the treatment of all nodes as mutually exclusive. At this stage of 
the development it was necessary to limit the mathematics involved in order to 
test the nature of applying Bayesian theory to the information networks. In 
developing a program within MATLab it is possible to include nodes with 
feedback loops and also to introduce relationships of non-mutually exclusive 
events. The quantity of data required is significant in order to build the 
relationships to a level which is useful and for this reason the limit is 
predominantly processing related. This can therefore be conquered with larger 
data pools and more complex network programming. 
In terms of this study and manipulation of the network, the primary limitation is 
the quantity of information available and used to populate the networks. This 
really is to identify the potential of a novel methodology and any increase in 
data can be catered for with more complex and automated programming 
processes retaining the base theory tested here. 
Finally, the identification and use of factors and node elements would need 
further development in future studies. In particular, for the purposes of this 
study the author compiled the list of nodes from the accidents and in future 
repeats would develop a method of cross-validation both inter and intra-rater to 
improve quality. 
With these limitations, and the potential methods for removing them, in mind the 
following addresses the outcomes and further developments that this study has 
resulted in. 
5.4.2 Chapter outcomes 
What this chapter has done is take the potential of Bayesian mathematics and 
combined that with the novel information network approach to understanding a 
complex system.  
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As discussed in section 5.1, the current literature tends to argue that GA and 
commercial accidents can not be compared successfully. Methods such as 
HFACS do suffer from these limitations but primarily this is due to classification 
of events and the difficulties in achieving the non-natural taxonomies required 
especially at the higher levels of taxonomic methods. This study has shown that 
GA accidents are not fundamentally different in that communication and 
information flow remain central to any system. As such, analysis can be carried 
out with networks which centralise the barriers and links of information rather 
than outcome. Despite the different types of information or methods of 
information transfer the fundamental process of communication can still be 
modelled through information networks. Failures in this communication can 
then be further investigated or potential leaks and weak points highlighted. In 
this way the approach detailed here based on information networks is argued to 
be more suitable than other methods for studying the breadth of aviation 
accidents.  Unlike the main comparable work in the field, that of Luxhøj et al. 
(e.g., 2002 and 2006), the method is not restricted by limitations of 
classification/taxonomic techniques. For the first time Bayesian theory has been 
merged with systemic information theory and shown potential to overcome the 
restrictions associated with linear based fault-trees and methods that require 
causal taxonomies. This marks a first step in opening up the potential to study a 
system holistically without the prerequisite of an incident or causes.  
This method has used historical data to populate the networks. It is very 
unlikely for historical event data to predict accurately a future event outcome 
due to the rarity and variability of aviation accidents and as such limited use has 
been made of such data. However, using data in a way that removes the need 
to compare ultimate outcomes or events and can instead compare the 
pathology of an aviation accident at a deeper level (i.e. information flow and 
individual information elements) has already been shown possible by 
information networks in chapter 3. This development in the field allows areas of 
particular concern to be highlighted by centring the barriers (and links) instead 
of the labelled or „classified‟ event. Historical data of a particular link failing 
could lead to the further investigation of that link and associated barriers or 
factors. This would then develop a further understanding of exactly what that 
barrier or link is and how it is affected by, for example, training, regulations and 
propagation of relevance. This link may be implicit in a number of outcomes 
and as such by understanding the system at the information network level we 
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are not limited to attempting to predict outcomes with historical outcomes; more 
relationships can be studied, modelled and potentially understood. A fully 
developed program using the methods above could result in a warning system 
as certain barriers are attacked more frequently than others or have potentially 
more far-fetching negative results than others. Crucially also, the same barrier 
may affect many different links and this is where the model would develop into 
a fully functional 3D network. This is explored in chapter 8. 
The strength of this model when compared to many PRA methods is that the 
aim is not restricted to needing exact predictions of outcomes. Instead, the 
focus is on highlighting and making salient relevant nodes, links, barriers, and, 
factors. The quantitative aspect of the approach give the method objectivity and 
make use of the large amounts of data that are far from useless despite the 
caveats given in the previous chapter. Further than simply predicting the 
probability of a particular node or barrier to be activated, this method has 
potential to really develop the understanding of the pathology of the system. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has taken information networks further as a comprehensive 
qualitative and quantitative model. By removing the limitations of classic 
taxonomic methods, information networks prove to be equally as useful in 
understanding GA accidents as commercial accidents. The availability of GA 
accident data, although limited in detail due to reporting issues discussed, 
meant that a sample network could be built and predictions made on the effects 
to other nodes within that network following a manipulation of a barrier. This 
idea can then be extrapolated to larger and more complex networks and where 
possible programming, studied further in later chapters, can overcome the 
limitations discussed above. This is where this method takes the leap from 
reactive to proactive and has definite elements of a predictive model; the 
ultimate aim of investigative models. 
The Bayesian model developed in this chapter is the basis for the testing 
carried out during a flight simulator study in chapter 6. This chapter investigates 
for the first time whether a simulation study can be used to validate predictions 
from information networks embedded with Bayesian mathematics. Future 
application of this type of method is also possible with the commercial aviation 
industry based work detailed in chapter 7. 
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6 Can we validate networks 
derived from incident data 
through simulation? A Pilot Study 
 
6.1 Can a validation approach be validated? 
The thesis continues with Bayesian mathematics merged with the information networks 
because they allow us not only to define the probability of a hazard occurring but also 
encapsulate risk more fully by integrating the probability of an accident given any 
particular hazard (Luxhøj, 2002). Further than this, by integrating the information 
network theory the restrictiveness of this approach to hazards and accidents can be 
removed. Analysis can occur based on the deeper level of information nodes meaning 
the analysis can occur regardless of perceived blame, linear cause or even a negative 
outcome. Bayesian networks have been developed to indicate relationships within a 
system just as an information network does – therefore together these two methods 
have the potential to be a strong analytical tool.  
The initial introduction sets the scene of the study and reinforces the strong link 
between this chapter and chapter 5. Next the idea of using a verbal instruction to 
participants as a barrier is introduced and validated with reference to previous literature 
and usability. Finally, the last part of the introduction looks at the use of simulators 
within aviation and identifies this as a novel study that  attempts to validate Bayesian 
information network predictions using flight simulation for the first time. 
6.1.1 Setting the Scene for Simulator Validation 
Chapter 5 looked at how information networks can be developed along a very different 
path to exploit the quantitative potential of the method without limitation in terms of 
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immediate applicability. The current Chapter looks at whether, for the first time, the 
quantitative predictions from the information networks being populated with conditional 
probability data could be validated given enough simulation, or real-life, data collection. 
The aim of this study and chapter is to investigate the possibility of validating the 
predictive nature of Bayesian networks through laboratory experimentation. The 
landing sequence of a general aviation aircraft has been isolated in order that the data 
produced and tested do not become too unwieldy that any underlying lessons or 
potential is missed. It is not possible at this stage to model the entire flight within one 
thesis and so in order to maintain a constant approach, the landing phase has been 
isolated as in chapter 5. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to validate an entire network or 
comprehensively the use of Bayesian theories applied to information networks. 
However, as the subsection title suggests, this chapter attempts to discover if historical 
data can, as used in chapter 5, help to predict and model real-life scenarios. This study 
attempts to begin this process and if successful, develop and increase the scope of 
application which is then more down to software development and data management. 
Ideally, with comprehensive information networks based on GA flying populated with 
historical data, changes to training or regulation of pilots and flight could be tested in 
the network probabilities and then possibly cross-checked through simulation. This 
chapter sets out to attempt to introduce the possibility of validation of this theory in 
order to capture the elusive idea of error-migration within networks and chart best or 
worst scenarios given specific changes. 
6.1.2 Bayesian Information Networks and Barriers 
Networks have been developed in chapter 5 based on General Aviation (GA) historical 
data collected from landing scenarios. The information networks‟ nodes were populated 
using this historical data from the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) without the 
use of taxonomies such as HFACS, a technique breaking protocol with the literature to 
date. The use of information networks instead of causal fault-tree based approaches 
provides potential for a deeper understanding of a complex system such as aviation 
without linear restrictions. Following the construction of information networks, similar in 
design to those found in chapter 3, the links between nodes were quantified with 
probabilities and in order to capture the full interrelationships between nodes a 
Bayesian network developed. Luxhøj et al. (2001) based the values within their 
Bayesian networks initially on subject matter expert assessments and then began to 
integrate historical data. In order to remove subjectivity as much as possible at this 
stage, the networks were populated with historical data. It is then hoped that this 
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Bayesian information network reflects accurately the real-world and the simulated world 
tested in this study. It is clear though that further work needs to be carried out to really 
quantify the interactions and models and this is continuing throughout the subject area 
(Ale et al., 2005). 
Further than this, developing upon ideas introduced by Luxhøj (2002), this chapter 
looks to introduce barriers into these Bayesian models and manipulate the values of 
nodes and links within a network resulting in the variation of any potential outcomes 
and node activation. In the future both the nodes and the barriers may be quantified in 
terms of “...distributions of values rather than point estimates wherever appropriate.” 
(Ale et al., 2007, p. 1432) 
Luxhøj and Coit (2006) talk of introducing “technologies” or “interventions” into their 
Bayesian Belief Networks in order to affect the causal trees used. Luxhøj and Kauffeld 
(2003) used HFACS as the basis for developing a Bayesian network and attempted to 
assess relative risk post-barrier introduction based on the taxonomy. What this study 
looks to do is remove itself from any restriction of a classification or taxonomy 
technique and instead look to identify at a deeper level information (or error) migration; 
an issue that is to date not covered comprehensively in other literature. Methods have 
been published and used to attempt to qualify relationships within systems such as 
System Hazard Analysis (SHA). The FAA have published a handbook (2000) that 
details integrated SHA (ISHA) and MIL-STD-882E (US DoD, 2005) is a well known 
document detailing US military safety practice. Both of these identify the sort of work 
that must be done to understand the effect on the rest of the system of any new 
insertion and that “...insertions...are accomplished in a manner that maintains an 
acceptable level of mishap risk” (US DoD, 2005, p.13). Although positively addressed, 
these issues are raised at a very high-level, something this study attempts to 
overcome. Indeed, it is hoped that by adopting the information network methodology 
this study will show that information migration prediction can be validated with flight 
simulation as a starting point. Further to this the information network, by removing 
compartmentalisation of particular accidents or outcomes, has the potential to really 
show migration outside of the particular scenario which is being investigated; ideally 
highlighting nodes of interest that are not immediately apparent to the investigator. In 
this way the potential of the method will not be fully developed in this study but the 
foundations for this further research so will be born. 
For the purposes of this study, it is not appropriate to develop and test a technology, or 
barrier as understood from a purely engineering perspective. Instead, using barrier 
theory to its fullest, barriers do not require a physical presence and in this case a 
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strong instruction to a pilot (as long as it is unambiguous and possible) may act as an 
intervention; a barrier. MIL-STD-882E considers a wide range of barriers including 
modifications to equipment, insertion of new technologies or materials and changes to 
techniques and methods; this makes an instruction a suitable insertion. This strong 
instruction, in having an influence upon the information flowing between nodes and the 
presence or otherwise of a node within the network acts in a manner comparable with a 
physical barrier. This makes an instruction suitable for testing in this study where 
Bayesian predictions are compared to flight simulation results. Indeed, to “develop 
procedures and training” as a “mishap risk mitigation measure” (US DoD, 2005, p.11) is 
considered a fourth level, or lowest order of precedence, method to mitigate mishaps. 
Therefore, if a verbal instruction is shown to work in this method then it is reasonable to 
expect those mitigation measures with a higher precedence (design selection, safety 
devices and warning devices) would work to an improved extent. In this way, the 
method is testing the worst mitigation and its effect on the nodes and the 
network/Bayesian model. 
6.1.3 Is Simulation Suitable for Study? 
It is clear there would be serious implications, both financial and safety-related, if 
participants were asked to fly real aircraft in potentially difficult, or even dangerous, 
situations. In fact, aviation has been a forerunner in the use of simulators for training 
and practise since their early development when computer graphics and processors 
could satisfactorily reproduce facets of the real-world scenarios. Indeed Salas et al. 
(1998) discuss the centrality of simulators within almost every aspect of aviation 
training. It would appear appropriate, therefore, to turn to simulation for the testing of 
aviation centric models of accident causation. 
Simulation in itself though is also incredibly expensive when looking at, for example, 
the high-fidelity, full-motion platforms that a company such as British Airways (BA) 
spends millions of pounds on. The running costs are also high, requiring specialised 
synthetic flight instructors (SFIs). It is not surprising then that just one hour in a BA 
simulator costs upwards of £400 to the general public in 2009. Conversely however, 
this is still significantly cheaper than an hour‟s cost of flying a BA aircraft given fuel, 
handling costs, approach fees and dual crew etc.  
So the same is true for general aviation. The cost of hiring a light aircraft varies 
considerably depending on type, age, capability and location. But there are a small 
number of light-aircraft simulators which are being developed to provide cheaper 
solutions to training and testing of safety and aircraft performance. Brunel University 
has one such simulator; the Merlin MP521 (Figure 6-1).  
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This simulator provides a cost-effective platform for basic training and aeronautical 
testing. The graphics and fidelity of the simulator, despite being full-motion, are of 
course limited in comparison to the type used in large airlines but in the right situation 
they provide very valuable tools for research. This project is one such example. The 
aim of validating a section of the network for a light aircraft landing does not require 
high-fidelity and highly-graphical simulation. So long as visual cues similar to that of a 
normal approach, e.g., instrumentation, runway and surrounding visuals, are present, 
then the simulation is suitable for the type of study in this chapter. In fact, Dahlstrom et 
al. (2009), after some discussion of the literature surrounding the argument, even go so 
far as to say that sometimes “high levels of technologically driven fidelity can simply be 
wasteful in terms of costs and time....” 
The aim of this project was to investigate the potential of using simulators to validate 
and test predictions made by the Bayesian style networks adapted and researched in 
chapter 5. It is hoped that the results from this study give support to the probabilities 
harvested through studying the GA accident archives. Further than this though, the 
study will allow for the manipulation of the pre “Heavy Landing” node barrier previously 
identified. Using an instruction to affect the behaviour of the participant pilots a 
measure will be taken of the reduction effect this has on heavy landings. Subsequently 
the factor of reduction can be entered into the Bayesian Information Network and a 
predictive value for changes in nosewheel collapse events elicited. The actual value of 
nosewheel collapse pre and post instruction will be compared with the predicted value 
from the network statistically and if found to be similar it can be concluded that the 
information networks do have strong potential to act as predictors of real-world events 
after manipulation of barriers within.  
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Figure 6-1 - Brunel University‟s Merlin MP521 Flight Simulator 
6.2 Methodology 
The reasons and theory behind the testing of Bayesian information network predictions 
by flight simulation have been discussed. Section 6.2 sets out the way in which this 
study was carried out. In particular it highlights the study variables and the 
experimental design including the equipment, procedure and participants involved. 
6.2.1 Design 
This study takes the form of a within and between subjects simulator test built up of 6 
scenarios. The 3 scenarios had altered starting points from where the simulation would 
begin and the participants asked to execute a landing approach. In order to test the 
network predictions it was necessary for the study to elicit results of the aircraft 
overrunning a runway and carrying out a heavy landing. Therefore each scenario was 
developed to allow the participant to carry out an approach, and possible landing, to a 
runway of fixed length. The force of impact of the aircraft (heaviness of landing) and the 
landing distance (distance past the fixed threshold where the aircraft came to a 
complete stop) could be measured and stored for statistical analysis and comparison 
with the results from chapter 5. Within each scenario it was possible to carry out a 
successful and safe landing but with increases in speed and height at the starting point 
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this would obviously become more of a test and reflect more realistically a high and/or 
fast approach to land.  
Independent 
Variable One (Made 
up of 3 levels) 
Independent 
Variable Two (Made 
up of 2 levels) 
Dependent 
Variable One 
Dependent 
Variable Two 
Slightly High & Fast No Instruction Force on Landing Overrun 
High & Fast Instruction Received   
Very High & Fast    
 
Table 6-1 – Summary of the study variables 
Table 6-1 summarises the variables within this study. The independent variables are 
covered in detail in section 6.2.4. Force on landing (dependent variable one) was 
measured with reference to normal acceleration of the aircraft upon impact with the 
ground. This offered the best value reference for distinguishing which landings are 
considered heavy and those considered not heavy. The second dependent variable, 
overrun, was measured in relation to the distance past the threshold that the aircraft 
came to a complete stop. This could then be related to the overall length of the runway 
and thus a conclusion made as to whether the aircraft had overrun the runway. Since 
all participants completed all conditions so the manipulations of the scenarios are 
within-subjects. 
The study was developed so as not to measure flying skill directly due to the limitations 
imposed by the hardware and software used. Instead the study deals with decision 
making, ability to interpret simple instructions, basic flying skills and allows for any 
improvement over the scenarios flown by using pseudo-random test order. Most pilot 
participants remarked that the simulator was just like converting onto a new type of 
aircraft (not necessarily totally realistic or as easy to fly as many aircraft). As such each 
volunteer was flying this “type” for the first time and each therefore is equally 
handicapped in that sense. 
As in chapter 5, the network was broken down into a more manageable section 
concentrating on the “too high/too fast” scenario of landing approaches which could be 
modelled in the simulation (Figure 6-2). 
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Figure 6-2 - Information network with non-conditional probabilities applied 
6.2.2 Equipment 
 
Figure 6-3 - Internal view of the Simulator 
The Merlin MP521 full motion flight simulator was originally designed to teach all 
aspects of aircraft design principles including the evaluation of controls and 
aerodynamic models. The basis of the software is a non-linear transonic six degree-of-
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freedom model. This allows reconfiguration of the module to almost any aircraft type 
from glider to airliner.  
Due to the limited nature of simulator graphics it is usual to increase the amount of 
information available on screen in terms of data to make up for a lack of depth 
perception and other subtle cues. For the simulator study the Heads Up Display (HUD) 
was modified to remove the central crosshairs, g-reading, latitude and longitude 
readouts, height, speed and vertical speed. These were instead represented in 
standard format instruments (identical to Cessna light-aircraft) on the instrument panel 
to the side of the control-yoke. The screenshots of the simulator control-panel and 
pilot‟s view are included here to show the graphical capabilities of the simulator. 
Figures 6-3 and 6-4 illustrate the set up of the simulator cockpit, position of 
instruments, controls and visual display used. 
 
 
Figure 6-4 - Heads Up Display in standard format (This was adapted for sim study) 
In terms of feel and control, the simulator uses compressed air to give feedback to the 
yoke control and also to control the full-motion experience. The simulator is fitted with a 
vernier throttle akin to that in a Cessna light aircraft, a yoke control, rudder pedals and 
a suite of instruments digitally representing measurements of altitude, speed, pitch, roll 
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and yaw in a standard format. The aeronautical model underlying the behaviour of the 
aircraft model is similar to that of a Cessna 152 training aircraft (figure 6-5). 
 
Figure 6-5 – Cessna 152 Landing 
6.2.3 Participants 
Participants were invited to take part voluntarily in the study. An email was sent to 500 
members of a local flying club and replies received from 36 acceptable individuals as 
wanting to take part. An acceptable participant from the study was determined as a 
pilot holding at least a Private Pilot‟s Licence for aeroplanes (PPL(A)) so student pilots 
or enthusiasts were not accepted. Of the 36 individuals, 30 were able to make the days 
that the simulator was available for use and of those 30, 28 produced usable data. Of 
the 2 unusable participants‟ data, one set of data became corrupted on saving which 
was not recognised until after that individual had left and the other (due to the wish not 
to impose changes or restrictions on pilot‟s behaviour) carried out manoeuvres which 
impaired the ability of the data to be compared fairly with the other participants. 
The 28 participants can be broken down into 26 males and 2 females. Ages varied 
from 25 to 63 with a mean age of 46. There was a range of hours as pilot of a light 
aircraft of between 54 and 1470 with an average of 383 (382.7143). 
6.2.4 Procedure 
The scenarios themselves were made to be simple due to the nature of the simulator 
used and in order to limit result variations. This is best achieved through simple 
scenarios and limited outcomes which would in turn reflect best the chance to validate, 
or not, the possible prediction values from the network models.  
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Due to a limited number of airfields available in the software, Gatwick was chosen as 
the airport to base the scenario at as it had less surrounding scenery than the 
alternative (Heathrow). The runway at Gatwick is too long to make the study valid for 
looking at runway overruns in light aircraft, therefore a straight taxiway parallel to the 
main runway was located in the South-Eastern corner of the airfield and this used as 
the “runway” for the practice and the scenarios. Figure 6-6 and Figure 6-7 show the 
location of this taxiway at London Gatwick. The length of the study “runway” is 
approximately 3,118 ft (950.5 m) of tarmac and this is comparable, albeit a very 
generous length within GA, to the home airfield of the participants where the main 
runway length is 3,330 ft (1,110 m) of grass. 
 
Figure 6-6 - The Study "Runway" (© Google Maps) 
 
Figure 6-7 - The Study "Runway" Enlarged (© Google Maps) 
Each participant was given a guide of the simulator and its controls/instruments on 
arrival and then asked to read a preliminary brief: 
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“You are the pilot in command of this light aircraft and all decisions are yours to be 
made as if in command of your own aircraft on a „typical‟ flight. Following an 
introductory circuit during which you can become familiar with the controls, you will fly a 
series of 6 approaches to the same runway. This first circuit is not being recorded for 
the purposes of this research. Each subsequent sequence is simulating the first 
approach to an airfield at the end of a flight. Each sequence will begin from a point on 
the final approach with the simulation frozen. When you are ready to continue, the 
simulation will begin and continue until you are told that the sequence is at an end. If 
you do decide to land from any sequence please land as short as possible and stop as 
near to the threshold as possible. After each sequence there is a short questionnaire to 
be completed; be completely honest in your responses. You will not be judged on your 
performance, no person outside of this laboratory will see details of your performance 
and we are unable to provide feedback on your flight.  
Do you have any questions?” 
Any questions were then answered although great care taken to ensure that any 
questions would not alter the behaviour or decision-making of the pilot; such as the use 
of a go-around. 
Each pilot was then given the opportunity to fly a circuit from the runway to get used to 
the handling characteristics of the aircraft before attempting 3 landing approaches from 
a “normal” 600ft, 80kts starting point with the simulator frozen. This was the non-
experimental task and carried out as follows: 
Non-experimental task: 
Task A 
1. Initial Point: threshold of Taxiway at LGW, 0ft AMSL, hdg 080°, 0 KIAS. 
2. Free-exercise to complete circuit and familiarise pilot with the aircraft. Following 
this allow 3 practice approaches to the taxiway to become familiar with task. 
3. Identify with the participant approach and landing speeds as follows: 
Vref =  65 Vfe = 80 
Following on from this practice session, each participant was then presented with the 
simulator frozen in one of 3 starting positions: 
Experimental tasks: 
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Task 1 
1. Initial Point: 1nm finals for Taxiway at LGW, 600ft AMSL, hdg 080°, 80 KIAS. 
2. Continue approach and aim for any landing within specified preferred landing 
zone (PLZ). 
3. Measure normal axis impact force and distance from 08R threshold that landing 
occurred. 
Task 2 
1. Initial Point: 1nm finals for Taxiway at LGW, 800ft AMSL, hdg 080°, 90 KIAS. 
2. Continue approach and aim for any landing within specified preferred landing 
zone (PLZ). 
3. Measure normal axis impact force and distance from taxiway threshold that 
landing occurred. 
Task 3 
1. Initial Point: 1nm finals for taxiway at LGW, 1000ft AMSL, hdg 080°, 100 KIAS. 
2. Continue approach and aim for any landing within specified preferred landing 
zone (PLZ). 
3. Measure normal axis impact force and distance from taxiway threshold that 
landing occurred. 
As mentioned, the order of these 3 tasks was pseudo-randomised (see full test profile 
in annexe 3 for full order). Participants, who were in two-way radio contact throughout, 
were then read the following brief before being presented, in a pseudo-random order, 
tasks 4 to 6: 
“For the remaining 3 landing tasks you are required, as pilot in command of this 
aircraft, to avoid at all costs from making a heavy landing. A heavy landing is one 
described as being uncomfortable for your passengers, causing excessive bounce on 
touchdown, or, in danger of damaging your aircraft in any way.” 
This additional brief acts to modify the barrier within the Chapter 6 network before the 
node “Heavy Landing” and as such is key to any validation exercise. Tasks 4 to 6 had 
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the same initialisation features as tasks 1 to 3 respectively and each participant was 
told when each had come to an end. 
Any comments from the participants were then noted (anonymously) and age, gender 
and hours data noted on their completed questionnaires. 
As this study is an attempt to see whether larger scale validation of the Bayesian 
inspired information networks is feasible it was important to limit the number of 
variables so as not to cloud the data. Since the test was interested in landing force and 
landing distance, not braking force or distance, the braking force was set at a moderate 
level for all participants and they could not increase or decrease the singular force. 
Each participant was given precisely the same brief and same practises before the 
experimental phase began. The runway and conditions of flight including control feel, 
visual cues and starting-points were all consistent. The pseudo-random order of 
scenarios was used as the most likely way of limiting improvement effects with time 
and practise. The fact that the aircraft was unlike any real GA aircraft in a number of 
ways in terms of feel and behaviour meant that no participant could have an advantage 
by flying a particular type in the past. 
As discussed in chapter 5 it can be assumed that exact predictions will be very hard to 
come by given the extent and quality of current historical data. However, if trends can 
be identified and relationships studied then a lot can be elicited from this technique. 
There are a number of methods which can be applied to the data resulting from this 
study to identify and test any relationships and these will be looked at in the next 
section.  
6.3 Results 
The results of this study are addressed in this section on several levels. Firstly some 
general observations relating to heavy and overrun landings are made together with a 
high-level summary of all data collected. Next the data is grouped into alike sets and 
tested using the chi-square metric. Section 6.3.4 then looks at continuous data and 
applies a nested ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) to the results. Although it can be 
argued that the ANOVA takes credence away from the chi-square, both provide a 
slightly different slant on the results. Each is useful in order to validate the usefulness 
of the instruction as a barrier and then take that further to investigate the relationships 
further. Whilst an ANOVA statistical test might suggest one group or individual has 
made a heavier landing than another, chi-squared definitively says what a heavy 
landing is (defined later in the chapter) thus providing a definitive slant on the results 
versus the continuous metric‟s relative comparison. Finally in the results section, 6.3.5 
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returns to the Bayesian based predictions made in chapter 5 and relates them to the 
empirical data found in this study. It is hoped that the data from the flight simulation 
scenarios validates the relationships that have been modelled in the Bayesian 
information network. 
6.3.1 General observations 
168 scenarios were flown (28 participants with 6 scenarios each). Data was recorded 
via a datalog produced by the simulator‟s mainframe. This raw .asc file was then 
modified to a usable output. Relevant data have been harvested from the datalog and 
reproduced in annexe 4 to this thesis. Table 6-2 displays one participants data for 
explanation. 
Participant Scenario Ground roll (m) 
Distance past 
T/hold (m) 
Normal 
Accel. 
A 1 378.5786172 743.3316396 -26.97 
Table 6-2 – Example of relevant data from simulator datalog 
Table 6-2 shows an example participant and the recorded data for one of the 6 
scenarios. Highest and lowest values for each dataset within the table in annexe 4 are 
highlighted in amber and green respectively. All scenarios highlighted in red resulted in 
an overrun of the runway which is discussed in section 6.4.2.  
Within the annexe, column 3 records the longitude at touchdown. Participant AA 
touched-down closest to the threshold on scenario 3 with a value highlighted as -
0.15018641 (4 metres into the runway). Conversely, participant C, scenario 6 had a 
touchdown point of -0.1398577 (819.5 metres down the 950 metre runway). The overall 
mean for touchdown longitude was -0.145708271 (358 metres into the runway) with a 
standard deviation of 0.002805892 (221.3 metres). 
Column 4 displays the longitude at which the aircraft has come to a complete stop, 
taking into account a constant braking force for all participants. The longitude for the 
stopend of the runway is -0.138198 and any longitude in excess of this would result in 
an overrun which is discussed in the next section. The shortest full-stop of an aircraft 
was participant AA during scenario 1 with a longitude of -0.14598704 (336 metres). 
The longest full-stop was participant KR, scenario 6 at -0.13522286 (1185.3 metres). 
The overall mean for full-stop longitude was -0.141000321 (729.4 metres) with a 
standard deviation of 0.002607827 (205.7 metres). 
Column 3 of table 6-2 (column 5 of annexe 4) gives a measure of ground roll in metres. 
This is calculated by comparing the longitudes and multiplying by a factor of 78895.2 
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metres per longitudinal value of 1. This is a distance calculated for longitude in degrees 
at a latitude of 51º 8‟ 53” North (Gatwick airport). The shortest ground roll was 
participant C, scenario 1 at 219 metres. The longest ground roll was carried out by 
participant Z, scenario 6 at 651 metres. 
As a more useful illustration of stopping distance, column 4 (column 6 in annexe 4) 
indicates the distance (in metres) that the aircraft is past the threshold when it comes to 
a complete stop. The basic observations are as explained above in column 3. 
Column 5 (column 7 in annexe 4) is a measure of force of impact of the aircraft upon 
first contact with the ground. The unit of measure is m/s2. The greatest force of impact 
is -54.91 m/s2 (participant Y, scenario 2) and the least -10.24 m/s2 (participant D, 
scenario 4). The mean force of impact is -19.6 m/s2 with a standard deviation of 6.3 
m/s2. 
In total, out of 168 scenarios, there were 30 go-arounds. This is where the pilot elected 
not to continue an approach and the height in feet and longitude value at which the 
pilot carried this out are given as columns 8 and 9 in annexe 4. 
6.3.2 Overrun Events 
In total 22 “overrun” landings were recorded out of a total of 168 scenarios (138 landing 
scenarios after removing go-arounds). As discussed previously the scenarios were 
developed to be challenging and to increase the chance of overrun height and speed 
was above ideal in two out of three scenarios therefore this value is artificially high for 
the purposes of this study. This is important since the section of network isolated was 
that surrounding a high and fast approach to land. 
On the surface, scenario 1 had no overrun events, scenario 2 had 1 overrun, scenario 
3 had 2 overruns, scenario 4 had 2 overruns, scenario 5 had 7 overruns, and, scenario 
6 had 10. However, since the number of go-arounds varied the percentage of 
completed landings that produced an overrun event per scenario is given in table 6-3 
below and this shows more clearly the increase in events for scenarios 3, 5 and 6. 
Scenario & 
No. of Ldgs 
Overrun events as a % of 
completed Landings 
1 (26 ldgs) 0 
2 (26 ldgs) 3.85 
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3 (18 ldgs) 11.1 
4 (25 ldgs) 8 
5 (25 ldgs) 28 
6 (18 ldgs) 55.56 
 
Table 6-3 - Percentage of overrun events per scenario 
It is not sufficient to look at the raw data in terms of overrun events. Therefore, a chi-
square test produced by the crosstabs procedure for multiple unrelated samples was 
carried out on the data. 
 
 Value df Asymp. Sig (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 33.051 5 .000 
 
Table 6-4 – Results of Chi-Square for Scenario versus Overrun event 
It can be seen that this chi-square statistical test shows the differences in the number 
of overrun events to be significantly different between scenarios ( p < 0.05). However, 
since more than 20% of the expected frequencies are smaller than 5 (50% (6 cells) in 
this case) the chi-square test is not reliable. The best way to resolve this issue is to 
record more data in a future study. It is possible, however, to group some of the data 
together and rerun the test with scenarios 1,2 and 3 grouped versus 4, 5 and 6. This 
would elicit whether there is a statistically significant difference to back up what 
appears to be a significant number of overrun events after the instruction not to land 
heavy is made. 
 Value df Asymp. Sig (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 14.404 1 .000 
Table 6-5 - Results of Chi-Square for grouped Scenario versus Overrun event 
This value for chi-square shows that the number of overrun events in scenarios 1,2,3 
versus 4,5,6 is significantly different (p < 0.05). This would suggest that the instruction 
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not to land the aircraft hard for the second series of scenarios has indeed increased the 
likelihood of an overrun event. Again at this point it is pertinent to recall that a pseudo-
random order of testing was used to avoid any developmental changes due to practise.  
However, in order to eliminate the differences in speed and height at the starting point 
from being the cause of overrun event frequency changes those must be compared in 
the fashion: 1 and 4 vs 2 and 5 vs 3 and 6. The results are encapsulated as Table 6-6. 
 
 
 
 
 Value df Asymp. Sig (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.861 2 .012 
Table 6-6 - Results of Chi-Square for scenarios grouped by starting speed and height 
On this occasion it is clear that the difference between the groups in terms of number 
of overrun events is not statistically significant (p > 0.05). This confirms that the 
differences in overrun event occurrence are due to the instruction on heavy landings 
and not the starting point of the simulation. This statistic, therefore, validates the use of 
the verbal instruction as a barrier as it is clear this has had a statistically significant 
effect on the network and its outcome. Therefore, it can be concluded at this stage 
there were significant differences where the barrier appeared to affect the outcome. 
6.3.3 Heavy Landings 
So now it has been found that there is a statistically significant difference in the number 
of overrun events between the pre-instruction scenarios and post-instruction scenarios 
the same analysis can be carried out for those landings classified as heavy.  
„Heavy landing‟ is not a label that can be applied quite so clinically as overrun. An 
overrun is an excursion from the runway which has a defined length so any landing that 
exceeds this distance is an overrun. A heavy landing, however, is not so clear-cut. The 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) document CS-23 (Certification 
Specifications) outlines the acceptable means of compliance with the specifications 
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required for aeroplanes. As part of this document, a requirement of approval for 
certification is that the aircraft is stressed to at least 4g. This, however, refers to the 
a9ircraft as a whole and undercarriage limits are lower. Certification requirements for 
light aircraft require the undercarriage to accept up to 2.75g (26.968 m/s2) without 
structural damage (EASA, 2003). A perfect landing, in contrast, should be 1g normal 
acceleration as the force of lift transfers from the wings to the undercarriage 
undetected. For the purposes of this study, a „heavy‟ landing is one where the normal 
acceleration exceeded a value of 2g (19.6133 m/s2). This figure is based on 
requirements set out in EASA documents CS 23.473, CS 23.479, CS 23.483, 
discussion with an AAIB engineering inspector and a certified aircraft engineer. 
As discussed above, there were 138 landings after go-arounds were removed from the 
data. Of these landings, 59 were classified as „heavy‟ given the definition of the 
previous paragraph (leaving 79 considered satisfactory). Breaking those landings down 
further it can be seen that from scenarios 1, 2 and 3 there were 47 heavy landings 
(67.14% of successful 1, 2, 3 scenario landings). Scenarios 4, 5 and 6 produced 12 
heavy landings (17.65% of successful 4, 5, 6 scenario landings). 
As with the overrun data, this information about heavy landings was analysed using the 
chi-square test produced by the crosstabs procedure for multiple unrelated samples. 
The results are illustrated in table 6-7. 
 Value df Asymp. Sig (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 35.841 5 .000 
Table 6-7 - Results of Chi-Square for Scenario versus Heavy Landing event 
Table 6-7 shows that through the chi-square statistical test, the differences in the 
number of heavy landing events is significantly different between scenarios (p < 0.05). 
On this occasion there is no issue of cells having lower than expected counts so there 
is no need to group the samples together. It can be concluded that the instruction not to 
land heavy (an introduced barrier in the information-style network) has increased the 
number of overrun events and decreased the number of heavy landings to a 
statistically significant level (p < 0.05). 
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6.3.4 Further Statistical Analysis 
Next, the data can be analysed in the context of being continuous beyond that of the 
discrete variable statistics used thus far. This eliminates the need for the data to be 
classified in qualitative terms such as good or bad landings and allows a greater range 
of statistical investigation to overcome some of the limitations associated with this. 
However, since the term overrun is a discrete title the following statistical measures will 
compare force of impact with the distance past the threshold at which the aircraft came 
to a complete stop. This is akin to measuring the likelihood of an overrun. Unlike the 
chi-square tests the ANOVA will compare two non-heavy or two heavy landings with 
each other thus providing an alternative slant on the testing. 
Firstly Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to confirm that the 
independent variable (restricting heavy landings) did have a statistical significant effect 
on the dependent variables; i.e. the normal acceleration on landing (force of impact) 
and distance past the threshold (overrun likelihood).  
The resulting values from this statistical test (Multivariate test for Intercept and 
Scenario both showed Sig. = .000) show that there is a statistically significant effect on 
all dependent variables when considered as a group (p <  0.05) by the instruction to 
avoid heavy landings. This improves upon the data analysis from above and makes it 
clear that the instruction (barrier) is central to the differences. 
Looking further than this it is possible to see whether the changes in the data values 
„distance past threshold‟ and „normal acceleration of impact‟ are related. Due to the 
nature of the results a simple one-way ANOVA is not sufficient to reveal the true extent 
of significant differences or relationships between values. As such a doubly multivariate 
repeated measures design was adopted (nested ANOVA type approach) and a 
summary of the results is given in table 6-8. 
Effect Significance (p value) 
Instruction 0.000 
Scenario 0.006 
Instruction*Scenario 0.706 
Table 6-8 - Sample of results of ANOVA analysis between scenarios  
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What the results in table 6-8 tell us is that when looking at normal acceleration (heavy 
landings) and distance from threshold (overrun) the effect of the instruction and the 
effect of the scenario are significant upon the results when looked at independently (p 
<  0.05). However, with a p value of 0.706 there is little evidence to suggest that the 
interaction between the instruction and scenario have a significant effect on the 
outcome. In other words, there is little evidence to suggest the effect of each scenario 
is dependent upon the instruction. This is not in itself a bad result since it has already 
been shown the effect of each on the results is significant and it is preferable that the 
effect on the results of the scenario is not changed by the instruction so that alone may 
be tested. However, it does not provide immediate information about any relationship 
between the two variables. Figures 6-8 and 6-9 plot the estimated means used in this 
statistical test for the instruction and the scenario respectively. They show many 
similarities and that is what is investigated in the next part of this section. 
 
Figure 6-8 – The effect of the instruction on the estimated means of distance past 
threshold 
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Figure 6-9 - The effect of the instruction on the estimated means of normal acceleration 
These data would now appear to suggest that there are indeed statistically significant 
effects on the overall event outcome by the instruction mid-experiment. However, 
despite there being some real similarities between the plots for each scenario above 
there may be no overriding relationship (statistically significant enough to be used) 
between distance past threshold and force of impact in this dataset. To test this 
assumption the data were subjected to tests for correlation; or the presence of a 
relationship between variables. 
 Normal Acceleration Sig. (2-tailed) 
Distance past T/hold (m) .096 .263 
Table 6-9 - Results from a Pearson‟s Correlation Test 
Pearson‟s correlation divides the covariance of the two variables, distance and force, 
by the product of their respective standard deviations. The correlation value is +1 in a 
perfect positive linear relationship and -1 in a perfect negative linear relationship. Since 
the value given between distance and force is 0.096 it can be seen that there is no 
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relationship visible at this level of analysis. The following scatter plot illustrates visually 
the lack of a simple relationship. 
 
Figure 6-10 – Scatter plot of the relationship between distance from threshold and force 
of impact 
The statistical analysis could be taken further to investigate regression curves, non-
linear regression curves or regrouping data as discussed earlier in the chapter in an 
attempt to create a relationship. However, it would appear futile given the top-line 
statistics not revealing a relationship, therefore the assumptions not being met, to dig 
until one is found. 
Despite the lack of a clear statistical relationship between the factors, the data certainly 
indicate links and differences between sets of scenarios as described above and also 
summarised here: 
In total there are 62 sets of scenarios (e.g., 1 and 4, 2 and 5, 3 and 6) that can be 
compared after removing any that have a go-around situation within. Of these 62 sets, 
47 comparisons show that scenarios 1, 2 and 3 resulted in a full-stop with less distance 
past the threshold than scenarios 4, 5 and 6; a majority at 75.8%. 
Additionally, 60 out of the 62 comparable sets of scenarios showed a harder landing in 
terms of normal acceleration from scenarios 1, 2 and 3 when compared to their 
counterpart scenario 4, 5 or 6. This equates to 96.8%. 
These figures simply illustrate that the instruction to avoid heavy landings had a 
significant effect on the study pilots and that as the heaviness reduced so the length of 
runway required increased.  
-50.00 -40.00 -30.00 -20.00 -10.00
Normal Accel
400.000000000000
800.000000000000
1200.000000000000
1600.000000000000
D
is
ta
n
c
e
 p
a
s
t 
T
/h
o
ld
 (
m
)

















































 




























 






















 













 







©    Griffin, T. G. C.   Chapter 6 – Flightsim Validation Study 
 150 
6.3.5 Bayesian Application 
Referring back to the Bayesian information networks of chapter 5, we now have the 
raw data that can be used to attempt to validate the predictive nature of probability (or 
error) migration. The occurrence of heavy landings reduced from 0.6714 to 0.1765 after 
the instruction (barrier) which is a reduction factor of 0.2628. In the context of the 
MATLab code, DF is multiplied by 0.2628 to get the new df and then the program 
executed. The resultant probability of nosewheel collapse is reduced from the AAIB 
data probability of 0.2627 to 0.0738 (a reduction factor of 0.2809). 
From the simulator study data there were 13 cases considered to result in a nosewheel 
collapse (normal acceleration exceeded -2.75g). This results in a probability of 
nosewheel collapse pre-instruction (heavy-landing reducing barrier) of 0.17143 (12 out 
of 70 successful landings within scenarios 1 to 3).  
Post-instruction there was only one case of a nosewheel collapse (normal acceleration 
> -2.75g on impact). This results in a probability of occurrence of 0.014706 (1 out of 68 
successful landings within scenarios 4 to 6). 
Binomial Test 
 
Category N Observed Prop. Test Prop. 
Asymp. Sig. (1-
tailed) 
NWC Group 1 1 1 .0147 .0738 .035
a,b
 
Group 2 0 67 .9853   
Total  68 1.0000   
a. Alternative hypothesis states that the proportion of cases in the first group < .0738. 
b. Based on Z Approximation. 
 
Table 6-10 - Binomial Test of Significance for scenarios 4 to 6 
Table 6-10 displays the results of a binomial test for the significance of any deviation 
from a predicted outcome (null hypothesis). The test shows that there is a significant 
difference between the nosewheel collapse probability in the Bayesian network and the 
flight simulator study (at p < 0.05) based on the predicted probability of nosewheel 
collapse from the Bayesian network (populated by AAIB data); 0.0738.  
Binomial Test 
 
Category N Observed Prop. Test Prop. 
Asymp. Sig. (1-
tailed) 
NWC Group 1 1 11 .157143 .262700 .026
a,b
 
Group 2 0 59 .842857   
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Total  70 1.000000   
a. Alternative hypothesis states that the proportion of cases in the first group < .262700. 
b. Based on Z Approximation. 
 
Table 6-11 - Binomial Test of significance for scenarios 1 to 3 
Based on the AAIB historical data, the proportion of nosewheel collapses for scenarios 
one to three was predicted as 0.2627. This binomial test shows that there is a 
statistically significant difference (at p < 0.05) between that prediction and the 
proportion of nosewheel collapses observed in the flight simulator experiment. 
Although these binomial tests show that there are significant differences between the 
datasets (AAIB versus flight simulator study) it is the relationship between them that is 
more important. Figure 6-11 illustrates the difference in expected and observed values 
as used in the binomial test. 
 
Figure 6-11- Lineplot of predicted versus observed Nosewheel collapse values 
 
Despite the different significant differences of proportion in absolute terms, a visual 
inspection of the data illustrates a relatively similar change in probability pre and post 
barrier. Thus there appears to be some validity in the model with regards to predicting 
relative effects of barriers rather than absolute values. Further work could be carried 
out on attempting to normalise or calibrate the relationships for the data. This would 
involve increasing the sample size of the flight simulator participants to more reflect the 
AAIB data pool. These, and other limitations of using a flight simulator to validate these 
data, are expanded upon in section 6.5. 
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6.4 Other Results of Interest 
Throughout the experiments comments were taken from the subjects outside the 
bounds of the experiments themselves in order to gain a deeper understanding of the 
study. A number of different types of pilots could be informally identified including those 
who were more nervous of committing a mistake and those who, possibly with 
behaviour modified by the fact it was a safe simulator environment, made riskier 
choices.  
Those pilots who had a lot of time in very basic GA aircraft and flying into farm strips 
and small airfields reported finding it a very difficult exercise as their “seat of the pants” 
sensing had been removed in the artificial environment. Additional factors that weren‟t 
present including a windsock and no realistic air noise that a few (although very few in 
comparison to the number of participants) said they found it hard to land without. It 
would be an interesting further study to continue these experiments and compare the 
data amongst gender and number of hours flown rather than on the purely objective 
levels that are of most importance to this chapter. Finally, some landings would be 
considered unacceptable regardless of the data collected. Certain pilots stalled the 
aircraft from a considerable height onto the ground, others were extremely eratic on the 
controls near the ground and a large number used flap well above the flap limiting 
speed shown on the air speed indicator. These are not issues that affect the crux of the 
study but are points that would make for interesting further study in the future. 
Of all the interesting comments made the most significant were that the aircraft did not 
feel “real” in terms of handling and that it was very difficult to gauge height due to the 
graphics-limited visual cues. These are limits that can not be avoided on current GA 
simulators and as discussed above overall they have very little effect on the data 
collected. 
6.5  Discussion 
This validation study has done two things. It has shown that historical data can, to a 
certain extent, be used to predict future events. However, this is in approaching the 
event in a new way which looks at highlighting the barriers, links and nodes that will be 
affected by change, or are currently failing, rather than attempting to predict what the 
accident may ultimately present itself as. Previously all studies using Bayesian 
networks have used classification and eventual outcome taxonomies resulting in 
methods that attempt to investigate scenarios (Luxhøj and Kauffeld, 2003). In contrast, 
this new method is a study of the pathology of the system rather than the surface. This 
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is the first time that Bayesian mathematics and information networks have been 
merged and used to attempt to identify the effect of barrier insertion and possible 
migration of information within a network not just towards a linear chain. 
Secondly, a method has been introduced which may allow an approach similar to cost-
benefit analysis in terms of predicting error migration through a network following 
manipulation of the links and barriers. This predictive method using bayesian 
mathematics can itself be manipulated by SMEs and other factors in order to elicit the 
most likely migration routes of information or error. This is further discussed in chapter 
8. 
Simulators have been used in aviation training and even in recreating aspects of 
aviation accident investigation. However, to the author‟s knowledge they have never 
been used to validate a method such as that described in this chapter and chapter 5. It 
is hoped that running such simulations may enable effective predictions to improve 
aviation safety and limit damaging effects of error migration. This provides a much 
more objective method of identifying issues related to barrier insertion within a system 
than methods such as SHA and ISHA (FAA, 2000) and the high-level assessments 
discussed earlier as part of MIL-STD-882E (US DoD, 2005). It appears that this 
method, not only through the Bayesian mathematics and iterative process discussed 
later in chapter 8, but also in the simple clarity of the illustrated network design may 
allow an investigator to identify relationships that are not apparent on a high level 
analysis or one that is dominated by linear chains as in those presented by the FAA 
(FAA, 2000). 
What the results of this study have shown, with statistical significance, is that a strong 
verbal instruction does indeed work as inserting a barrier into the network. This would 
appear to be initial evidence then consider that all other „barriers‟ discussed in e.g., 
MIL-STD-882E (US DoD, 2005) could be tested in a similar method. The landing 
network used in this study has been limited to a too high/too fast approach with limited 
outcomes and nodes in order to be able to manually work the mathematics. In the 
future this could be expanded to much more complex networks and relationships. 
However, even at this stage, evidence has been gathered that shows inserting a barrier 
has a significant effect on the presence (or activation) or other nodes within the 
network, i.e., when a barrier restricting the node “heavy landing” was inserted, the node 
“overrun” was much more readily activated. This can be extrapolated in larger networks 
to identify all possible migration routes of information given insertion of a barrier. 
Due to the limited number of suitably qualified subjects the data could not be used to 
fully elicit a relationship between nodes and links. It is not overly surprising there is not 
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a linear regression/correlation between the data given that the system being portrayed 
and investigated is itself a non-linear complex one. However, the statistics confirm that 
there are statistically significant relationships both within the data but more importantly 
possible relationships between the experimental data and the predicted AAIB data. 
Additionally it was seen in the introduction to this study that Bayesian networks can 
utilise distributions of values to model a relationship (Ale et al., 2007) and this may 
account for the differences in exact values whilst a relationship may still exist. This 
gives the foundation required for a great deal of interesting future work to establish 
relationships and using an iterative process, eluded to in chapter 8, attempt to fully 
predict outcomes. 
The node “Overrun” was identified in chapter 5 as having a subsequent nosewheel 
collapse probability of 0 in the AAIB data. However, this in itself would seem unlikely 
and is probably limited by the number of accidents studied. If the data is taken at face 
value, it can be seen that the ideal in this event is to migrate error towards that node. 
This results in the largest reduction of nosewheel collapse. In order to back up claims 
like this though the networks need to be expanded and the validation exercise 
continued.  
It is indeed a major limitation of this project that the landing scenario studied has been 
artificially isolated from the flight system. There needs to be this step back at the initial 
stages due to the fact that the programming and computation required to test would be 
unwieldy. It is the basic premise that the Bayesian information networks can help to 
predict error migration, albeit possibly only at a relative and not exact quantitative level, 
that is being tested not a fully developed model of flight. 
This expansion would eventually look to include positive data and complete 3D 
networks for a particular phase of flight or even a series of 3D networks that are linked 
for the entire flight system. The next step though would be to take a few parallel 
scenarios that are linked in the information networks to predict the strength of barriers 
and the potential gains of predicting the probability, or error, migration. This future work 
would require a larger number of participants, improved simulator facilities and a larger 
database of GA accidents studied to populate the networks.  
6.6 Summary 
Through chapters 5 and 6 a theoretical and experimental extension of information 
networks has been developed. This has show real potential in merging the functions of 
information networks and Bayesian mathematics to produce a model which moves 
towards prediction and greater understanding of the wider system. Chapter 7 looks at 
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industrial application and extension of the model which is a central tenet to the 
research of this thesis. 
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7 Incidents versus Accidents; 
an Industrial Study 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 investigated the increased usability and function of the information 
network method as an accident investigation and mitigation technique with the use of 
Bayesian mathematics. Central themes of this research addressed in chapters thus far 
have included the comparison and use of both commercial and GA aviation and the need 
to address dominant linear models. The final tenet of this research is that it remains 
firmly rooted in applicability and usability to improve real-life industry. 
Incidents, or “near-misses”, can be defined as ranging from partial penetration of 
defences to situations in which all the available safeguards were defeated but no actual 
losses were sustained. As such they cover a whole multitude of sins and would hopefully 
therefore promulgate a multitude of information for safety development. This chapter sets 
out to develop the way in which industry is currently working with accidents. Incidents, in 
relation to accidents and their potential use in accident investigation, were discussed 
during the review of literature for the thesis (chapter 2). Of particular interest to this 
research project, is a concept of taking such incidents and visualising their outcome if the 
corrective actions hadn‟t stopped the chain of events. Thomas (1994) had a vision of 
“safety imagination” whereby he suggested one was forced to visualise the development 
of “near-miss” events into accidents. This reflects a method whereby the possible 
outcome of incidents was related to actual outcomes of accidents. Thus, the causal 
pathways compared, one for the common cause hypothesis investigation, but in future 
terms as a tool for accident prevention. 
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This chapter centralises that goal, takes the arguments outlined in earlier chapters of this 
thesis, and in work closely centred on real-industry, attempting to improve on the current 
use of incidents and near-misses. The author was approached by the safety 
management team manager at British Airways (BA); a legacy carrier and one of the 
world‟s largest airlines. British Airways were interested in the work being carried out in 
accident investigation and were looking for novel applications to drive forward a new 
generation of incident reporting and risk rating tools. The majority of this chapter 
addresses the key elements of this work and then draws out the issues central to this 
thesis in the concluding sections. 
The structure of this work with BA is outlined here for clarity: 
Introduction: Section 7.1 introduces Safety Management Systems (SMS) before looking 
at the development of British Airways‟ SMS in particular. Subsection 7.1.2 addresses the 
main limitations of the current methods and models being used. This draws support from 
relevant literature, subject matter experts and those working within the safety 
management team at BA themselves. 
Section 7.2 continues the introduction by reviewing best practice from across industry in 
order to establish the dominant models in use today and learn any lessons that are 
available. This section ends with a summary of the dominant models and methods in use 
across complex risk industries. 
Finally, section 7.3 concludes the introduction by addressing the true value of risk with 
particular reference to its value to British Airways and the wider aviation community. This 
includes breaking free from the constraints of Risk = Severity x Frequency. 
Method and Results: This part of the project looks at developing alternative models. 
Section 7.4.1 introduces a novel model of risk rating and incident investigation for use 
within BA. 7.4.2 takes this further and provides the reader with a walkthrough style guide 
of the model‟s use in its current guise. Finally within this section, 7.4.3 looks at the 
validation and implementation of the new method. Annexe 5 contains a letter of 
appreciation from BA‟s manager of operational risk. 
Conclusions: Section 7.5 then returns to the place of this work within the bigger picture 
that is the thesis. Benefits and limitations of working with industry are addressed and the 
further work required to continue taking forward the model discussed. 
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It may be helpful for the reader, and reflects the current status of this study, to think of 
this as a three-stage process. This is displayed in figure 7-1 and not only illustrates the 
three-stage process but also reflects the three-part chapter. The first part is dictated by 
the practices and safety system in place at BA before the work discussed in this thesis. 
The middle section reflects the work of this study and the position BA are now in; this is 
an interim stage. The final section of the study and chapter reflect the future for the 
method, model and BA. 
 
Figure 7-1 – The three-stage process of the BA project 
7.1 Safety Management Systems within Industry 
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) mandates, in annexe 6 (2009), that 
aircraft operators, such as BA, must establish a Safety Management System beyond that 
required as a state safety system. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) 
defines a SMS as “…a systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary 
organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures.” (IATA Website, July 
2009). IATA goes on to state that a SMS should be capable of identifying safety hazards, 
managing remedial action when necessary, providing a method of monitoring and 
assessing safety, and to continuously improve safety levels within an organisation. 
ICAO have amended paragraph 3.2 in annex 6 and produced a Safety Management 
Manual (Document 9859) to detail the requirements. Further than this, BA are required to 
abide by national, or in BA‟s case European, regulators. The European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA; the successor to the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA)) have produced a 
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document (EU-OPS paragraph OPS 1.037) which details the ways in which EASA and 
EASA state operators must comply with ICAO. The exact wording of these documents 
can be found through the EASA website but for the purposes of this chapter the 
requirements and aims of any such SMS are as set out in the paragraph above.  
7.1.1 The development of BASIS to date 
In this introductory section the design and method of use of the current SMS within BA, 
BASIS, are reviewed. This lays the foundation to discuss the limitations and problems 
encountered in its current guise in section 7.1.2. 
In 2009 IATA is including SMS reviews in its IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA). This 
follows well with the ever increasing commitment to safety and management of risk that 
airlines are showing. However, even back in the late 1990s, BA had been honing a 
Safety Management system for a couple of decades. It was during this time that the 
British Airways Safety Information System (BASIS) gained popular usage, both within 
and outside of BA to coincide with the popularity of organisational safety models such as 
those propagated by Reason (1997) and Turner and Pidgeon (1997). The pivotal three 
streams from which BASIS was populated were Air Safety Reporting (ASR; see Annexe 
1 for copy), Operational Quality Monitoring (FDR; AKA Flight Data Recording), and 
Human Factors Reporting (HFR).  BA have stipulated tougher inclusion criteria for the 
requirement of submitting an ASR (with approximately 8000 raised per year) than is 
compulsory by the Civil Aviation Authority‟s (CAA) Mandatory Occurrence Reporting 
Programme (MORs). The ASR programme is primarily concerned with establishing what 
happened and is an excellent tool for identifying the day to day safety problems. FDR is 
an automatic monitoring system of certain flight parameters such as speeds, 
configurations and handling characteristics. FDR was born out of its predecessor named 
SESMA; Safety Event Search and Master Analysis (O‟Leary et al., 2002). Any non-
standard (or outside allowed normal limits) events are automatically recorded and the 
data can be investigated. There is an expectation within the airline that an ASR is 
submitted voluntarily by a pilot to coincide with them receiving the FDR data; thus 
showing a level of integrity and honesty that is paramount. Finally, any ASR that is 
submitted initially had a voluntary HFR questionnaire sent to those involved. This system 
is completely confidential (unlike the previous two mentioned) and aims to elicit more 
information on the why and how of an event rather than the what. It is in this area of HFR 
working with the ASR that most potential for proactive safety management is found and 
that is central to the aims of this thesis. These three elements are core to the Incident 
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Reporting Programme (and thus the BA SMS) for BA. An Incident Reporting Programme 
is well described by Van der Schaaf‟s seven step framework (1995): 
1. Detection (usually through reporting) 
2. Selection for further analysis 
3. Detailed description and investigation 
4. Classification of the causes 
5. Recognition and computation of patterns and priorities 
6. Interpretation of results of investigation for recommendations 
7. Evaluation and monitoring 
In the early 2000s the BA ASR program had been adopted by well over 100 airlines 
world-wide and demonstrates the pedigree of the format (O‟Leary et al., 2002). Indeed, 
O‟Leary et al. (2002) state that in a few short years the ASRs and BASIS were key to an 
overall improved safety culture of reporting and managing risk. Following on from the 
original winBASIS (the name for the software behind the British Airways SMS at the time) 
being sold off in the early 2000s, BA set about developing a new generation of BASIS 
known as eBASIS. It is this generation of the SMS program that is still in use today.  
As a central part of this risk assessment and prioritisation procedure, “analysis and 
assessment of reports is principally reliant on trained investigators‟ professional 
judgement” (Macrae et al., 2002). So how are the received data currently analysed within 
BASIS? 
Once an ASR is raised, it is converted into an electronic format and entered onto 
eBASIS. Professional judgement of the operator determines the salient features of each 
incident including likely causal factors, risk to flight safety and operational integrity.  
There are four generalised steps to the task of analysis as follows: 
1. The text is input and technical details are reviewed. A summary is then written 
identifying salient points and important elements of each incident such as those that 
characterise their relationships. A causal structure is then inferred. 2. In order to allow 
classification of an event, suitable keywords are applied. This step is intended to allow for 
trend analysis of the full incident database. Keywords are applied to causes, effects, 
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influencing factors at different levels according to the event that took place e.g. 
operational effects, technical causes and filtering down to the specifics of that particular 
incident.  
3. A risk category is assigned to each incident so that historical trend analysis and the 
prioritisation of response to incident reports can be carried out. Implicitly though, this step 
embodies the consideration of each incident‟s potential impact on flight safety and BA‟s 
business as a whole. In the initial version of eBASIS, an assessment of risk category is 
made according to a 3 x 3 risk-matrix comprising severity vs probability of recurrence (a 
standardised risk-matrix across industries). Later this was replaced with a 5 x 5 risk 
matrix again based on standard theories of risk categorisation but with the aim of 
allowing more detailed analysis and trending. This risk categorisation process results in 
an ordinal 5 point scale of risk: A-E.  
 
S
e
v
e
rity
 
Occurrence 
 Minimal Low Medium High V. High 
V. High 100 (A)     
High 71 (B) 86 (B) 100 (A)   
Medium 35 (C) 43 (C) 55 (C) 71 (B)  
Low 15 (D) 19 (D) 25 (D) 35 (C)  
Minimal 1 (E) 3 (E) 6 (E) 10 (E) 15 (D) 
Table 7-1 - BA Flight Safety Risk Rating Matrix with Letter Value 
 
 
Risk Response 
A 
 
AAIB/State Investigation 
B Company/BASI 4 Investigation 
C Departmental Action Required 
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D Monitoring Required Only 
E Statistical Data Only 
Table 7-2 - BA Flight Safety Risk Rating Guidance 
The ordinal value given to an event is reliant upon the company‟s response to that event 
and “…allocation relies on the expert judgement of safety officers and investigators.” 
(Macrae et al., 2002) 
4. Some events require further action such as further investigation or a callback to the 
staff involved in the incident. These actions are assigned within eBASIS dependent on 
their letter rating (Table7-2) and can be monitored by safety data personnel. Finally, an 
incident can be considered closed when all required steps have been fulfilled and no 
further action remains. 
Further information about the intended use of ASR, FDR and HFR data and how it was 
originally analysed can be found in e.g., O‟Leary et al. (2002), and O‟Leary (2002a). 
7.1.2 Limitations of use and requirement for further development 
The aim of the rest of this chapter is to highlight and tackle some of the issues that BA is 
facing in the current use of its eBASIS tools. BA safety managers have expressed 
concerns with certain limitations of the current system and were looking for an original 
and novel method to develop and take the SMS forward in a unified way. BA were very 
interested in the models being developed within this thesis and requested that I work to 
apply them to the SMS. As such, a significant length of time was spent working within the 
BA safety management team. In line with this, it was hoped that the network-based 
approach to system investigation may elicit a more useful and proactive method of safety 
management. 
As outlined above there are a number of streams for the supply of safety data and 
information. However, key to developing safety models and methodology is to improve 
the cohesion and unification of how safety data are gathered, and more importantly how 
they are actioned. This is particularly true within an organisation such as British Airways 
where demands on safety data are increasing alongside expansion of services and 
equipment. In discussion with BA‟s Safety Management Services team a number of 
issues were highlighted as concerns in the current system and areas that could lead to 
potential improvements. 
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The rest of this section will highlight the eight key issues that arose as areas of concern 
for the current eBASIS SMS system during discussions and research. Following on from 
this, the issues will be expanded upon and then two mini case-studies will represent the 
main issues before then looking at ways of improving the situation with reference to best 
practice and literature. 
1. Frequency Skew:  
The primary concern raised by BA with the current risk rating method is that using 
current matrices, obviously less important events are being reported as having a 
serious effect on operations. With the use of matrices, probability and severity are 
given equal values in terms of the effect they have on the overall scoring of an event 
so if an event has an unusually high frequency, despite a low severity, it can be 
reported that such an event has an undue risk. The issue within the current system is 
that if an event is given the risk rating of 1 and it occurs once its value is 1. However, 
should its frequency increase to, e.g., 10 occurrences, suddenly each event would be 
valued as 10 (i.e. risk 1 x frequency 10) and the ten occurrences amount to a risk of 
100 to the company. This logarithmic rise distorts corporate risk data. 
2. Lack of Theoretical Models and Cohesion: 
Michael O‟Leary and the team that set up winBASIS in the 1990s predominantly 
relied upon subject matter experts and the knowledge and judgement of those people 
applying a risk rating methodology. This has its intrinsic issues in terms of items 5, 6 
and 7 below but also in that without a solid scientific model as a basis it may be that 
development and progression may be stunted.  
3. Granularity of D and E rated events: 
As would be expected within an airline, most events recorded and reported are low 
severity and therefore fit into what BA classifies as a D or E event. Since the majority 
of incidents are reported at this level and there is only a 0-100 risk rating point 
variation within them, it is often very difficult to gain the granularity that may allow for 
separation and further study of specific events and incidents or separate out those 
which are more, or less, serious. 
4. Five Different Risk-Rating Matrices: 
Without a solid scientific foundation at the centre of the current system, each 
department has developed its own interpretation of events and with that their own 
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classifications, rating requirements and even rating matrices. There was a shift from 
3x3 matrices to 5x5 (Table 7-1) but this didn‟t result in the enhanced granularity that 
was expected. This is obviously not conducive to the cohesive safety management 
method reflecting a system as a whole. For this reason, BA were looking to take 
steps towards a common incident management system. 
5. Retention of Knowledge: 
BA is currently very aware of the knowledge levels they have fostered and developed 
after the past ten or twenty years. However, the current methodology leaves very little 
real chance of converting individual knowledge into system knowledge. As such, 
learning and retention of knowledge is a concern of the team at present should 
individuals leave or new safety specialists join. To date, training and knowledge 
sharing has taken on the approach similar to that of an apprenticeship and working 
closely with a suitably experienced safety specialist. 
6. Subjectivity of Ratings: 
Without clear guidelines for applying ratings to events, it is often the case that certain 
events are considered key or important at a particular time and these often receive 
more attention than some other events. Due to the nature of the risk rating on an 
individual specialist‟s basis, subjectivity of ratings is an issue that may affect the 
resultant risk based decisions. 
7. Replicability of Ratings: 
Again, as with subjectivity and individual knowledge and experience versus objectivity 
and system, or collective knowledge, there are issues with the replicability of ratings 
especially between individual risk raters. 
8. Operational vs Occupational Risk: 
These have developed to be two very distinct areas of risk for BA‟s current risk rating 
methodology and again a method will be sought that helps to draw together all 
aspects of safety or at least be capable of integrating them. 
“The problem to those with a high level responsibility for ensuring aviation safety is to 
identify the highest priorities to ensure that they are using resources effectively” (Rose, 
2008, p.1381). It is therefore an essential requirement for a risk rating method or SMS 
that the highest priorities produced from any such process are indeed reflecting the most 
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serious and relevant safety issues to the system. The eight issues above illustrate that 
this is not always the case for the current iteration of eBASIS. The Safety Management 
Services Team Manager has to present regular risk-based safety reports to the BA board 
and to identify key areas or issues that the company could make best use of resources in 
terms of time and money in order to improve safety. The BA management team reported 
that during these management meetings the statistics were being skewed 
overwhelmingly by the issues outlined above leaving high severity, low frequency events 
in particular in the shadows. This is key to the argument for a new and very different 
method of risk rating and safety management. Frequency currently skews the 
identification of central issues and therefore effort and resources are being wasted in the 
wrong areas; this would suggest that “risk” as a value is not sufficient in traditional terms 
of frequency and severity, and this is examined in more detail in section 7.4. 
Whilst interviewing and observing winBASIS specialists in action, Macrae (2002) 
reported that all of “the analysis and risk assessment of flight safety incident reports 
within BASIS relies on the expert judgement of trained investigators”. There is a danger, 
in this being the sole method, of not retaining knowledge and information, but this also 
highlights the issues of subjectivity and lack of solid foundation principles and objective 
limitations through which to work. Macrae (2002) goes on to say that “…experts may 
possess different tacit models of accident and human error”. Lucas (1990) spoke of three 
general models which may be held at the expense of all others by an individual. Those 
that focus on the individual (issues such as Health & Safety or coercion), models based 
on what is seen as the more traditional risk management focus (i.e. engineering and 
HMI), and finally, systems safety approaches incorporating organisational safety. This 
appears to have happened within BA and given rise to the different risk matrices with 
slightly different agendas for each department. 
Again, the issue of subjectivity is brought to the forefront due to the reliance on specialist 
knowledge and individuals (although it must be reiterated that these individuals do have 
a lot of knowledge and often do a great job) as we see “the assessors‟ evaluation of the 
risk of individual incidents or their underlying factors appeared to be heavily weighted by 
the recency and frequency of similar events, or current topics of interest each analyst 
was keeping in mind” (Macrae 2002). This form of bias is a possible way for important 
and underlying issues to be missed in my opinion. Therefore, it would make sense to 
have a more objective structure to the process to be followed regardless of “hot topics” (a 
BA term in safety reports and discussions). We know by now that recent events (as 
implicated by recency or “hot topic” biases) do not always predict future incidents but 
©    Griffin, T. G. C.   Chapter 7 – Industrial Application of Method 
 166 
recurring safety lapses (i.e. barrier breaches) may do so. This refers back to the literature 
covered in chapters 2, 5 and 6 in terms of maximising the usefulness of incidents in 
understanding the system‟s safety issues as a whole (e.g., Dekker and Hollnagel (1999)). 
Macrae‟s take on BA‟s ASR “analysis and assessment of reports is principally reliant on 
trained investigators‟ professional judgement”. Key therefore to moving forward and 
progressing the SMS is to look at removing subjectivity and increase objectivity as well 
as improving knowledge retention, reducing frequency bias and addressing as many of 
the other eight issues as possible. 
Next, two examples summarising  polarised yet equally important issues are introduced 
which formed central discussion points with BA as they address many of the flaws and 
issues currently facing eBASIS and the BA SMS. 
- Example One: Bag falling from overhead locker 
With the large number of flights BA operate per year and therefore the high number of 
bags and passengers transported there are occasions when a bag falls from an 
overhead locker before, during or after flight. These events are therefore considered to 
be high frequency but owing to the fact that often no injury or damage occurs and threat 
to life is minimal they are classified as low severity events. However, the overwhelming 
effect of the high frequency is to skew BA‟s safety data to suggest that this is one of the 
greatest dangers in safety terms that BA must face. The Safety Data Team obviously 
apply caveats to such data when reporting to the board but this is symptomatic of a 
larger problem where frequency appears to have too much power in determining unsafe 
events. 
- Example Two: The crash of Air France Flight 4590 (Concorde), 25 July 2000 
This event is truly at the opposite end of the spectrum to the bag case above. The crash 
was extremely complex in nature, as are most accidents, and gladly a very low frequency 
type event. What is important to BA though is whether, should this accident occur with 
them, the event could be termed preventable. This is not necessarily from a legal 
standpoint or a moral one but more specifically is there a way of recognising the 
information and possible issues surrounding such an event before it happens. If there is 
found to be a way, does BA‟s SMS draw these issues out and highlight real risks 
effectively. Alternatively, does the current SMS maintain the possibility that important 
information is being lost or hidden by relatively unimportant safety matters. 
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As a result of the work set out in this section with BA‟s safety management team a 
summary of aims could be made. In order to do this effectively, it is best to refer back to 
Van der Schaaf‟s (1995) seven-step framework: 
Detection (reporting) needs to be driven by the needs of the model and method in use 
and therefore it will be paramount that this research is conducted without the limitations 
imposed by current reporting practices. Intrinsic to the model must be a method for 
selecting those incidents that require further investigation and so a reporting grade or 
rating is required. There needs to be more understanding of each incident so a method 
that encourages the risk-rater to fully-examine each incident including the background 
and outcomes is essential. Potential for prioritising and centralising important issues is 
also required for the method to be effective. Importantly, a pathway for feedback and 
evaluation of the method would be advantageous. 
7.2 “They‟ve Rebadged it you fool!”8; A Review of best 
practice in aviation and beyond 
The final part of this study‟s introduction (sections 7.2 and 7.3) looks into wider aviation 
and other complex risk industry practices. This identifies the gaps in the industry that can 
be used together with the gaps identified within BA‟s own processes to underpin the 
development of a new approach in section 7.4. The major industries within the literature 
of complex systems and risk include aviation, rail and petrochemical processing. These 
areas directed a review of current practice in order to ascertain what models were 
already being applied in risk management. It was found that although there was a 
plethora of accident investigation techniques both within and outside aviation, such as 
the Human Factors Analysis and Classification (HFACS) System (Shappell and 
Wiegmann, 2000),  actual risk rating and safety management methodologies were 
centred on matrices. A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study (Kletz, 1983) is well used 
within these complex industries yet they often become unwieldy and time-consuming 
therefore making them unpractical for application to the large number of incidents BA has 
reported each year. The vast majority of techniques studying accidents and incidents, 
and to a certain extent the current format of eBASIS, are essentially classification 
methods. As the title, somewhat tongue in cheek suggests, there is a danger in these 
methods that incidents or events are merely grouped together and relabelled. This may 
help to understand the current state of safety and trend analysis but does very little in the 
                                               
8
 © BBC, “I‟m Alan Partridge”, Steve Coogan 1997. 
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way of truly gaining any further insight into what is going on underneath; the pathology of 
a system. That is not to say, however, that the use of other analyses is precluded when 
an incident is deemed to require it or is of sufficient importance. Rather, as an everyday 
occurrence, suitability to BA‟s requirements were not found. 
There is limited use of accident investigation methodologies to actually rate within a 
system and they are often used alongside, or even because of, risk-rating methods 
applying an important enough severity to an event. There has been much work in the 
petrochemical industry in particular though to investigate and study more advanced 
methods which move away from rigid matrix standards. The following paragraphs 
summarise the main methods which are presently the industry standard and highlight 
areas of improvement but also where the methods fall short of what BA require. 
Risk ranking matrices based upon the edict “Risk = Frequency x Severity (R=FS)” are 
still by far the most common basis to risk ranking methodologies used in safety-critical 
industries. A comprehensive review of the literature and working documents from across 
the rail, petrochemical, health, marine and aviation industries did not reveal any safety 
model which was not based on a R=FS structure. Particularly in the aviation industry, this 
comes as no surprise since eBASIS is based upon the most successful implementation 
of risk ranking in aviation thus far (i.e., winBASIS). 
Even within risk matrices there are variations depending upon intended output.  Tables 7-
3 to 7-5 (Railtrack, 2000) illustrate some of these variations. In all matrices, the higher 
the rating, the more priority should be assigned to the hazard. What we see with these, 
however, are biases and skews to risk ranking figures which reflect what the company is 
most concerned with. 
Table 7-3 is the most simple and most commonly used type of matrix weighting method 
with figures based on severity and frequency. Here, the figures in the table are derived 
as a multiplicative model, i.e., frequency x severity. Table 7-4 is preferred by some 
practitioners as it assigns the same rank to risks which are associated with a similar 
number of equivalent fatalities per year due to the fact that it is additive in nature, i.e., 
frequency + severity. Table 7-5, on the other hand, assigns similar ranks to risks which 
are associated with a similar number of equivalent fatalities per year, but is biased to 
assign higher ranks to risks with more severe consequences; i.e., it is a weighted model 
based on increased severity yielding increased rating scores. 
 Severity of Potential Harm/Loss 
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  5 4 3 2 1 
Frequency Multiple 
fatalities 
Single 
fatality 
Multiple major 
injuries 
Major 
injury 
Minor 
injury 
5= Daily to 
monthly 
25 20 15 10 5 
4= Monthly to 
yearly 
20 16 12 8 4 
3=yearly to 10-
yearly 
15 12 9 6 3 
2=10-yearly to 100-
yearly  
10 8 6 4 2 
1= Less often than 
100-yearly 
5 4 3 2 1 
Table 7-3 - Example hazard ranking matrix 
 
   Severity of Potential Harm/Loss 
  5 4 3 2 1 
Frequency Multiple 
fatalities 
Single 
fatality 
Multiple major 
injuries 
Major 
injury 
Minor 
injury 
5= Daily to monthly 10 9 8 7 6 
4= Monthly to 
yearly 
9 8 7 6 5 
3=yearly to 10-
yearly 
8 7 6 5 4 
2=10-yearly to 100-
yearly  
7 6 5 4 3 
1= Less often than 
100-yearly 
6 5 4 3 2 
Table 7-4 - Example skewed hazard ranking matrix 
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  Severity of Potential Harm/Loss 
  5 4 3 2 1 
Frequency Multiple 
fatalities 
Single 
fatality 
Multiple major 
injuries 
Major 
injury 
Minor 
injury 
5= Daily to monthly 25 23 20 16 11 
4= Monthly to 
yearly 
24 21 17 12 7 
3=yearly to 10-
yearly 
22 18 13 8 4 
2=10-yearly to 100-
yearly  
19 14 9 5 2 
1= Less often than 
100-yearly 
15 10 6 3 1 
Table 7-5 - Example biased hazard ranking matrix 
Despite the ability of these risk matrix models to be manipulated by the user to magnify 
the importance of certain types of incident, they are very limited by the type and quality of 
data that can be input. In order to develop the current risk rating system employed by BA 
the natural starting point is to look at updating, or developing the current sets of matrices. 
The matrices currently in use are relatively simple and a search of the literature, and in 
particular risk documents for large public and private organisations, yield a number of 
developments to these methods. By adding additional broad-term groupings such as 
those represented in figure 7-2, it is possible to extend the scope of these matrices. 
Doing so would allow for greater cross-departmental integration of matrices and reduce 
the number of different models in use. This would be advantageous to the overall risk 
methodology and safety system in that it would help to validate and support cross-
departmental, and hence organisation wide, analyses of risk (e.g., in reports to the 
board). Additional groupings (e.g., for engineering or cabin crew reports) could lead to 
several descriptors from different areas, thus providing similar risk rankings based on a 
company-wide implementation. 
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Figure 7-2 - Illustrating possible additional levels to a risk matrix (FEMA, 2002) 
Nevertheless, since these matrices are still based upon a rigid R=FS structure, none of 
them will overcome the issues in eBASIS which restrict the effectiveness of frequency in 
eliciting the required information. The need to remove this skew leads us to eliminate risk 
matrices based on severity and frequency alone as possible methods to take forward. 
To move away from the skewed effect of frequency on incidents, literature for non-
frequency based risk methodologies was reviewed in order to develop a novel risk 
ranking method. Methods based on non-frequency models, propagated and in actual use 
within organisations, are few and far between. Fault-trees are often used within „hard‟ 
engineering tasks where probability of failure data is commonplace. However, there were 
very few examples of potentially non-linear methods that could also incorporate Human 
Factors issues. One such example that appeared to have potential to extend beyond the 
linear and incorporate Human Factors issues is Layers of Protection Analysis (LoPA). 
LoPA (Figure 7-3) was developed by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) in 
2001. LoPA is a semi-quantitative risk assessment method for evaluating scenario risk, 
whether existing safeguards are adequate, or whether the addition of supplemental 
safeguards, or barriers, is necessary. In this way it encapsulates the theoretical 
background required to develop a risk ranking structure not based solely on frequency. 
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LoPA is used as a method for evaluating the risks identified in a qualitative safety 
measurement tool such as a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA). These identify possible 
sources of failure and then attempt to identify the barriers present, or required, through 
the LoPA strategy.  
For use as a method within eBASIS LoPA must be changed to focus more interest on the 
link between number of safety barriers remaining following an incident and severity of 
that incident. In relation to the incident reports that populate eBASIS, the initiating event 
can be seen as the descriptors used in the database. At present there is no requirement 
to formally identify what type of event the descriptor identified in a report was leading to, 
but this analysis of descriptors and identification of the possible event outcomes would 
need to be carried out for LoPA to work. 
 
Figure 7-3 - Generic LoPA diagram depicting basis of model (CCPS, 2001) 
Prior to rolling out the method across eBASIS, a number of core incidents would have to 
be studied and worked on to provide groupings of descriptors that lead to particular 
immediate events (e.g., GPWS warning, incorrect configuration etc.) as well as 
identifying possible event outcomes (e.g., CFIT, runway excursion etc.). Pathways, or 
networks, would be formed for these incidents and safety barriers identified at all stages 
from any descriptor event occurring to any potential outcome associated with that 
descriptor.  
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Event Descriptor
(e.g., Flight Crew 
Mis-Selection)
Potential Outcome 
1
(e.g., Control Loss 
Non-Technical)
Potential Outcome 
2 (e.g., Runway 
Excursion)
Safety 
Barrier 1 
(e.g., 
Checklist)
Safety 
Barrier 2 
(e.g., 
Alarm)
Safety 
Barrier 1 
(e.g., 
Checklist)
Safety 
Barrier 2 
(e.g., 
Alarm)
Safety 
Barrier 3 
(e.g., PNF 
X-Check)
 
Figure 7-4 - Illustration of how an event descriptor links (via safety barriers) to several 
possible potential outcomes  
In figure 7-4, the mitigation stages of the LoPA diagram have been removed so as to 
concentrate on the pre-event stages which are most important in an eBASIS 
investigation. As illustrated, there may be a different number of safety barriers from a 
single descriptor towards each potential outcome related to that event. The relative risk 
of such an event descriptor occurring (i.e., being reported) is therefore associated with 
the number of safety barriers present between it and the potential outcome, and the 
number of safety barriers which have been breached before the event was averted. 
Prior to rolling out the method across eBASIS, a number of core incidents would have to 
be studied and worked on to provide groupings of descriptors that lead to particular 
immediate events (e.g., GPWS warning, incorrect configuration etc.) as well as 
identifying possible event outcomes (e.g., CFIT, runway excursion etc.). Pathways, or 
networks, would be formed for these incidents and safety barriers identified at all stages 
from any descriptor event occurring to any potential outcome associated with that 
descriptor.  
In its original formulation within chemical process safety, LoPA utilised “Independent 
Protection Layers” (IPLs), whose failure was defined as being independent of any other 
©    Griffin, T. G. C.   Chapter 7 – Industrial Application of Method 
 174 
failure in the scenario. These IPLs exclude Human Factors issues on the basis that the 
method was not designed to cover areas already analysed in a PHA. There is, however, 
“…no inherent reason these issues cannot be considered by LoPA.” (Baybutt, 2002) IPLs 
are defined by their Probability of Failure upon Demand (PFD), which is simpler for 
mechanical barriers than it is for Human Factors issues.  This is therefore an area that 
requires further review and more detailed data validation before it could be applied to a 
system such as BA‟s operations. 
Each barrier (IPL) is given a value, originally in terms of a PFD, but this can be modified 
to reflect the potency of the safety feature (e.g., alarm < override feature but alarm > PNF 
X-check). It is envisaged that the “pathway” from descriptor event to potential outcome 
will be quantified against data and specialist knowledge. Safety barriers can then also be 
assigned safety values given the descriptor and potential outcome pairing. Although 
Human Factors values are not included in an original LoPA analysis, in the current 
project we proposed to modify and utilise the tool in a very different way.  
Notwithstanding these modifications, the method will still be based on its solid theoretical 
foundations. It can be agreed as good practice to separate the hard safety barriers from 
the more Human Factors types and to limit the effectiveness of the latter on the model 
outcome (Waller, 2004). 
LoPA in its own right has been found to be too restrictive when attempts are made to 
apply it to an incident or event. The time required to develop a LoPA case for each event 
would also be prohibitive in a commercial organisation such as British Airways where the 
number of events per year is high (as in all aviation companies). In addition, the theory 
works well at a level where mechanical barriers (i.e. barriers which can have probabilities 
applied to them post-destructive testing) are the primary concern but lacks the fluidity 
required to identify the less quantifiable human-factors issues within a complex system. 
Although these probabilities of failure do have an important place in investigation, we 
believe it is more appropriate to develop a method that can be based on historical data 
as indicators of current and future risk rather than attempting to develop LoPA style p-
values.  
Barrier theory is, as its name suggests, a group of theories and foundations upon which 
ideas can formulate and thus makes an ideal candidate for incorporation in a risk rating 
methodology. Barriers, or levels of removal from a potential outcome, do not require 
exact “probabilities” or “distances” but instead create a relative safety system. Each 
event is considered relative not only to all other events (as in standard risk matrix type 
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systems) but also relative to an eventual, or possible, outcome. This gives a truer audit of 
system safety in relation to negative events. 
As already has been seen throughout this thesis there are numerous uses of barriers in 
theories and for illustrating safety models. System safety practices such as MIL-STD-
882E (US DoD, 2005) refer to the implementation of mishap mitigation measures which 
envelop a wide variety of barrier types including at design strategies, physical barriers 
and additional training. Outside of the military barriers too are inextricably linked to the 
safety practices legislated by aviation authorities (e.g., FAA, 2000). At an academic level 
safety specialists such as Ale (2007) have used barriers within fault trees to illustrate the 
ability to prevent accident „pathways‟. Luxhøj (2002) applies barrier theory to complex 
Bayesian networks of complex systems stating that “according to the algorithms of 
Bayesian Belief Networks, that if the state of the defense system is known, and is 
working properly, then the relationship between the sequence of errors and the accident 
is blocked”. This association of a variety of barriers with models and techniques sets 
precedence for using barriers within safety but to the author‟s knowledge barriers have 
never been actively linked to risk rating events or a system at the level of information 
elements. Neither has the model underpinning the introduction of barriers had 
information networks at its centre. Ale et al. (2005 & 2007) when looking at attempting to 
model the aviation system in order to utilise barrier theory and understand aviation 
accidents used event sequence diagrams as their initial basis and introduced some 
Bayesian theory into this. BA had looked at using ESDs in 1999 under O‟Leary so there 
was some evidence that these would work. What was of more interest to the study was 
to analyse a deeper level than ESDs tend to. 
With this centralisation of safety barriers and potential outcome risk we remove the bias 
and skew of frequency in the analysis. Through the process of deriving a safety barrier 
pathway, a risk value is produced based on the potential outcome risk minus any safety 
barriers that remained intact to prevent the scenario. This risk value can then be factored 
to fit into the eBASIS risk rating system organisation-wide. 
As Figure 7-5 shows, the concept of centralising the potential outcome of an event and 
the use of barriers, or defences, has been introduced by British Airways (albeit in matrix 
format) and show the recommendations of this thesis are consistent with BA practice. 
Our literature reviews and methodology critiques have validated this as a scientifically 
solid foundation on which to build a risk rating methodology. 
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Figure 7-5 - Risk Matrices reproduced from British Airways working document 
Table 7-6 summarises the main methodologies used in the primary complex-system 
industries to date. The biggest issue facing a company such as BA when comparing with 
these other industries is that more than ever, there is little to separate Human Factors 
from hard factors such as engineering issues. In some industries it is easier to use hard-
barriers to prevent negative events and to limit the input of humans to some extent. 
Some industries, despite still being complex, also have a more limited variety of possible 
outcomes. Due to these reasons it appears that no single method discussed and in 
current use will suffice so the rest of this chapter looks at developing a new model as the 
basis of a risk rating and safety management system; i.e., one based on information 
networks. 
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General Area 
of Use 
Base 
Methodology 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Aviation in 
general 
Risk Matrices 
(including 
extended/ 
complex 
matrices) 
- Simple 
implementation 
- Only requires 
severity and 
frequency 
- Able to extend 
across 
departments with 
labels 
- Unable to unify 
cross-departmentally 
- Limited by use of 
R=SF 
- No real scope for 
further improvement 
Other 
Transport (e.g. 
railways) 
QRA Type (e.g. 
LUL, RSSB) 
- Based on Fault-
Tree methods 
- Extremely in-
depth studies 
- Inhenrent 
inflexibility of method  
- Too detailed for 
purpose 
- Very time 
consuming 
Nuclear/ 
Petrochemical 
Process Hazard 
Analysis (PHA) 
- Includes (limited) 
human factors  
- Thorough 
analysis of 
scenarios 
- Purely qualitative 
- Subjective 
methodology 
- Very time 
consuming 
Chemical LoPA (safety 
barrier) based 
methodology 
- Semi-quantitative 
method 
- Centralises safety 
barriers 
- Can incorporate 
human factors 
- Removes 
frequency skew 
- Protection layers 
are deemed to be 
independent 
- Quantifying of 
PFDs required. 
Table 7-6 - Summary of current methodologies in use across complex industries 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis illustrate the variety of possible uses that information 
networks have. So how would network models fit with the requirements of BA? 
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7.3 Is Risk Really = Severity x Frequency? 
7.3.1 Does frequency necessarily dictate risk? 
Network models of accidents and incidents throughout this thesis have allowed us to 
illustrate and understand more clearly the information space in which decisions are made 
and interactions between agents (human and non-human) take place. The methodology 
allows clear identification of the causal factors central to an event and centralises the 
totality of a system space, providing an holistic approach to investigation. Information 
networks allow us to build an image that can be used to further understand and identify 
the relationships between different facets of that complex system. Networks can be built 
up from the information that is present within a system during a particular event or more 
generally.  
Networks allow us to picture links between events, barriers and outcomes, and allows us 
to look at potential outcomes; all valuable and required facets of any comprehensive 
investigation method. Andrew Rose (2008, p.1381), a previous employee of BA in the 
Safety Management team, also points out that “where [safety related data sources] are 
used to make risk decisions it is generally in an individual and isolated way and without a 
clear understanding of their relative importance.” Here, again, is a key point in 
introducing a comprehensive method that embraces a network approach to safety as an 
attempt to bring cohesion to the SMS. Since barriers draw together all incidents that are 
linked not just by outcome but by causes and effects they are not simply reclassifying the 
same old thing but actively looking to improve the data sources through more thorough 
and focussed analysis. 
Key to the success of a new model is addressing the eight limitations of the current 
methods highlighted earlier in the chapter. One of the key concerns with the current 
application of eBASIS is that using frequency as a rating factor is not representative of 
potential risk, and can distort the overall risk ratings. If risk is simply the potential 
outcome of an event, then alternative risk matrices and metrics should be explored. 
Reason (e.g., 1997) and others conceive of barriers in the system line of defence to 
avoid accidents and adverse events. One option is to remove frequency from the risk 
rating matrices and replace it with a factor relating to the success (or otherwise) of these 
barriers and their proximity to the event. More than this though, the importance of 
understanding an event in terms of the system it occurred in is of particular importance 
and any method must reflect this. Rasmussen understood that to isolate actions and 
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decisions from the context in which it took place and attempt to model this decomposition 
was an ineffective way of learning about the system. (Rasmussen, 1997)  
Macrae et al. (2002, p.104) state in their paper that “…the risk of safety incidents should 
not be directly tied to their severity”. However, Rose (2008, p.1384) counters this 
argument in saying that “individual events can be rated for their own individual risk 
contribution”. This slight deviation from the standard allows us to forego risk matrices and 
concentrate on severity and risk of particular events and yet any SMS which collects data 
can still intrinsically report frequency based statistics as required for trend analysis etc. 
Consistent with the development of this thesis and the issues Rose and the BA staff had, 
Macrae points out that “...we are concerned here with issues of flight safety. That is, 
major organisational accidents in well defended systems. By definition, the most relevant 
incidents to managing these risks will always be towards the high severity, low probability 
end of the scale. However, quantitative analysis of such small probabilities is often very 
difficult”, and often of very limited productive use in the opinion of the author. “As such, 
extreme event analysis may require extensions to current risk assessment 
methodologies.” (Macrae et al., 2002, p.101). This allows for novel application and 
original thinking in terms of foregoing frequency and formulating safety methods 
centralising severity and barriers which appear to be more useful and applicable across a 
complex system thus far. Macrae et al. (2002, p.102) continue, “what is more, there still 
remain considerable modelling challenges to be met in capturing the actions embedded 
in organisational context. These include…the means by which latent organisational and 
management factors shape outcomes at the „sharp-end‟ of operations (e.g. Reason 
1997).” This last point can be addressed through the application of networks to events 
such as in Chapter 3 of this thesis; information networks have shown a degree of 
modelling and pliability that other methods cannot replicate. 
The next issue that this novel method would seek to address is again an over-emphasis 
by current models on frequent but less significant events on an organisational level – 
such as bags falling and injuring staff. By quantifying safety barriers, it can be determined 
whether there is a need for additional safety barriers – and more importantly, whether 
these would represent a real safety improvement for British Airways. These networks 
allow for manipulation of barriers whilst identifying any other areas that may be 
potentially affected (whether in a positive or negative sense) by any changes in the area 
surrounding the barrier. Industry-wide, the accepted method for assessing safety 
standards in this way is through the principle of As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
(ALARP).  
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It is expected that implementation of this new safety barrier-centric model will allow for 
clearer representation of which risks need to be concentrated upon, and as such make 
the decision process for valuable resources simpler for BA Safety Services. All event 
descriptors with their associated potential outcomes will lead to a certain risk factor 
dependent upon the penetration of existing barriers. Although these risk factors will be 
consistent across the organisation and across the reporting structures, applying the 
ALARP principle will allow for certain threshold levels to be introduced for particular 
events that do not deserve as much attention as others despite a relatively high risk 
factor ranking.  
Equivalent fatalities is a concept used across the rail industry whereby a major injury is 
considered to be 0.1 fatalities, and a minor injury 0.01 fatalities. (London Underground 
Limited Quantified Risk Assessments, 2001) This allows for simpler comparison of risk in 
terms of fatalities across all incidents including those with non-fatal outcomes. Equivalent 
fatalities may therefore be a suitable basis for the decision making process associated 
with ALARP and will require testing against data for suitability in the context of British 
Airways‟ operations. 
“Risk prediction today is often at the level of looking at trends of safety information and 
assuming those trends will continue. This however does not recognise the many 
variables that affect safety performance and does not enable effective prediction of the 
affects of changes to the system”. (Macrae et al., 2002) These network models, it is 
hoped, can reflect changes because changes to SOPs, company activities, aircraft fleets, 
airports used etc. may affect safety due to networked links and the networks can 
highlight the barriers that may be affected. Macrae et al. (2002) go on to say that 
“accident theories make clear that much of the real worth of incident reporting comes 
from the interpretation and understanding of the organisational processes underlying 
unsafe events.” Therefore with the networks encapsulating the defences left, and the 
defences (or barriers) broken, it is not purely historical quantities that are being 
investigated. 
Another issue Macrae et al. (2002) had with improving winBASIS was addressing “how 
can risk assessment actively support the flexibility of process needed to deal with ill-
structure, dynamic and ambiguous safety information?” He also examined how “in the 
management of ill-structured, complex problems the creative process of risk assessment 
often provides as much benefit as the final output. Questions of how such beneficial 
processes could be integrated into incident report management systems remain largely 
unresolved”. It is argued that the network process addresses these issues by the risk-
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rater having to address each barrier in the system, and therefore being required to 
understand fully and acknowledge the complex problems of the situation in doing the risk 
assessment process. 
Further than this though, a large limitation of the current eBASIS methods is that “in 
practice...it‟s often hard to distinguish [new ways a system may fail or is weak] as many 
incidents are unique, either in their causal factors, failure mode or combination of 
occurrence.” (Macrae et al., 2002) However, with this network barrier theory, the barriers 
are a common linking factor as they are part of the system that is purposefully there. 
Therefore, there is more chance of highlighting and trend-analysing barriers than 
incident-classifiers. This again harks back to section 7.2.2. 
So, in answer to the question „Does frequency necessarily dictate risk?‟, it would be more 
conducive to discuss the idea of a severity rating rather than a risk rating if this then 
eliminates the necessity to rely on biasing frequency. There is no doubt that the Royal 
Society (and it appears most complex industries) adhere to the idea that risk is based on 
probabilistic measures of occurrence of events combined with measures of the severity 
of those events‟ consequences. It is argued, however, that due to the nature of aviation 
and complex industries and the significance of low frequency events, that severity is in 
fact key in distinguishing the priority of investigation and study. An interesting final point 
made by BA‟s safety team is that “risk” is BA‟s fundamental safety metric, i.e., BA does 
not rely on individual events materialising to say if the organisation is safe or not but risk 
itself and therefore there needs to be a way of incorporating potential risk that simply is 
not there at present. This too is built into the network approach to risk rating and safety 
management outlined below. 
7.4 The Distance from Disaster Model 
7.4.1 A network-based approach to modelling safety information: An 
Overview of the Method 
Section 7.4.1 presents a brief overview of the purpose of the model before section 7.4.2 
takes a step by step look at the method. In its original form, the process of risk rating with 
the new methodology requires the risk-rater to formulate a diagram similar to that in 
figure 7-5 in order to ascertain the accident pathway that the event took place on. These 
diagrams will build up over time so it will not always be necessary to create them from 
scratch, but they may be modified from existing British Airways Standard Incident 
diagrams. 
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If the worst potential outcome (furthermost event) given the scenario has occurred then 
the event is classified as an “A” rated event. Should one barrier be identified preventing 
the potential outcome from occurring then the event is rated as a “B”. Given two barriers 
a “C”, three barriers rates an incident as a “D” and four or more barriers means that event 
would be rated “E”. As can be seen in the footnotes to figure 7-6 there are situations 
where an event occurs which could have led to a more serious potential outcome and a 
reason why it hasn‟t cannot be identified; in these circumstances that event is also 
classified as “A” (see *1 in figure 7-5 below). At this point in the model there is potential 
for identifying the „strength‟ of a barrier and incorporating that into the rating of an event. 
The risk, or severity, score could be increased if the barrier is identified as a „weak‟ 
barrier or decreased if a particularly „strong‟ and proven barrier. This idea of „strength‟ of 
barriers is something which will come into its own once the model has been used for 
some time and it has been fully populated with a lot of data on which to base the 
„strength‟ or otherwise of a barrier. 
The usefulness of this technique of rating is that isolated from any other influences, each 
event is rated on the basis of its distance from a disaster. This in turn reflects on the 
positive aspects in identifying what stalled the event from becoming an actual disaster 
and solidifies the importance of barriers as the best method of rating safety within a 
system. This particular method also “walks” the risk-rater through the entire process 
innately and therefore does not need complicated instruction nor wholly subjective 
assertion which is common practice in many risk rating schemes to date. The objectivity 
and structure this method can bring risk-raters is an underlying feature of strong methods 
and should be strived for when reviewing current or future practices. 
The model behind the new risk rating system is illustrated in its most simple form in 
Figure 7-7. It is essentially broken into three parts and each part can be represented as a 
network, which, in the final version is of course joined to the next in a comprehensive 
systemic picture of airline events. 
The middle section is the first to be identified as this information is gained from the 
incident report from crew and any digital data recorded by the airline. This gives 
information on the actual event that has occurred including, for example, persons 
affected, the amount of deviation from normal or the extent of injury/damage. 
It is then the job of the investigator to populate the first section of the diagram by studying 
what can be considered precursors and most importantly identifying barriers that failed to 
stop the event. 
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Figure 7-6 – A single strand of the “Distance from Disaster” Methodology illustrated with 
ratings applied at 7 locations (or events) 
Finally, the model aims to encourage investigation into possible outcomes from the 
reported event. This would require identification of any positive-actions on the part of 
crew or non-human agents together with any defences or barriers that have remained 
intact and hold responsibility for preventing further/potentially worse outcomes; a positive 
slant on the picture. 
 
Figure 7-7 - Distance from Disaster Simplified Model 
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7.4.2 The “Distance from Disaster” methodology 
In order to produce a workable rating method it was decided that the practice of risk 
rating has, of itself, an intrinsic “flowchart” style procedure. By this it is meant that not 
only is it the aim of this work to introduce a new risk rating scale but also to make that 
scale representative of the methodology required to carry out the action. Developing a 
new method must have usability at its core and as such the model above is the basis for 
this new risk rating system but the method itself differs in order to improve usability and 
reduce complication at the outset whilst retaining the ability to improve and develop over 
time. In other words, central to this study is that the model underpins the method. 
However, in order to move forward in manageable steps for the company a usable 
method that has attributes similar to those in current use needs to be formed as an 
intermediary step. This section outlines the development of the method and its usability. 
Having discussed the issues involved and the requirements of the project, a number of 
“standard incidents” analysed by BA over time were studied together with the safety 
manager, a pilot specialist, an incident investigator and a subject matter expert. At this 
stage, the actual eBASIS files were not used so as not to limit the scope of the model (it 
is important that the method is not to be restricted by current shortcomings of the eBASIS 
system or directed to be too similar). This also meant that the eBASIS files would serve 
better in the validation stage later in this chapter and the results of any such validation 
would hold more weight. 
The “standard incidents” covered significant aircraft accidents that BA felt had real 
potential to jeopardise the operation. These included incidents such as Runway Incursion 
(most notably illustrated by the catastrophic accident at Las Palmas in Tenerife), mid-air 
collision, Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and fire/smoke in the cockpit. These issues 
were highlighted by safety and technical professionals within British Airways. Once 
identified a number of causal occurrence types were identified. These, for example, 
would include contributory factors such as, for a runway incursion; disorientation, 
incorrect radio instruction, incorrect runway use etc. These incidents of note were then 
the basis for the safety plan within the company and spurred training modules, 
feedback/newsletter articles, investigation into “hot topics” and formed a safety related 
goal. This was at a level that was pseudo-aspirational and by this I mean there was no 
single formal method in place to address such an issue hence the desire for this work 
with the safety management team. 
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The main “standard incidents” had to be deconstructed in order to create network 
diagrams as the basis for depicting the system. The team outlined earlier sat down with 
each of the incidents in turn and looked to identify influences on the flight crew in 
particular. At this stage of the development all of the reports that are entered into BASIS 
are flight crew reports. This necessitates the tying together of the method and the data it 
is attempting to analyse. These influences, similar to any risk work, can be 
organisational, environmental, personal and in particular informational. Table 7-7 (on the 
next page) contains the human factors that were considered when creating a network 
style diagram for each “standard incident”. 
The network was originally created by working through each line of table 7-7 and 
inserting a node relating to any of them that were relevant to the “standard incident”. The 
basis for this was the specialist knowledge of the team. In the future the allocation of 
nodes/factors/barriers etc. could be cross-checked against other specialists but more 
importantly through the aggregation of information from each incident outlined above the 
nodes would become self-perpetuating.  
If the incident referred to in figure 7-9 is used as an example the relation to table 7-7 can 
be seen. Table 7-8 highlights some examples from where the nodes (or barriers/factors 
etc.) were identified. These are not an exhaustive or necessarily highly accurate group 
from which to ascertain the full systemic network of aviation but they worked to direct 
group discussion and formulation of the early networks which could then be developed 
further. 
As already mentioned no ASR data was used at this stage but in the future it is expected 
that the model can aggregate any new factors, barriers and informational elements that 
are reported by crew/investigators so that it is a continually building and adapting 
database. This and the aggregation of probability data for each element ties this method 
into work from earlier chapters of this thesis (Chapters 5 and 6). 
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Table 7-7 – Table used by the team to develop networks for “standard incidents” 
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Node Inserted Item from Table 7-7 Type of Influence 
Wig Wags 
available/in use 
Airport Facilities Environmental 
Use of one 
language 
ATC Communications Environmental 
LAHS/SIRO in 
operation 
Group Violation Organisational 
Lights on entering 
runway 
Checklists/Cross Checking Informational/Team Skills 
Low Speed RTO Handling/Briefing Handling/Team Skills 
Incorrect readback 
of clearance 
Misunderstanding/Mistake Errors 
 
Table 7-8 – Items relating Table 7-7 to Figure 7-9 
From here it was necessary to apply severity scores to all outcomes (e.g., runway 
incursion), barriers (e.g., No ground radar being used) and factors (e.g., Low visibility). 
The aforementioned team gathered on many occasions to discuss the severity scale. 
Originally BA was using a 100 point risk rating system but it was deemed necessary to 
increase this to 1000 points in order to gain some granularity particularly amongst the low 
and mid-end risks (this is discussed further in section 7.4.3 below). This 1000 point scale 
set the starting point for allocating severity and the team, based on their vast knowledge 
of safety, aviation and BA incidents in particular, allocated a range of severity to each 
“standard incident” (as an aside this relates nicely to the use of ranges of values in 
Bayesian mathematics as described in chapter 6). Each incident was then looked at 
individually and moving out from the node that described the incident deemed to have 
been reported (e.g., runway incursion) each subsequent node that was linked had a 
value applied to it that resulted in an acceptable overall severity score once each 
permutation was completed. This was an iterative process and one which was largely 
subjective. This is argued to be acceptable at this stage because of the make-up of the 
team and the potential for feedback from future incidents, system developments and 
rating scores to affect the networks continuously. 
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The result of these discussions was a number of network diagrams where each node had 
applied to it a severity score so that these may represent an event or occurrence. 
Additionally all other nodes could represent either a positive or negative factor or barrier 
and as such has a score related to it. This has important implications in terms of the 
concept that any node is capable of having a severity score applied to it. This is 
discussed further in the conclusions to this chapter. The crux of the method then, is that 
the investigator will start at a node with a set severity rating and then look at all nodes 
that are linked and those that are considered active in light of the pilot report would then 
affect the severity score by the value of each node. 
Returning to the three-stage nature of the process of developing a new method for BA, 
this middle stage had to be an improvement on the matrices that were in use. It was 
important that certain features were retained that made it relatable to the staff that would 
be using it and usable with the level of data received (the ASR program could be 
developed in the future to get more of the correct information required for a more 
complex methodology but that was not feasible at this stage; the model and method, 
however, do hold the potential for all these options in the future). For this reason the 
networks were modified from the information networks seen in earlier chapters of the 
thesis to a simplified version similar in style to figure 7-8 and in turn reduced to a 
flowchart style such as figure 7-9 and table 7-9. BA had a preference for this first iteration 
of the method to use a flowchart to direct the work of the investigator and that is from 
where the worksheet (table 7-9) was formed. Here the underlying principle is based on 
the nodes created for an information network but each node, assigned to be either a 
factor or a barrier, is now replaced by a series of tables and worksheets. This retains the 
core of the model whilst simplifying the exterior look of the method. 
By means of summarising the results of this developmental method the following shows 
the steps required within the current iteration of this “distance from disaster” 
methodology: 
Phase 1:  
Draw networks of “incident” to identify barriers and factors for that incident. This is based 
on investigating the event as per the model including potential outcomes and links with 
other incidents. Initially this will take the form of network diagrams, similar to earlier 
chapters and simplified to be more akin to figure 7-8 in time. All network barriers and 
factors affecting that network are identified and comprehensive networks produced. 
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Phase 2: 
These networks will then be broken down and modified to produce a flowchart style 
network akin to figure 7-7 and illustrated in steps similar to the developmental stages of 
the method in figure 7-9 and table 7-9. The barriers can thus be identified and potential 
outcomes or causes clearly displayed. Subject Matter Experts check the assigned values 
to the barriers and factors for each network, store the network diagram for future use and 
publish a simple to use risk-rating worksheet as shown in Table 7-9.  
 
(These two steps are carried out by SMEs any time there is an incident that does not fit 
into one of the already published networks/worksheets.) 
 
Phase 3: 
Now a member of the Safety Data staff, no longer needing specialist training, can use a 
worksheet to score an incident that has been reported without needing to refer directly to 
the model itself. The score starts with the original incident rating, in the example of Table 
7-9 that is 250 points. Next, each of the barriers breached boxes are checked and any 
that hold true for that incident incur that number of risk points to be either added, or 
subtracted where the figure is preceded with a minus sign (there are no negative values 
in the example given in Table 7-9). Next, the risk-rater also checks any factors boxes 
which are relevant to the incident which again alter the score resulting in an incident total. 
Some factors ask the risk-rater to refer to another worksheet illustrating the linkages that 
will develop between worksheets and thus in the incident investigation for BA. 
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Figure 7-8 - Example simplified network for Go-Around Standard Incident
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Figure 7-9 - Example interim network step for Runway Incursion Standard Incident
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Incident total    Barriers Breached Total    Factors Total   
        Incident Rating  Barriers Rating 
 
Factors Rating 
Runway Incursion 250  Airport Facilities and Maintenance    Phase of flight   
   Green taxi way lights not available / in use 10  Above decision ht with clearance to land 50 
Overall Risk Rating    Stop Bars not available / in use. 20  Below decision ht  150 
   Wig Wags not available / in use 10  Airport Environment   
   Signs and ground markings unclear 25  Land and hold short LAHS /  SIRO in operation 200 
   ATC    Weather   
   No ground radar being used. 5  Low Visibility 100 
   Conditional clearances being used. 20  Flight Crew Actions   
   More than one language being used 25  RTO performed see RTO 
   Flight Crew SOPs and airmanship    Go Around performed see go 
around 
   No brief or discussion about taxi routes before 
moving at unfamiliar airfields or in low visibility. 
5  Unable to take avoiding action with no collision 200 
   No Visual check made / use of TCAS before lining up 
or crossing a runway. 
15  Unable to take avoiding action with near collision 750 
   Clearances not confirmed. 15  Unable to take avoiding action with collision 1000 
   Lights not put on when entering an active runway. 5    
Table 7-9 - A working example of the method‟s “worksheet” for an incident reported as “Runway Incursion”
©    Griffin, T. G. C.   Chapter 7 – Industrial Application of Method 
 193 
Phase 4: 
Finally, the event can be classified according to BA‟s Operational Safety 
Scoring Categorisation (Table 7-10; further discussed in the section 7.4.3) and 
any company/departmental action taken as appropriate to that level of incident. 
Grade Risk/Severity 
Score 
A 800-1000 
B 600-800 
C 400-600 
D 150-400 
E 0-150 
 
Table 7-10 - BA‟s New Operational Safety Scoring System 
7.4.3 Validation and Implementation 
Following development of this method for rating the severity of incidents, 637 
BA Air Safety Reports (ASRs) were scored between myself and an SME pilot 
and the data reproduced in Table 7-12 below. To reiterate for clarity, no ASRs 
were referred to during the building of the networks and flowchart style 
worksheets so that as best a test as possible could be made of validating the 
severity scoring from the developmental stage. The ASRs for validation were 
selected from November 2009 and working back in date order until 50 of each 
type were tested. This was not possible with certain event-types due to their 
rarity. For each of the “standard incident” types detailed in table 7-12 there was 
a worksheet similar to that shown as table 7-9. 
Screen captures of the ASR database on eBASIS are included as Figures 7-10 
to 7-14 to illustrate the spread of information available from pilot reports and 
used to validate our method (and more generally to rate events by the safety 
team). These will now briefly be described so as to illustrate the method of 
validation used. Figure 7-9 shows mainly administrative information relating the 
flight details to the investigator including date, location, aircraft type and 
whether a formal report is required by law. At the bottom of figure 7-9 (and 
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repeated in figure 7-10) is the incident summary. This provides an overview of 
the situation. The lower half of figure 7-10 show that this particular incident was 
rated as D by eBASIS prior to the new method and classifies what type of 
incident it is (in this case a take off performance issue). Figure 7-11 explains 
who raised the incident (e.g., was it an ATC report or a flight crew report) and 
further details of the flight. Figures 7-12 and 7-13 are where the majority of the 
information to use the worksheets is gleaned. The validation would begin at a 
node reflected by the “summary” box of figure 7-12 and then any barriers or 
factors that could be identified using the “event and cause”, “action and results” 
and “other information” boxes would be marked on the worksheet. The starting 
rating would then be affected by any factors and barriers marked as active in 
the event and the resulting severity rating recorded. It is these scores that are 
recorded in table 7-12. 
 
Figure 7-10 - Basic details available on an ASR include investigation details, 
date,  
location, fleet, flight details, MOR filing and a brief incident summary. 
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Figure 7-11 - Risk rating (A-E) and classification labels including event type and 
descriptor added to illustrate inferred causal structure. 
 
Figure 7-12 - Raw technical data is also included in the report 
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Figure 7-13 - Reports from the flight crew in terms of what happened are 
included in the report and any relevant weather or operational details 
 
Figure 7-14 - Actions and results are entered as the incident is “closed” or 
further requirements are entered and the incident kept “open” for further 
investigation 
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The data have been studied against what are considered suitable severity 
scores for a particular type of incident together with suitable severity scores for 
the potential an incident shows. The highlighted cells in the table indicate the 
main spread of severity scoring for that type of standard incident. These scores 
(the 5 columns on the right of table 7-12) were compared against the values 
raised by the previous eBASIS risk ratings (column 3 in the table). The results 
can be seen to be comparable and more importantly three further subject 
matter experts were given the results of the new method and a selection of the 
ASRs and without exception there was a positive agreement. In the future a 
more comprehensive cross-rater test could be carried out and further validation 
would continue. 
This validation against BA‟s own data is important because of the need to 
report on safety and risk within the company relative to the history (a method 
that rendered historical data useless would not be acceptable). The fact that 
the method maintains a relatively similar area of severity scoring to previous 
methods alleviates any need to reanalyse historical data and allows for 
comparisons to continue.  
The final issue to be validated was that of whether or not to use an 
alphabetised scoring system to group incidents of similar severity and risk. It is 
important to get not only the best reflection of severity in terms of the grouped 
score but also the best spread of risk points in the areas most needed by the 
company. The use of a score from A to E has been used by BA for some time 
and appears to have served the company well in terms of distinguishing those 
incidents and accidents that require, for instance, company or regulatory 
investigations.  This way of reflecting the severity of an incident allows the 
company to report and concentrate on those incidents causing the most 
serious problems. As a point of note though, this does not predicate against 
accidents scored as C, D and E being important since these can often occur in 
higher numbers and still, as shown in this method, elicit important facts about 
the system safety and where extra barriers or investigation is required. 
There are two arguments surrounding the retention of the use of an A-E 
system. The first would dictate that since those incidents at the higher end of 
the scale, rated high in severity, have a wider range of outcomes in terms of 
levels of damage or injury and death (and all of these components in small or 
large amounts would cause an incident to be scored highly) then the widest 
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range of severity points should be in those incidents described as A or B 
events. 
The second would be to relate the range of severity points to the A-E system 
on the basis of volume of incidents, i.e., since there are many more D and E 
events than A, B and C events so the range of severity points within each of 
those ratings should reflect that. 
Since the aim of this method is to improve incident investigation and rating and 
with no alternative precedent set in the literature, it is recommended that the 
ratings be spread as shown in table 7-10. This allows for greater granularity 
amongst the lower band incidents which are most prolific, which was an 
additional aim of this project. Since the issue of A to E rating is purely an 
internal method of discussing safety there is no critical issue in either approach 
outlined above. The arbitrary decision that is required at the outset can be 
modified as data is collected and levels can be manipulated depending on 
variations of the safety levels and approach within the company. 
Incident 
Classification 
Old System Range of 
Values 
New Method Range of 
Values 
A 100 n/a 801-1000 200 
B 71-86 15 601-800 200 
C 35-55 20 401-600 200 
D 15-25 10 151-400 250 
E 1-15 15 0-150 150 
Table 7-11 - Classification Grades from A-E for incidents (The old system is not 
based on a continuous measurement of risk) 
©    Griffin, T. G. C.   Chapter 7 – Industrial Application of Method 
 199 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incident 
Starting 
Values 
End values 
from eBasis 
 
0-150 151-400 401-600 601-800 
801-
1000 
Total 
tested 
 
Birdstrike 50 50-255  47 3 0 0 0 50 
Medical Emergency 50-200 50-250  42 8 0 0 0 50 
Go around 75-150 125-450  8 40 2 0 0 50 
Lightning strike 100 100-320  27 23 0 0 0 50 
Pushback Incursion 100 175-325  0 32 0 0 0 32 
Taxiway Incursion 125 175-325  0 20 0 0 0 20 
TCAS RA 150 75-525  23 23 4 0 0 50 
Hold Point Incursion 150 275-415  0 5 1 0 0 6 
Low speed RTO 150 100-200  20 5 0 0 0 25 
Taxy without flaps set / mis selected 200 200-275  0 30 0 0 0 30 
Flap Mis-selection for take off 200 250-575  0 2 13 0 0 15 
Altitude Deviation 250 175-400  0 50 0 0 0 50 
Runway Incursion 250 275-650  0 6 14 1 0 21 
Fire smoke Fumes in Cabin 225-300 225-475  0 48 2 0 0 50 
Fire smoke fumes on flight deck 250-350 225-575  0 45 5 0 0 50 
High speed RTO 300 250-600  0 15 5 0 0 20 
Pilot incapacitation 300 100-500  2 40 5 0 0 47 
Incorrect performance figures used. 300 250-650  0 19 1 1 0 21 
                   
                 637 
Table 7-12 - Results of the validation of methodology against BA ASRs 
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KEY for Table 7-11: 
Column 1: Incident Title, Column 2: Incident Starting Value in the new methodology, 
Column 3: Resulting severity scoring range for all incidents of that type, Columns 4-
10: Number of incidents from study group that scored in given severity range, Column 
11: Total number of incidents in that study group tested 
7.5 Discussion of the benefits and limitations of 
working within industry 
Merging academia and industrial application is a central tenet of this research. Being 
able to work with industrial partners and develop a model that is not just integrated, 
but the basis for a new Safety Management System within a legacy airline is of great 
benefit to this work. However, there are issues surrounding working in real industry 
which can lead to limitations in methodology. A fine balance has to be struck between 
the ideal “Distance from Disaster” model utilising advanced network techniques and 
the practical application of a method to actually be used fully by BA. As such, the 
methodology has taken a slightly more linear approach than the networks appear to 
be capable of. However, this opens the door for masses of further work in the future 
given the correct time, finances and software development. It must be stated that this 
chapter does not reflect a finished application of the information network model. 
Indeed the letter of appreciation from BA (annexe 5) includes the continuance of work 
to implement and improve the interim methodology. The key to this, and previous 
chapters within the thesis, is that the central ideas and models are tested to an 
extent. This becomes the basis for future development and continuing work for many 
years to come. 
BA required a specific and workable risk-rating and safety management model and 
method which has been produced in this chapter. Any limitations imposed for the 
needs of simplicity of use are far outweighed by the benefit of using real industry 
data, specialists and situations. Industrial work must take the form of a step-by-step 
process (figure 7-15) and BA are now at a stage much more developed than 
previously and on a long road that has thus far taken them from reactive to proactive 
and now has true potential to adopt a predictive approach with networks. 
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Figure 7-15 – The past, present and future of BA‟s risk rating model (the three-stage 
process referred to throughout the chapter) 
Macrae (2002) affirms that “…it is of considerable importance that any assessment 
process is practicable. Not only does a process need to address the assessment 
problem, but it must meet time and resource constraints; it must be simple enough to 
be implemented and understood….” There are many methods which are accused of 
being far too unwieldy and time consuming for real-world application and this is one 
stigma that cannot be appended to this work and that is a coup for academia/industry 
work in the thesis especially given the solid foundations and extensive development 
that can continue. 
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7.6 Conclusions and Further Work 
7.6.1 The future for eBASIS? 
As discussed in the previous section there is much scope to develop the current fault-
tree style standard incident bank into complex networks that centralise barriers as the 
reporting classifier and not the incident. Ultimately, it is hoped that BA will adopt a 
more complex network approach to the underlying models of standard incidents; one 
where figures 7-6 and 7-7 are extrapolated into 3D networks interlocking with many 
others and sharing nodes across many, to the „naked‟ eye, unrelated incidents using 
classification of outcomes. It has always been the intention throughout this project to 
develop the models and methods so that they can extend into the application of 
information networks. BA require time to implement this novel procedure and explore 
the potential that it has to offer. After this period the next phase of the upgrade to 
network based models supporting the SMS can begin. The chances of applying 
historical data to the networks together with SME values for barriers could lead to 
more predictive levels of safety management. The strength of barriers concept 
discussed in section 7.4, and adopted within methods discussed earlier such as MIL-
STD-882E (US DoD, 2005) and Luxhøj (2002), can really come into its own it future 
iterations of the method. Feedback, itself a perquisite of Van der Schaaf‟s framework 
and many positive practices within a safe organisation, can feed the very model that 
underlies the method. As reports, or the system itself, changes so barrier strength 
may fluctuate in terms of their effect on safety. If, for example, a barrier is reported as 
being active within a large number of incidents and stopping worse outcomes yet 
never has been broken so the strength may be typified as high. Conversely if a barrier 
is found to be weak, and often active within incidents whereby a worse severity score 
is issued so that barrier would be highlighted as a potential issue. What this does is 
centralise the barriers and nodes not the classification technique. Ideally, in time, this 
process could be totally automated so that a barrier that is perceived to become 
stronger could allow nodes around it to reduce in severity rating. This automation 
would also extend to updating of probabilities of occurrence of nodes and this ties in 
well with the work covered in chapters 5 and 6. 
On the shorter term, the method requires regular checking of data trends in order to 
ensure barriers and factors are appropriately scored. Any changes to 
fleet/SOPs/training can also be reflected in the models. As briefly alluded to, there 
needs to be a discussion on the applicability of ALARP or equivalent fatalities to the 
model in order to begin a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) aspect to the method. BA have 
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to make some hitherto undisclosed decisions about what is considered to cost BA; is 
it hull-losses, passenger injuries/fatalities, or, brand image. 
7.6.2 Conclusions 
The crux of the work in this chapter is to have produced an incident auditing method 
that centralises barriers and not events themselves. A barrier could be involved in 
more than one event, or type of events, and as such this method would allow for the 
barrier to be implicated and investigated the correct number of times. This is 
something that may be overlooked when concentrating purely on the event itself; it is 
the barriers that ultimately create (or destroy) a safe system. 
The method designed and tested in this chapter is based on treating events on the 
basis of their individual risk contribution as discussed by Rose (2008). By analysing 
an event almost in isolation and not relying on risk = frequency x severity (thereby 
allowing frequency to skew the resulting risk score) the issue discussed in the 
introduction where logarithmic increases in frequency skew results is avoided. Yet at 
the same time the method is capable, through the centralisation of barriers within a 
large model, of allowing a more systemic approach to safety with arguably less 
emphasis on particular individual events (unless that is warranted as explained 
above) in isolation. This is in contrast to a prevalent type of safety system that aims 
predominantly to reclassify incidents alone. In this way the method moves away from 
an auditing safety method to a proactive one and it is argued has a better balance of 
individual event and system safety than previous methods and models. 
Further than this though, the use of potential outcomes and accident pathway 
diagrams allows the visualisation of what could have happened and therefore 
highlights the importance of protecting the company in terms of responsibility in the 
future which was key to the Concorde example earlier in the chapter, e.g., if an 
incident recurs but in the future has a different outcome, if that incident was only 
investigated in isolation the possible outcomes may not have been addressed. 
However, if possible outcomes are addressed, even if a different eventual outcome 
occurs, there is much to say that a safe attitude and proactive attitude has been held 
by the company. This centralisation of potential is key to a proactive safety 
management system. Further than this though, the method develops the safety 
management system in introducing predictive elements. Macrae et al. (2002) and Ale 
et al. (2005) both argue that analysing an accident is not enough to understand 
systemic problems and can not enable effective prediction. Through the monitoring 
and further understanding of the barriers within the British Airways network, we have 
seen how potentially weak or over-strained barriers can be identified prior to a 
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catastrophic event. This is where the method improves upon current methods of risk 
rating. It appears there is more potential from using the information networks as the 
underlying model than the use of event sequence diagrams (ESDs; e.g., Macrae 
2002 and Ale et al. 2005) as there is a deeper level of the system being investigated 
with more scope for detail and highlighting or discovering nodes of interest. In using 
ESDs as the foundation for their investigations Macrae and Ale have to assign 
outcomes and classify events in order to fit the design. As is discussed throughout 
this section, information nodes may transcend the higher level analyses by being 
present in very different outcome situations or other classifications. This responds to 
the difficulties discussed in the introduction that Macrae et al. (2002) found in 
overcoming the uniqueness of many incidents and their causal factors an extremely 
limiting and important issue. It is more likely that by analysing and modelling barriers, 
and reducing outcome to almost a by-product in the system, that patterns can be 
identified and safety issues highlighted.  
We have seen in the model (section 7.4.1) that the incident itself becomes the key 
element in any rating. By that, we mean that frequency has been removed from a 
central position. Intrinsically there is a value for frequency in the system, especially in 
how often a barrier is “attacked” and survives etc., but the severity score isn‟t 
dominated by that value in the way risk rating to date has been. This also relates back 
to the classification of barriers as „strong‟ or „weak‟ discussed earlier (e.g., MIL-STD-
882E (US DoD, 2005) and Luxhøj (2002)). If a barrier survives many attacks then it 
could be argued that it is a good or „strong‟ barrier. Alternatively, it can also be argued 
that that barrier needs further investigation and possible funding to retain its strength 
and ability to defend. Indeed, there is the potential for an alerting system based on 
the frequency of “attack” of a barrier regardless of whether there was a positive or 
negative outcome. This could be a simple colour-coding to the barrier within a 
network diagram to highlight those areas of particular interest and potential risk. This 
would require increases in the amount of positive-outcome data recorded. However, 
the potential of an incident replaces frequency as a central facet of the method as 
discussed in the previous two paragraphs. In comparison with where BA were at the 
start of this project, using a series of 5x5 matrices, the improvement in terms of 
introducing system analysis to understand system safety is immense (and this will 
continue with the third stage of the process). The movement away from risk matrices 
draws accident investigation models into the centre of risk rating techniques. This is in 
sharp contrast to using a secondary model at a higher level with less detail in order to 
„fit incidents into boxes‟ for statistical evaluation. This method has introduced to BA‟s 
safety methods a representation of safety within the entire complex system. 
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The method itself has used a solid model at its core and yet has been simplified 
enough to be practically useful within a large organisation such as BA without 
restrictive amounts of user-training. The central bank of standard incidents can be 
built upon and, as in the flight-crew orientated incidents tested thus far, specialists 
from the relevant departments can be drawn upon to populate network style models 
that feed the worksheet approach. 
The key to the proactive view of potential within the model is with the factors. Factors, 
alongside barriers in the worksheet, influence the severity score on the basis of 
potential, i.e., “no heavy crew on duty”, or, “it happened in bad weather” even though 
these were not causes or barriers necessarily broken.  
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), in their 2002 document 
introducing LOSA (Line Operations Safety Audit), discuss how incident analysis does 
not provide good enough information on barriers (i.e. positive actions etc.) that occur 
during the build up to events. Through the recreation of not only the event but the 
possible furthering of that event into an ultimate event outcome (including factors), 
risk raters are encouraged to understand more fully the scenario and look beyond the 
negative aspects. It has been important throughout this project not to limit thinking to 
the limitations of current reporting practice and data received but more to drive the 
reporting style and data that is required by a solid model and method; hence the 
future requirement for positive-outcome reporting. A significant benefit of these 
network models (and Bayesian style networks that could be added to the mix during 
the third stage) is nodes can have specific significance (e.g., be marked as an 
outcome or incident/accident node) as all of those things are just the manifestation of 
information in different ways. At the same time a node may act as any other nodes 
with probabilities and links to other nodes potentially in all directions. Therefore, this 
chapter has introduced an actual risk rating method different to those seen in the 
literature and more similar to an accident or system investigation tool. There is no 
place for stating the „end point‟ and then looking „how we got there‟ as the nodes are 
simply active or not and the interest is in what nodes are linked and also active that 
may have prevented a worse situation or had a part to play in the manifestation of this 
one. Theoretically there is no „end of the line‟ as it is not a linear model and for BA at 
the end of stage two, i.e., where we are now, what this means is the networks 
developed in this chapter and the worksheets that are produced from them can be 
joined with each other. This often occurs in several places such as a common factor, 
barrier or outcome/potential outcome since all are merely informational nodes within 
the greater system. This conceptualises a truly non-linear system and maintains a 
natural approach to investigation and attribution or risk. As the nodes and links 
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multiply a fully integrated view of barriers, nodes and information is formed. No longer 
is there a need to specify an „overrun event‟ and allocate that to a particular bracket. 
Instead, all events are simply events where certain nodes/factors/information were 
activated in the situation by their interaction with barriers and their strengths or 
weaknesses. 
Through testing of the method with genuine ASR data the validity of the ratings that 
are being produced have been shown to be useful and accurate. Further than 
replicating a satisfactory level of rating though, the new method has allowed for 
greater granularity in rating an event. Through the new spread of A to E events in 
terms of severity score (see Table 7-10) we can see that granularity is increased as 
much as 25 times greater levels for D incidents and 10 times more for E incidents. 
This is important since these levels of incident, as mentioned above, are the most 
prolific for the Safety team. Any increase in granularity allows for enhanced 
separation of events even within alphabetised ranges and therefore greater chance to 
readily use the data to understand the systemic picture of safety. The use of ASR 
data and the good result of the validation test means historical data (of which BA 
have tens of thousands of records) can still be applied to the method and is not lost. 
The positive validation at this stage allows for each ASR feeding back into the scores, 
the links, the nodes and the model as a whole to keep growing and improving. 
This method allows for a standard system of rating throughout the company. The 
matter of standardisation is not a simple one and not one that will occur overnight. 
However, with its emphasis on the airline as a whole and the operational and 
occupational elements of an incident the method could eventually be adopted 
throughout the company. Departmental and company responses to different incidents 
regardless of ultimate rating, may vary depending on company aims and issues of 
importance at the time. Departments have the ability to draw up their own addition to 
the method which requires further investigation within their specialist field of particular 
events; especially those flagged as having barriers that are constantly under attack or 
barriers that frequently fail. 
In terms of addressing the aims of this study (section 7.1.2), it is felt that this method: 
- Is formed on the basis and foundation of solid theory and exceeds current 
best-practice found through literature review. 
- Removes a large amount of the subjectivity that is required of risk-raters by 
“walking” the rater through an incident. This does not prevent an incident being 
referred for further in-depth investigation should it be warranted; it is merely a 
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way of dealing with a large number of similar safety events and of highlighting 
the smaller number of novel or significant events. 
- Standardises the application of risk rating company wide whilst still allowing 
for departmental responses to be as flexible as they need to be. This 
standardisation also allows for non-experts to be brought into the team (or work 
sent outside of the team e.g. for pilots to rate incidents themselves using this 
method) and therefore addresses a concern that any new member of the Safety 
Services team would not hold the experiential knowledge of a previous member.  
- Removes the frequency bias that limits the usefulness of current data whilst 
also improving the communicability of the data to the board by using company-
wide safety metrics. Frequency remains an intrinsic part of this method though 
since details are kept of the number of that type of incident that occur. However, 
what is removed is the logarithmic skewing effect that frequency was having on 
„minor‟ events during matrix use. In addition to this BA would benefit from 
keeping track of the number of times each barrier is highlighted as important in 
an incident whether in a negative or positive sense. 
- Building on this point, all knowledge is basically built into the pathway models 
for incidents as they are developed and modified over time. This combats the 
issues of knowledge retention highlighted. 
- Increases the granularity of incidents in the most common severity brackets 
(i.e., D and E) whilst not detracting from the significance of more severe 
incidents. 
- Will continue to build upon itself and develop so that the more analyses are 
carried out so the more comprehensive the pathways and rating becomes. The 
networks (and worksheets developed from them) are not static; they can be 
updated and manipulated as the system changes or with developments in 
barriers/factors and staff knowledge. 
The important feature of the method is not in gaining new severity scores necessarily 
but in the way in which those scores are gained subjectively, with an emphasis on 
potential and without the skewed effects of frequency taking over. Coupled with the 
movement towards truly predictive safety management that this model brings gives 
the method real potential. 
The challenge ahead is to now implement this new methodology. A central core of 
standard incidents from the operational perspective have been drawn up and tested 
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for this project and it would now be sensible to draw on SMEs from other areas such 
as Engineering, Ground Ops and Cabin Crew to do the same. Testing can be done 
against historical data and SME knowledge. 
7.6.3 Summary 
The beauty of the model presented in this chapter, for both academic and industrial 
partners, is that there is tremendous scope for development. As more investigation is 
carried out into network models and the metrics associated with those there is the 
great potential. Computer processes and algorithms can be integrated to analyse and 
test barriers, centralised due to this work, within the system. This may offer the 
chance to study error migration within a system and predict effects on the network as 
a whole should proposed changes to barriers (i.e. operational procedures and 
equipment etc.) be made. 
Further than this is the work required to investigate and define a common value of 
risk.  There is much scope for research and development into building a unified 
approach to risk management aiming to draw on the experience and specialised 
knowledge of operators, manufacturers, regulators and academia. Areas such as the 
A to E labelling of incidents and company responses to events, in order to become 
less arbitrary, require further modelling and identification of company priorities. This 
would involve defining a value of risk based upon, e.g., a cost of life (and from this a 
cost of injury based upon equivalent fatalities as used in the railway industry) or the 
cost of brand image etc. 
Central to the continuing development of the work, and drawing the issues back 
towards the themes of this thesis, is the need to move towards complex non-linear 
models. The steps taken away from risk matrices are significant despite not yet being 
able to arrive at fully non-linear methods. Through this mini-study, the opportunity to 
work with the airline and maintain firm roots within industry adds extra dimensions to 
the thesis. It achieves real focus on the potential application of the thesis model in the 
future and the benefits that a non-linear method can bring to safety management. 
The ultimate aim of this work and of the safety team at British Airways has to be a 
common direction for all industries dealing with complex systems and risk. Despite 
the need for BA-centric methods, the models and knowledge behind those has to be 
merged from aviation partners and non-aviation industries alike. This is the next big 
challenge in order to fully recognise the potential in network diagrams and predictive 
modelling of risk. 
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8  Conclusions 
 
8.1 Thesis Contribution 
8.1.1 Overarching Thesis Themes 
This thesis has developed the notion of complex systems requiring complex 
models to fully understand them. The current literature has shown that for a 
considerable time, models used within aviation accident investigation have 
been dominated by linear chain models and this is addressed. EAST is initially 
identified as a suitable toolkit approach that moves closer towards this ultimate 
dynamic and complex model. The fundamental strength identified within EAST 
is the use of information networks and these are developed in a novel way to 
integrate conscious ownership and transfer of information. This centralises a 
continuing theme of the thesis - communication. 
Information networks alone improve the understanding of the system in which 
events take place. They also allow positive, neutral and negative outcome 
events all to be integrated and studied. A common concern within accident 
investigation models however is the level of subjectivity and the artificial fitting 
of events to a method. This thesis evaluates a new quantitative method of 
accident investigation. This Bayesian method develops the information 
networks and addresses complex issues such as error migration. 
The application of information networks to an industry safety management 
system have led to the adoption of this information network based approach. 
The complexity of the methodology cannot be underestimated and it will take 
time for the comprehensive elements of the model are working holistically in 
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one model. However, this industrial setting allows continued testing of the 
usefulness and usability of the approach. 
This thesis has set out to improve the model and method of aviation accident 
investigation currently being used as the industry standard.  
8.1.2 Contributions Summarised 
8.1.2.1 Information Networks as an Accident Investigation 
Method 
Firstly, the thesis embarks on a journey that moves away from the linear 
models that currently dominate aviation accident investigation. The real world is 
a complex system and this is clearly identified in chapter 7 working with an 
airline. This thesis has developed a novel application of information 
networks to aviation accidents. Further than this though, it has developed 
this method to integrate ownership of information thereby achieving more 
detail within a single network. 
Through this work the theme of information flow, or, communication has been 
centralised as a key aspect of understanding the state of the system. This 
approach gives a greater insight into not just the „what‟ but the „how‟ and „why‟ 
of events. 
8.1.2.2 Integration of Bayesian Mathematics 
The thesis also sets out, in chapter 5 and 6, a new model which incorporates 
the elements of information networks and those from Bayesian 
mathematics in order to improve objectivity and being to address the issues of 
error migration and potential barrier failure. This new approach utilises historical 
data to highlight often used nodes and pathways and from this strong, weak, 
unused or overused nodes can be identified. In addition, the extra dimension 
that Bayesian mathematics adds to the networks is the movement towards 
modelling and understanding error migration and the effects of barrier 
manipulation. 
8.1.2.3 Centralisation of Barriers not Accidents 
General Aviation is an area that, despite some literature, is largely unstudied in 
terms of accidents. There is no doubt that the world of GA is very different to 
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that of Commercial transport. However, the novel use of information networks 
overcomes the limitations of so many more linear methods so that it can be 
applied to both GA and Commercial environments. Through the 
centralisation of understanding the system rather than the event this new 
method can be used to understand both flying environments equally. This 
thesis contends that information transfer is key to understanding a complex 
system and the basis for events regardless of the levels at which this transfer is 
taking place. The new approach considers barriers as fundamental to 
understanding the passage of information throughout a system network. The 
study of both negative and positive impact barriers (or factors) reveals more 
than a surface level approach limited by event types. 
This same thinking allows the method to be used to address both accidents 
and incidents as each can be modelled through information networks. This 
novel development removes the classification of events as a particular type or 
level and instead looks at the system holistically and regardless of whether an 
event has occurred or not.  
8.1.2.4 Novel Safety Management System 
Incidents are the basis for the integration of the method into an airline‟s SMS. 
They work well to populate the information networks and key to their use is to 
identify the potential outcomes and reasons for more positive outcomes 
than an accident. A continuous stream of incidents like these can be integrated 
into the network model to provide an up to date analysis of the system safety. 
Rather than terming these events as incidents, though, it would be more proper 
and in keeping with the thesis to term it as a potential-accident that has been 
prevented. 
This thesis has introduced the first SMS model that does not adhere to the 
edict that Risk = Frequency x Severity. It was identified that such a dogmatic 
view is preventing airline safety staff from effectively communicating risk in the 
system. Instead, through the centralisation of a potential accident‟s severity and 
the barriers that were broken, or remain, on the path to that outcome, a truer 
value of risk to the organisation is sought. The positive factors preventing an 
accident are central to this new methodology and the approach of risk rating 
staff is, for the first time, encouraged to look beyond any actual event to 
potential and successful positive features. 
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Further than the aims set out originally, this thesis has progressed beyond 
simply a piece of academic work. The work with a legacy airline and the 
integration of the network approach, even at an initially developmental level, 
into the SMS is a coup for the usefulness of the new approach set out in this 
thesis. 
8.2 Tying Together Several Aspects of the Thesis 
The aims of the thesis are set out in chapter 1 and are three-fold. The first was 
to develop and test a new method that departs from the current dominating 
linear models. The second aim of the thesis was to make any method or model 
applicable to General Aviation and that is covered in section 8.2.3. Section 
8.2.3 also addresses the issue of accidents versus incidents. Although no 
comprehensive effort has been made in this effort to support, or counter, the 
common cause hypothesis, the methods and model used allow that argument 
to be put to the side and instead concentrate on the holistic system not a 
singular event. 
Through several varied studies found in chapters 3 to 7 of this thesis these 
aims have been at the centre of the work. The following example of work that 
can be carried out on the basis of the developments from this thesis aims to 
show how all the aims, studies and conclusions can work together to improve 
aviation safety methods. 
8.2.1 Developing the Predictive Nature of the Bayesian 
Network 
Chapters 3 and 4 look at validating information networks with respect to 
aviation accident investigation. Further than this the potential for quantitative 
metrics was identified and tested. Chapter 5 integrated a level of Bayesian 
mathematics into information networks and MATLab was used with a Bayesian 
toolkit for a general aviation scenario. This was tested in chapter 6 against a 
flight simulation study to validate the use of historical data within the Bayesian 
information networks. This can be extended though and has potential for use in 
a system similar to that described and developed in chapter 7 with British 
Airways. Therefore, the type of process explored below has the potential of 
bringing all of the chapters‟ work together and providing a comprehensive 
qualitative and quantitative network approach to predicting error migration and 
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safety risks. This is not intended to form part of the studies proper for this thesis 
but give an indication of forward motion of the work in this thesis and a platform 
for indicating the relationships between chapters, studies and the methods 
contained within the thesis. 
With slight tweaks to the program code developed in chapter 5 (figure 8-2) it is 
possible to develop iterative processes based on the historical data and nature 
of relationships of the nodes. The code has been modified in order to take into 
account any changes that may be made, through the introduction of a barrier, 
prior to the node Heavy Landing. As discussed the nature of this barrier, so 
long as it is shown to be effective is not important and for the purposes of this 
study takes the form of a verbal instruction. It is predicted that this instruction 
reduces the probability of occurrence of the node Heavy Landing and as such 
the new iterative process predicts the magnitude of effect on the network 
outcome; Nosewheel Collapse in this instance. 
The main changes to the code are summarised here for completeness and 
reference back to chapter 5 is recommended to identify the changes. Lines 36 
and 37 tell the program to spread the probability removed from the node Heavy 
Landing (by manipulating the pre-node barrier) as per the ratio of probability 
spread of the historical data (see figure 8-1).  
 
Figure 8-1 - Information network with non-conditional probabilities applied 
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Line 32 then tells the program to step-by-step increase the proportion of this 
removed probability that is going to the nodes “Overrun” and “Other Rare-
Event” (therefore reducing the ratio that is received by the node “Heavy and 
Overrun”). This method looks at two different ways the error may migrate, 
therefore introduces the possibility of tracking error migration. As more data is 
collected and more relationships understood (and thus programmed into the 
network) so error migration itself may be modelled and predictions of exact 
migration pathways investigated. In addition this introduces a level of cost-
benefit analysis since with the introduction of a barrier a best-result outcome 
may be observed if the error is equally split or divided based upon the 
probability of each node prior to intervention. This may allow for the concept of 
barriers being required further back in the network in order to control the 
migration of error and information flow in the newly manipulated network; this is 
an improved method above attempting to control outcomes since it is working at 
a deeper level. 
Since the probability of a nose wheel collapse is zero from the data used if an 
aircraft simply overruns the program can then predict the best outcome from the 
limited situation. Line 33 then tells the program to iterate the process of 
changing the probability of the node “Heavy Landing” occurring from 0 to 1 with 
0.05 intervals. This then gives the program all possible outcomes of 
manipulating the pre-node barrier. 
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Figure 8-2 - Screencapture of the modified MATLab code incorporating iterative loops 
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Figure 8-3 - Resultant probability surface for Bayesian iteration 
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Figure 8-4 - Line graph illustrates slight reduction of Pr(NoseCollapse) with iterative process 
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Line 67 then executes the drawing of a surface plot (figure 8-3). This surface plot 
illustrates the changes in the probability of the nodes “Heavy Landing” (x-axis) and 
“Nose Wheel Collapse” (y-axis) through the range of iterative spread of the probability 
removed at the pre-heavy landing barrier (z-axis). 
The surface is not uniform although the differences in this example are small. The 
slight distortion of colour of the flattened spread (on the left of figure 8-3) is due to slight 
deviations of probability reflecting a non-linear increase at different iterative stages. 
The black dot (on the right of figure 8-3) represents the actual AAIB data and the 
prediction of nose wheel collapse from that data in this network. Figure 8-4 displays the 
two ends of the flat surface as a line graph to illustrate the subtle differences present. 
The red line in the graph is the standard result of removing probability (from 0 to 1) 
from the node “Heavy Landing” and spreading it as per the ratio defined in the historical 
data. The blue line spreads the removed probability via an increasing share to the 
nodes “Overrun” and “Other Rare Event”. It can be seen that this second process is 
slightly more favourable (probably due to the nature of the probability of Nose Wheel 
Collapse post-overrun only events being zero in this data sample) as the graph begins 
lower on the y-axis and also the line ceases much earlier up the y-axis than the blue. 
The key potential of these graphs is that if the direction of probability (error) migration 
can be controlled (and for this reference back to the nodes within the network 
highlighted as being of importance (or related) is necessary) then instead of the error 
migrating as per the normal population of data it could be directed to gain the best net 
result for the whole network and not simply one event or node or barrier within the 
system. This removes any localised manipulation of barriers without due attention 
being drawn to the effects farther afield.  
The ultimate aim of this method would be to have highlighted an area of concern and 
then look at all possible outcomes of manipulating a particular barrier (in this case the 
pre-heavy landing node barrier). All possible pathways of probability (or error) migration 
are then identified and then additional manipulations can be carried out on additional 
barriers in an attempt to direct and control the spread of this migration towards the 
most positive outcomes identified on the surface plot drawn. 
Extracting this concept to larger more complex networks then, firstly it would be 
possible to identify links that will be affected by any planned change (or for that matter 
any changes noted in the recorded events‟ historical data) that would not otherwise be 
immediately obvious. Secondly, this can be taken further to attempt to identify whether 
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manipulating a barrier may in fact have an overall negative effect or too much of a 
negative effect elsewhere that the reduction it would give in one place is not enough to 
warrant the change. This overcomes the still current issue in industry of sticking-plaster 
remedies within complex systems. It is not a large step then also to develop the cost-
benefit analysis side of such a networking model.  
8.2.2 Further application 
The potential of this novel method as a way of not only understanding the system in 
which accidents are occurring but also of potentially beginning to control it is clear. 
Using the methods above the surface plot highlights the most positive possible 
outcome and then the information networks behind the plot highlight the nodes and 
links/barriers associated with such an outcome. Together these can be manipulated to 
reinforce the barriers preceding negative nodes and reduce the barriers preceding 
perceived positive nodes in order to gain an overall increase in positive outcomes. 
From the thesis as a whole it can be seen how, despite being based on General 
aviation, this applied to the type of method developed in chapter 7 for an airline could 
provide real cost-benefit application from a non-linear foundation and using incidents 
and accidents together as one source of data (the three thesis aims drawn together). 
There are, however, a number of obstacles (some of which are highlighted above) and 
further potential that can be identified as areas for a lot of further work in the future.  
It is possible to model non-mutually exclusive events within networks and also to 
include feedback loops and multi-layered networks but all of this requires much more 
data. The aim is to arrive at a comprehensive network that could show every possible 
result of changing a barrier (resulting in changing a probability) and then looking to 
expand the usability of such a network. 
Further studies are required therefore where the amount of data building and 
populating the information networks is increased. The number of CPTs required to 
populate the Bayesian information networks grows exponentially with the number of 
nodes included so this is not a small task. Traditionally, probabilities and changes to 
them are often control by subject matter experts (SMEs). As the field of Bayesian 
networks continues to grow there are also more opportunities to utilise advanced 
programming and mathematical methods to aid an information network model. Das 
(2004) has studied the application of algorithms to Bayesian networks (only in fault-
trees which is the current standard) and this has huge potential for this work. If there 
were adequately populated databases that recorded trends and historical data (such as 
those available in aviation) then Das (2004) argues that batch learning can be used. In 
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batch learning, the formation of CPTs is automated by advanced programs so this 
would overcome some of the issues of sheer size encountered by applying this 
approach on a larger scale. It is also possible to incorporate system learning into any 
large scale models. With further development, data from accident and incident 
reporting schemes can constantly update the probabilities and relationships of all the 
nodes present (Trucco et al., 2007). 
Even at this stage though, despite the results not necessarily being exact 
quantitatively, the information networks allow “relative” predictions. That is to say, 
whether manipulation at one point is likely to cause a related node to change a lot or a 
little and also in which direction. This is especially true once the networks model 
interacting relationships rather than solely mutually exclusive ones. The more data that 
can be used to populate these networks using the methods above so the more 
potential there is to predict accurately and usefully not just in terms of quantitative data 
predictions of node occurrence but also relationship data between links and nodes and 
barriers. 
For the initial analysis of the nose wheel collapse scenario the probability removed 
from the node “Heavy Landing” was redistributed as per the ratio of historical data. 
There is plenty of scope for further work in understanding whether this is a suitable 
assumption. Chapter 6 takes these data and attempts to validate the potential use of 
such Bayesian information networks using a flight simulator study. 
Once a comprehensive network is arrived at that is not the end of the potential with this 
method. One of the major benefits of using Bayesian mathematics as a basis for this 
model is that it was born of merging both quantitative data and also SME knowledge. 
As such there are several avenues of utilising the strengths of each in order to produce 
the most effective and comprehensive network methodology.  
Specialists can apply weightings to the Bayesian information networks in order to 
model known relationships that aren‟t identified purely with the historical data. This can 
complement the iterative approach outlined in chapter 5. SMEs can also begin 
weighting the strength of links (and intrinsically the barriers on those links) therefore 
giving the network the knowledge to show migration through weaker barriers‟ links. 
Finally, SMEs can begin to weight barriers and nodes in terms of cost, whether that be 
financial, to life or to brand image and publicity. In doing so, manipulating barriers 
within the network before the real world may elicit useful information as to the overall 
effect for the company/individual/operator and allow an informed decision to be made. 
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The approach at present is illustrated in a relatively linear fashion. However, the 
information network approach is far from linear and expansion of the topics discussed 
within this chapter to a full information network would overcome this initial limitation. 
The ultimate aim is to develop a 3D model which reflects more fully the real world 
accident system information space that is so often being misrepresented in current 
models. This addresses the first thesis aim; to improve upon the linear models 
dominating aviation safety with a non-linear alternative. 
The potential for use of these networks does not stop at GA though. Commercial 
aviation holds great repositories and databases of abnormal operation information and 
accident/incident data that could be used to populate information networks in order to 
learn about salient information and communication issues. An information network 
model using probabilities in this way, it is anticipated, would combine very well with 
current safety management systems in use through aviation today. By exploiting the 
ability of the networks to give some insight into possible migration effects post-barrier 
implementation, it may be possible to provide cost-benefit analysis of future changes to 
an aviation system. This addresses the second and third thesis aims; to develop a 
method that can transcend general and commercial aviation operations and to 
fully utilise incidents (or near-misses) in a way similar to accidents. 
8.3 Developments and directions for future work 
As stated in the thesis, and in this chapter, there is much scope for continuing work to 
develop the models and ideas that have been set out. The thesis has concentrated on 
several aspects of a whole new approach to understanding aviation accidents and the 
recombination of these, although central to thinking throughout, will be the continuing 
goal of this work. The ultimate aim of this work is to move towards a 3-dimensional 
multi-network approach to illustrating and understanding the system in which events 
are taking place. Through the work of this thesis, this goal is much nearer and yet there 
is a need to identify some complex work ahead. 
The synergies that exist between the chapters have been loosely highlighted in the 
chapter signposting and a key central thread to the thesis. Figure 8-5 illustrates 
aspects of the ultimate reintegration of all the facets set out. 
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Figure 8-5 - 3D depiction of a portion of the information network and a single barrier 
There is no escaping the complex nature of the world in which aviation accidents take 
place. Therefore, any method attempting to understand and investigate these must by 
its very nature be complex. A number of information networks as used throughout this 
thesis can be linked together so that they stack on top of each other. Links would 
therefore exist both intra- (grey arrows in figure 8-5), and, inter-network (white arrows 
in figure 8-5). These links may have barriers, and/or positive factors, associated with 
them (brick wall in figure 8-5). Due to the nature of the networks, more than one link 
may lead to the same node but via very different pathways often being affected by 
different barriers and factors (depicted by some links passing through, whilst others 
pass around the particular barrier pictured). In addition, each node may have many 
links emanating from it. 
The work through this thesis has centralised barriers affecting the flow of information 
around the system. By focussing on these barriers many of the limitations of non-linear 
models can be overcome. Significantly, by concentrating on the barriers, the event 
itself becomes secondary and the issues of classification (or even whether the event 
has a positive or negative outcome) are avoided. This strengthens the network 
approaches ability to understand a system comprehensively and reap the benefits of 
incident and positive reporting for the future. Within the approach, a single barrier could 
be identified as having links from several networks with very different predecessor and 
successor nodes. This model makes clear that any changes to that barrier may have a 
far reaching effect on nodes (or even networks) not originally intended to be 
manipulated. A comprehensive network will draw this information out and through 
iterative processes and quantification, predictions can be made. In this way a complete, 
holistic and comprehensive analysis of barriers can be effected. Only then can the 
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strength and importance of a particular barrier be fully understood and any action taken 
to modify or reinforce it. This is the basis for full a cost-benefit analysis type approach. 
Methods such as Bayesian mathematics allow for some prediction of the nodes and 
barriers that will affect each other and which of these is critical.  
Ultimately this method can be developed to identify the severity or likeliness of a node 
occurring (or barrier failing). Nodes can be colour-coded as incident data is continually 
entered into the model to reflect the current true state of safety and risks to the system. 
Through highlighting the bottlenecks and potential failures of information flow, the 
network model can alert safety managers of impending issues. Further than this, the 
same method, when applied to specific accidents, incidents or positive outcome 
events, can elicit specific details about the flow of information and communication state 
of particular areas of the system. Together with the ability to apply metrics highlighting 
key information processing nodes, such as sociometric status these attributes mean 
that the information network model has the potential to be used in almost all aspects of 
system safety. 
In addition to these future developments it is a continuing aim from this thesis work to 
ensure the successful integration of a non-linear model to the airline‟s SMS. As 
identified in chapter 7 the current stage is just one in a long line ahead. Working with 
industry has its benefits and restrictions so it is important to be realistic in short 
timescale improvements. However, the movement towards the common goal is 
significant and work will continue in partnership. 
8.4 Closing remarks 
Setting out on the journey that this thesis represents there was such a large subject 
area to be explored and understood. Focussing ideas to a central theme and set of 
aims or objectives took time and a sense of realisation that the issue of aviation 
accidents will not be solved in one attack. However, it is hoped this thesis at least 
demonstrates the passion that is felt for further understanding of the complex system 
as a whole and the movement away from artificially isolated and restrictive approaches. 
There is no doubt that the more complex a method the more often it can be passed-
over by industry in particular. The fact that a developmental stage towards a 
comprehensive complex method has been achieved in an airline and their enthusiasm 
for the model underlying it shows that industry is keen to move on also. 
This thesis represents several years work towards what can almost be described as an 
infinite goal; the improvement of aviation safety. I feel certain that this thesis has 
moved the theory and application of complex methods forward. As such methods are 
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further developed and applied to more situations and across more domains so the real 
benefits of a data-harvesting, self-populating 3-dimensional system safety model will 
increase. 
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